Interview with Morris Draper

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MORRIS DRAPER

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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[Note: This transcript was not edited by Mr. Draper]

Q: As we do with all these interviews, Maury, perhaps we can start with a summary of your background.

DRAPER: I came from as family whose members had often served in the military—my father was a general—or in other forms of public service. During my young life, I traveled with my family from military post to post, but we always kept a home in California—first in Berkeley and later in Los Angeles. My mother was California-born. I went to school in California most of the time and went to the University of Southern California after a stint in the military, during which I was assigned as a chemist to the Manhattan Project in Los Alamos—1946-47. In fact, I worked there as a civilian, after my Army service. Then I went to College. By that time, I had decided that I was not good enough to make a career out of science and began to focus on international affairs in which I always had an interest. I concentrated on history, economics, international political science in my undergraduate years and was planning to go to law school. But after graduation, I discovered that with a wife and new born child, I couldn't afford law school and took some Federal Service entrance examinations, including the Junior Management Intern and the Foreign Service

tests. In those days, the Foreign Service entrance test took five days plus a half day Saturday morning for language examination.

Later that year—1952—I joined the State Department as a Junior Management Intern in the Civil Service, which was a fast track route. I was assigned to the Executive Secretariat where I had a splendid job with impressive responsibilities. In the meantime, I had been informed that I had passed the Foreign Service written examination, but because of budgetary problems and because of “Wristonization”, the oral examination was not given until 1954. So I wasn't appointed to the Foreign Service until 1955.

Q: Maury, this might be good time for some comments on the State Department of the 1952-55 period. You arrived just as the Eisenhower Administration was beginning its regime and you were part of the State Department's “front office”.

DRAPER: I began in the period of change of Administrations. We were very busy because transition papers were being prepared. The incoming Republican Administration was very suspicious of the Acheson regime. But Acheson was widely admired by the rank and file of the Department. I recall on one cold day in January shortly before Inauguration, Acheson came out of his office and spoke to the employees about the need to give the new team the benefit of their expertise. He reminisced about his own career, its triumphs for which he thanked the Department's and the Foreign Service's employees.

Then Dulles came in and some of the people he brought with him were very suspicious of the Foreign Service. McCarthyism was peaking at this time with a lot of debate about “who lost China and why?”. There were a number of spy trials at this time as well—the Rosenbergs in particular—which created an atmosphere that is hard to believe now in retrospect. At the time, it was dividing families. I was very much aware of all of this and very concerned about it, but I was excited by the work I was doing in the Executive Secretariat and by the people I was working with. They were mostly Foreign Service and I admired them. Mostly male but included were some first class women. We were

exposed to senior officials because of the Secretariat's work. As you know, the Secretariat is a paper mill which operates along military staff concepts. It assures communications to and from the top, carried out with speed and efficiency and high standards. It also required us to take brief assignments as special assistants to senior officials. I had one such assignment as special assistant to General Bedell Smith, who was the number two in the Department—then known as Under Secretary. I went to overseas meetings and conferences primarily to handle the required administrative support Secretariat-type chores.

Q: What was your impression of General Smith?

DRAPER: He was an exceptional personality with a great sense of humor, but an absolutely ferocious temper. He could be devastatingly sarcastic. One time, we were together and he was talking about extremely stupid events. In the middle of this conversation, he stopped and said: “Speaking of extremely stupid, get me the Chief of Protocol”. People feared his temper because he wouldn't tolerate anything below superior performance. In that respect, he was very much like Kissinger. He would tell people to go back to the drawing board and draft something better. But he was also a cautious man with great ties to Eisenhower—he was much closer to the President than Dulles was. In fact, I suspect that was the reason he was appointed to the Under Secretary's job. He had been the Chief of Staff during the invasion of Europe and then Ambassador to Moscow and the head of the CIA during its birth. Those experiences gave his words particular importance. He argued for example against American support of the United Nations, not because he was opposed to it in principal, but because he thought we were not good enough to handle these things. We couldn't keep a secret, for example and there were a number of other reasons. He was very sick much of his time in office; he was in pain quite often during the day from the illness which eventually killed him. He enjoyed working in his garden far more than he did in the Department, which he considered an awful bureaucracy.

There were others who joined the Department who had first class minds. People like Bob Bowie who headed the Policy Planning Staff. Throughout the Department there were some incredible people whom I got to know and admired greatly.

Q: Was the Department work a little better during this period than it did later on ?Did the military style that was introduced bring some order to the process?

DRAPER: Secretary Marshall brought the Secretariat concept into the Department, based on his experiences in the military. At the time we are discussing, the Department was considerably smaller than it is now. It was easier to handle; the span of control was not huge. Oddly enough, many of our overseas posts were more heavily staffed than they are now. There was a different set of rules governing the process. We had large AID missions overseas; many at posts which no longer have them. We were adequately staffed overseas for the needs of the times. In Washington, a different kind of spirit was, and indeed still is, required. You have to know how to defy the bureaucratic odds. You know what you have to do when you walk into a committee meeting. The secret of Washington lies in the saying that “he who writes the first draft of a memorandum wins the battle”. In later years, I would tell younger officers that you had to make a game out of the Washington scene so that you could enjoy it. But you learned a lot of things. Once, when the Indochina episode was coming to a head, Douglas MacArthur III, then the Counselor of the Department, was sending out a major instruction to the field with the approval in principle of both the President and Dulles. But he wanted to also have the approval of such officials as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (the Assistant Secretary was traveling overseas). It was my job to get those clearances. In the Pentagon, you can always find the Chairman. Even if he were traveling, he could be reached by phone. The military were always good about taking care of their commanding officers. But the acting Assistant Secretary for FE was a bachelor. I called his home and the man-servant answered that his boss had gone off for a weekend in the forests of Virginia. He hadn't left word how he could be reached because he was

camping. So I called the White House telephone operators and told them my problem. I said that the issue was critical and that the man had to be found so that I could talk to him. The White House operators have always been famous for their resourcefulness. Within an hour, they had gotten in touch with every Park policeman and every Ranger in Virginia and sure enough, the man was found. He got to a concessionaire and called me on the phone. I explained what the situation was and got his clearance. I sent the cable and then I went to MacArthur's residence in Georgetown, where I was met by Mrs. MacArthur, the daughter of Senator Alben Barkley—quite a personality in her own right. I was feeling pretty good about the success of my efforts. She mixed me a drink and I told Mr. MacArthur what had happened. MacArthur, after I told the story, turned to me and said: “Maury, if you ever let that son of a bitch out of your sight again, I am going to emasculate you with a rusty pair of shears with nicks in them”. So you learn a lot on the Seventh floor of the Department.

Q: Before we proceed, let me ask you about an experience you had with Henry Cabot Lodge.

DRAPER: It was on D-Day Anniversary during the Eisenhower administration. Eisenhower wanted to send an emissary to the celebrations and selected Henry Cabot Lodge, who had been a colonel during World War II. Lodge hesitated about accepting the appointment. Finally, the President called Doug MacArthur, then the Counselor of the Department and my boss. He asked MacArthur to resolve the problem. MacArthur was a friend of Eisenhower and Lodge. So MacArthur called Lodge and after a lengthy conversation, found out that Lodge was concerned about being upstaged by all the military brass who would be at the ceremonies. So MacArthur worked out an arrangement so that Lodge would only be escorted by WAC soldiers, who would not be allowed to wear campaign ribbons or other decorations. That seemed to satisfy Lodge, but just before taking off for France, Lodge made another request: that all the women soldiers be ugly. Upon receiving

assurance that it would be so, Lodge finally went to the D-Day celebrations.As you can see, Lodge had a huge ego. By the time, he retired, he had calmed down considerably

Along the same lines, I was present in 1954 in Caracas at a scene at the Hotel Tamanaco where an Inter-American conference was taking place. The Tamanaco was in the form of a pyramid and had twelve or thirteen floors. At each end of the pyramids, there were beautiful suites. That was just about right because that configuration could just about accommodate the Prime/Foreign Ministers of the various American states. Our Secretary was Dulles, but he stayed at the Ambassador's residence. But Lodge showed up one day, after the conference had started—in those days conferences would last a couple of weeks, not like today. In any case, Lodge decided that he wanted one of the special suites, even though he was only our Ambassador to the UN and not a Foreign Minister. Nevertheless, he was a Cabinet officer. The hotel management went bonkers; they were having enough problems as it was. Finally, a compromise was reached: on the top floor, there was a Foreign Minister who was interested in being viewed favorably by us Americans. So he gave up part of his suite to Lodge; the hotel management broke down walls, put up new ones, painted them all so that Lodge could be accommodate. He didn't have one of the special suites, but he did have a suite on the top floor. He wouldn't stay at the Ambassador's residence because there he would have had the third bedroom; Lodge was something else.

Q: You said you were very much involved in the Indochina crisis. What was your perspective?

DRAPER: The Geneva Conference was supposed to settle the issues. It if course didn't. There were periods before and after Dien Bien Phu when Washington was in a crisis atmosphere not knowing what to do. There were people with varying interests and ideas. I wrote the records of a lot of these meetings, many of which took place at Secretary Dulles' home, when Radford and others would go over to visit him. They didn't have to worry about office atmospherics at Dulles' house. It was quite clear that Eisenhower would

be very, very cautious and would not be stampeded into any rash action. His decisions prevailed, but I was struck by the thoughtful way he arrived at the decisions. He was firm about them and although Dulles was probably disappointed by them, all the Cabinet were good soldiers and behaved. Eisenhower had to have an opportunity to examine all the alternatives and he did do that. Most of the Foreign Service people were quite pessimistic about the US's ability to influence events in Southeast Asia. Rob McClintock, who was our Charg# in Saigon, was probably the most pessimistic. He was also very effective, being very articulate, with a real gift for words. His cables were awaited every morning because of the interesting asides and humorous phrases and telling similes.

Dulles never care for McClintock; Dulles didn't have any sense of humor. They were also other people who didn't care for McClintock; I was one of his great admirers. There were a number of people who felt he was a more smart aleck than a statesman. He did have certain tricks. For example, he carried around a French Field Marshal's baton, which was needlessly insulting to the French. He always had his dogs. I always felt that to end of his life he was a great gentleman and a very generous friend and colleagues. It was not a universal perception. But there was no question that he had a first class intellect and abilities.

I always marveled that we got so deep into Vietnam even though the preponderance of the experts were pessimistic. After the Geneva Conference, in which all the Great Powers participated —including China and USSR— and which was supposed to settle all the problems not only of Vietnam, but Cambodia and Laos as well, was over, the experts had very little confidence that anything had been solved. In fact, Dulles was very reluctant to agree and in the end did not stay in Geneva for the final signing. He did not wish to be seen signing the documents. So he sent Bedell Smith for the last days of the Conference when it came to frantic conclusion with many of the participants not being fully aware of what was going on. I was struck by the Chinese in Geneva; they were afraid to talk to Americans, but Zhou En-lai was a forceful presence. He had a phalanx of something like eighteen interpreters and note-takers in all the plenary sessions. So the PRC had a

gigantic delegation—three rows of people madly taking notes of speeches being made in all different languages. We handle it much more economically; we had one man who allegedly could read lips speaking Russian and Chinese. I thought he was a great failure.

When the Conference ended, every one fled to the bathrooms, as is the custom for all conferences. That is followed by drinks or coffee. I found myself between Molotov and Zhou En-lai in the men's room.

Q: I recall there was a celebrated refusal by Dulles to shake Zhou En-lai's hand. Was that pre-planned?

DRAPER: I was not present at that time, but I do know that there was a lot of hostility. The Chinese wouldn't talk to us even when we made overtures. We did not have instructions to avoid the Chinese. I reported on all contacts with all delegations, including the Chinese. We had a procedural problem because we had to pick up papers from all the delegations when they had something to contribute. It was very hard to deal with the Chinese and the Russians. They seemed to be annoyed all the time. We had problems with the French who felt that they were coming in second. It was a peculiar conference. One of our chief delegates, U. Alexis Johnson, when in charge of our delegation would sometime read the newspaper in sight of all the delegations when something was being said that he didn't want to hear. That surprised me, but he did it ostentatiously to show his disdain. There were a lot of hard feelings.

When I got back to Washington, Robert Murphy, then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, called a big meeting with all intelligence agencies and the Pentagon present to discuss Southeast Asia in his office which was quite large. There were many people in the room. He then asked what should the US do now after the Conference. The Geneva accords would not satisfy American security interests. That is where we probably started down the “slippery slope”. People had ideas for clandestine programs. The main objective was not make things easier for the hostile regimes in the North to get a foot-hold in the

South. That started some of our dirty tricks activities. One of the experts, Paul Sterner, describing the differences between the Vietnamese of the North and those of the South—ethnic and religious differences, drive and determination. He made it clear that if we didn't do anything, the North would control the whole region. They were powerful people with a long record of domination. The American experts were generally very pessimistic about the future of South Vietnam and about altering the course of events. And this was in a period of elan in the foreign policy establishment which thought we could do anything. That feeling was not lost for a long, long time. In fact, it may have never been lost.

Q: Let me pursue this question of McCarthyism. How did you perceive it while in the Secretariat?

DRAPER: I was married and had a network of friends including people from other agencies, young lawyers, bankers. We went to parties together and saw each other frequently. We were all highly political and talked about what was going on. We of course discussed McCarthyism and what it was doing to society. We followed events closely with great fear. In the State Department, there was an intense dislike for what was going on. But people were not that intimidated that the issues were not discussed. People would say things to the Secretary and others; they complained openly that Eisenhower wasn't doing anything to shoot McCarthy down. When Cohn and Schine, McCarthy's investigators, went to Europe, a whole host of Ambassadors and other senior officials—both career and political appointees—went out on a limb and expressed their views. That was impressive. By this time, it may have been that McCarthy was beginning to start on the down-side. It is now hard to believe that we went through this period in American history. We did and it was certainly a phenomenon that is now hard to grasp. My mother-in-law was one of McCarthy's strong supporters. She had lots of company.

Of course, a lot of things had happened after World War II. We couldn't believe how many traitors we had—people that sold out. There was a feeling in the State Department that a lot of people were crypto-communists—e.g. Alger Hiss, whose legacy stayed with us

for a long time. Most of the American public didn't understand Dean Acheson. He was a minister's son—part of the establishment. People couldn't believe that he would say of Hiss that he was not going to turn his back on him as a matter of personal loyalty and creed. Acheson was tremendously admired within the State Department for being brave enough to say such a thing. There was some feeling that all of the uproar would come to an end, although there would be a lot of damage in the meantime. This is why a great many younger people of my age group left the government, left the State Department. Every one —about thirty individuals—from my entering Foreign Service class—December 1954—left the government, most of them within four or five years of entering it. With some it took a few years longer, but they all left; I was the only one remaining after about ten years. Of course, my class was somewhat peculiar because it had been put together at the last minute. In fact, we are the only entering class without a class photo. We were put together because the management wanted to start a new class of entrants. All of us had passed the examination at least two years earlier and were therefore employed and had started our careers. With the long recruitment gap, the training program had fallen in disrepair and therefore much of our training was haphazard. The training was three or four weeks at the most over the Christmas period. We all had assignments before we began, unlike the normal practice of making assignments half-way through the course. I was one of the few who was already acclimated to the Department.

Q: Your first overseas assignment was Singapore where you served from the end of 1954 to 1957. What was the situation in Singapore when you arrived?

DRAPER: Singapore was going through a transitional period from being a crown colony to independence. The British were moving the process on stage by stage still controlling foreign affairs, defense and police. They were setting up a Parliamentary political system. They were nurturing it very carefully and cautiously. They institutionalized the judiciary as is their custom.

It was a tricky period for a number of reasons. There was an insurrection in Malaysia which spilled over into Singapore. It was led primarily by Chinese communists; it was a major uprising which brought large numbers of British forces to the area. It took them years to get the situation under control; in fact, the insurrection was never really brought under control; it eventually just petered out—the leadership lost heart. The Chinese were getting a lot of support through Thailand from mainland China. The insurrection was a real threat to British control as well as a threat to stable regimes in Malaysia and Singapore. Singapore was 85 percent Chinese and Malaysia was largely Malay. The people of the peninsula were trying to decide how to shape the future of the two entities with people preferring a larger federation for economic reasons and because Singapore was so important to Malaysia as a port. Others were concerned that the ethnic and religious differences between the Malaysians and the Chinese of Singapore were so great that federation would create major problems. The British felt that the Malaysians could never compete with the Chinese, which was true. There were many comments, some pejorative, about the energy levels of the two peoples. They didn't really get along together very well. The sentiment was in favor of giving the Malay something of their own; the British were sympathetic to this. It didn't work out well at all for a few years. In the meantime, traveling in Malaysia was quite dangerous. There were road blocks everywhere. The terrorists were going into Kuala Lumpur and other cities carrying out bombing attacks, making things miserable, interfering with commerce. Some of this activity spilled over into Singapore. While I was there, there was a major riot, considerable number of killings, including an American journalist. The rioters began to lose respect for the British force, as represented by the Ghurkas. One British officer made a terrible mistake by withdrawing the Ghurkas from an exposed position. This gave heart to the rioters, who had never seen the Ghurkas retreat.

I got to know quite a few of the politicians. The society was very open; the politicians and the budding leaders of all the parties wanted to be in touch with the American representatives. I used to play golf with Lee Kuan Yew who was then the leader of the

People's Action Party. He was considered by the British as a crypto-communist or worse. He was really something else— a very impressive person. He had his own agenda. We knew that he was going to either succeed or be killed. He manipulated the forces around him with great skill and daring; this included a very radical segment of his own party, which was anti-British, anti-American, anti-everything, but had the ear of a large share of the population. It was a tricky period. Self rule was not satisfying most of the people; they wanted to move faster. The British supported David Marshall as the first Prime Minister, who, interestingly enough, was Jewish on his father's side, but with Asian blood as well. There were a lot of mixed-blood people in Singapore—the mixed parentage off-springs were the handsomest people in the world. We were all concerned with the causes of instability in places as Indonesia, which at the time was in chaotic state with 90-100 million people. Thailand was outwardly peaceful and attractive, but they had many serious problems and needs. Even then, all of Indochina was considered a potential powder-keg. China was 100 percent hostile to the United States. The British were losing their influence in the area. There was a lot of anti-western feeling in the subcontinent—Burma, India. We had major security interests in the Philippines and Australia, which was not that far away. We formed SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) which a lot of us could never understand. I was in Washington in the period when Dulles wanted to proceed with these alliances which he hoped would stabilize the area. SEATO was one of the most artificial arrangements of all.

Because I had been in the Secretariat and knew something about Southeast Asia, I was called while in Singapore to attend the first session of SEATO in Bangkok which was very interesting exposure to that part of the world. The whole arrangement was so artificial that the delegates might well have wondered what it was all about. We had a palace assigned to us by the Thais, but it was open air. There was a big round table and the setting was beautiful. Unfortunately, the birds would swoop down on our papers and do their business on them. We brought in secretaries from the Armed Forces to take notes, which turned out to be a complete failure because they didn't understand all the funny accents being

spoken. It was one disaster after another. The Thais were so gracious and charming. Anthony Eden was there and he was often disliked by other delegates for essentially good reasons. On one hot day, he got up, languidly stretched his arms and said: “It is too warm here. Let us all take off our coats!”. It was a perfectly sensible idea and so the Westerners took them off. The then Prime Minister of Pakistan was wearing his tunic; it was very plain without insignias. He didn't want to take the tunic off. Finally Eden said: “All the rest of us are shedding our outer-wear. Why don't you join us?”. So finally the tunic came off slowly only to show an absolutely filthy undershirt. Eden was never forgiven. You have to be careful about all kinds of things.

I got a lot of sensitivity training in Far East. For example, one would not dare touch the headpiece of an Indonesian. There were a lot of others taboos.

Q: When you were in Singapore, the Suez crisis, the aftermath of which you spent your career on, was developing. Did that have any impact on our relationships with the British in Singapore?

DRAPER: Yes, indeed. The British had major military forces in Singapore, particularly naval. “God Save the Queen” was still being sung in the movie theaters, despite all the protests by the Chinese and others. At the end of the Suez affair, in 1956, when the US position became clear, the British troops, officers as well as men, became very hostile to Americans. Many long standing friendships were broken. I remember that a British pilot stopped talking to me and my wife because he was so upset. I also remember watching Anthony Eden on newsreels; he was shaking as he announced that the British would have to leave Suez. He had fallen apart. How a politician allowed himself to be photographed in that condition was remarkable. I learned later that the British position in Singapore got worse and worse in the aftermath of Suez. The word was that the British were leaving from east of the Suez.

Q: Tell us a little bit about the staff of the Consul General in Singapore, which was known as a first rate organization.

DRAPER: We had a very large staff, especially in the economic and commercial side. We had a major CIA station in Singapore; we had military attach#s and a modest military assistance program in Malaysia. We were well staffed. Elbridge Durbrow was the Consul General; he was known as a trouble-shooter; he was very able and gave the staff considerable leeway. He was very good with younger officers; he encouraged them to make contacts; he used them without regard to rank or age. I was busy all the time, even though it was small area of the world. The development of the contacts was an interesting experience; people were eager to have them, even if it was from a junior member of the staff. We did a lot of entertaining. On the economic side, contacts were even easier because all the business people wanted American investment. Americans were just pouring into the area, despite the instability, because they could see the future. The banks were doing very well; they had partnerships with Chinese bankers. If the area didn't go to pieces, it was bound to boom. Electronic factories were being established even then. The area had a labor cost advantage to start with and then Lee Kuan Yew talked about a positive investment climate. He promised he would try to maintain stability. They were booming times. While I was an economic officer during the first year of my tour, I got all sorts of correspondence from Washington and all around the globe. People couldn't believe that the future could be as bright as I was painting it.

America was known for its “can do” spirit. The quality of our businessmen was very good. In retrospect, I remember far greater language capabilities in the business community than I found later. They spoke some of the dialects. There were a lot of oil company people with interests in Indonesia, Brunei. Few bankers spoke Chinese, but Malay was well known. Malay is not a tonal language; its syntax has similarities to English and therefore was not too hard to learn. You could learn a pidgin Malay and get by in large parts of the area. Despite the threats, therefore, it was boom period and those who wanted to take risks had

plenty of opportunities. Many did. Our oil companies were extremely active considering the instabilities and threats in Indonesia. They moved ahead and explored where they could. There were a lot of problems living in Indonesia; people had squatters' rights and if they could come into your house at night, they couldn't be moved out. There were little revolts in Sumatra and Java all the time.

I can't say that I was astonished by happened later, but those of us who felt that Lee Kuan Yew would be a force for good, were satisfied with the direction he took Singapore. Singapore is essentially a great success; he changed the mores of its citizens in the process. He of course was working on a good base; Singapore was a boom town from the day it was founded in the 19th Century. The city was in a perfect location at one of the busiest crossroads in the world.

Q: Then you were assigned to Baghdad in 1957. That this comes as a surprise?

DRAPER: Not really because I had indicated that I wanted to take Arabic and specialize in the Middle East. I was first assigned to Kuwait to see whether the Department would be making a wise investment if I were to go to Arabic training for two years. I learned when I came through Washington that it was to be Baghdad instead. I was not assigned to the Embassy, but to the Baghdad Pact Secretariat. As it turned out, I and my family were successfully indoctrinated into the Middle East and later went to Arabic training in Beirut.

Q: Tell us a little about how you saw events in Baghdad and Iraq before the July 15, 1958 incident. But before we get to that, perhaps you might tell us what your assignment in Baghdad was?

DRAPER: I was seconded to the Baghdad Pact Secretariat, just as officers are seconded to the international organizations, like the U.N. I was a political and economic officer, who designed projects for the organization's use. I also acted as a secretariat officers during conferences, which I helped organize and monitored. I was usually the reporting officer for major conferences. The Pact staff preferred to have all records in English, although Arabic,

Farsi and Urdu were used. The Pact organization was an international one; the US was not a full member of the Pact, but rather an associate member. It was very questionable whether the Pact could survive; the British and the Turks wanted it and the Iraqis were the first to join it with the West. By doing so, that laid the seeds for its demise because Nasser and other critics of the regime used Iraq's membership in the Pact as evidence of that regime's pro-West position. Iraq was painted as a satrap of the imperialist powers —"lackeys" of the imperialists.

Iraq itself had pluses and minuses. Among the positive features were the Iraqi development program; they were devoting some 85 percent of their oil revenues to social and economic development and not to the military. You could evidence of this investment all over the country. There were massive dams, new highways as well as schools and housing programs, resettlement and development of agriculture. We had a large assistance mission and other countries also had assistance programs. The development experts were over-joyed with what they were seeing. There was visible evidence of development with considerable governmental support with almost unlimited funding by the standards of the day. So there were some real enthusiasts in Baghdad. Not only did development influence new infrastructure, but also new ways of life. Clean water was brought to rural villages and schools to people who had never passed fourth grade. There were a lot of changes being made. The society was a very interesting one; even in those days, it had a large percentage of college graduates; there was a major university system influenced by outside forces. The Jesuits, for example, ran a major college in Baghdad with professional schools which were beginning to give Ph.D. degrees in some of the sciences. By and large, the monarchy was benevolent even though there was a powerful and large security apparatus, which did not touch, however, the rank and file of Iraqis.

On the other hand, I have never seen any place with so much random violence. It occurred day and night. Taxi drivers would hit each other; policemen would cuff children; a lot of killings. It was unusual because in most of the Arab world there is very little violence

because of revenge. In Egypt, there is practically never a murder. But in Iraq it was constant and in terrible form.

There was still a Jewish community in Baghdad; some were quite well off. During the first week I was in Baghdad, the patriarch of the community was stuffed up a fireplace. There was a lot of that sort of violence, particularly between religious groups. The Shi'as, who were the majority, would hold one of their religious holidays, violence would break out and there would be demonstrations. The Sunni, who were the ruling group, did everything they could to humiliate the Shi'as in all sorts of ways. They would call dogs “Ali” or “Hassan” who were the Shi'as main prophets. Then there were the Kurds. I got to know quite a few of them. Many of the Christians who lived in my neighborhood were strongly opposed to the regime and it would not be uncommon for people to be put in jail, have relatives tortured and be challenged in various ways. There was a lot of resentment brewing against the dynasty among the educated; there was a pervasive opposition to the remaining forms of British colonialism; for example, there was considerable resentment of the British Ambassador, who sort of operated as if he were a pro-consul. So there were a lot of seething under-currents. I would say that in the Western community, —the British, French, Italians and others—, there was a feeling that Iraq would come through its travails quite well because they were spending money on social services; they were not trying to build up their army—in fact, they were keeping their military services deliberatively small—; many institutions had been established by the British which had been maintained—there was even a minor kind of representative assembly, which followed the dictates of the ruling group, but was nevertheless symbolically important. There was even an embryonic beginning of political parties. A couple of our Embassy staffers thought that the regime was living on the brink of disaster, One assistant military attach# predicted correctly that a revolution or an outbreak would occur in the summer of 1958. Another officer, a member of the United States Information Agency, from his contacts with journalists and the art community, also predicted an overthrow.

Iraq was an interesting country. The position of women was quite modern for that part of the world. The first female doctor to operate in the Arab world was an Iraqi woman. Iraq had a major thriving art colony. The Iraqis were not sold on all Islamic tenets which why is why they permitted the human figure to be represented in art.

Q: Who was challenging the regime?

DRAPER: They were many secret groups in the military in particular. Many were followers of Nasser of Egypt. There were nationalists who felt humiliated by what had happened to the Arab world in 1948 and 1956—the wars against Israel. Of course, the Iraqis had a long standing tradition of opposition to anyone in power. It took the British a couple of years during World War I to get the Iraqis under control. In World War II, Iraq was the scene of a rebellion and provided sanctuary to the violent anti-British, pro-Axis Mufti of Jerusalem. So Iraq had a history of anti-attitudes. When the revolution occurred, it took place because the Prime Minister—the strong man—let down his guard for the first time in his history and allowed a unit of the Iraqi army to move through Baghdad along with its ammunition trucks. This is the first time such a thing had happened in forty years and that army unit immediately proceeded immediately to the radio station, to the Prime Ministry, the information department and the Palace and took over.

Q: How seriously did you take the Baghdad Pact?

DRAPER: I didn't think it would last. I saw a lot of weaknesses in it. There was a lot of make-work. But I liked being assigned to it because I was exposed to the top leadership, including Presidents and Prime Ministers of many of the countries that belonged to the Pact. I was going to conferences in England, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and of course in Iraq. I was getting familiar with the area. I got to know some of the young people —e.g. the deputy Minister of Health and a rising star, who later became Prime Minister in Iran and was one of the modern influences there, although later overthrown. I watched these people and how they reacted and worked. I saw Harold MacMillan, who had become

Prime Minister in Great Britain. I not only saw these people in action, but in the case of Iraq and Turkey, I saw people who were part of transitional societies. When I first visited Iran in 1957, was still eliminating malaria which had in some parts of the country kept its birth rate down to zero. The results of malaria eradication was a population explosion which creates dilemmas. I saw people developing their countries facing huge problems. Turkey was a basket case in some ways, but you had to admire some of their efforts to modernize.

As far back as the mid-50s, you saw emerging the first signs of Islamic fundamentalism.

Q: What are your views about why Iraq joined the Pact?

DRAPER: The leadership felt very vulnerable and felt that the association with Western powers and Turkey and Iran would be a stabilizing element. However, in retrospect, most observers of that period find it hard to understand why Iraq joined the Pact. The establishment was very subject to British influence and control and wanted to do the right thing. The “right thing” includes being a “Western gentleman”. Nuri Said, as portrayed in Lawrence's stories, after destroying a train, marched into the baggage car and immediately took all the caviar and champagne. He and other Arabs had the desire to show that they could have been part of Western society as well.

Also the Hashemite rulers felt very unsafe on their thrones. The British had put them there; they had drawn the borders in irregular fashion. The oil boom was just beginning to cast its influence on Iraqi life. A country which is moving from a Third World status to the next higher step is always subject to instabilities. New classes of people come forth and others get left behind. In addition, you had groups such as the Kurds who would not buckle down to anyone; they still won't. They wanted their autonomy and their way of life, their culture and language preserved. Neither the Turks or the Iranians or the Iraqis have been able to subdue them. The Middle East is fundamentally a mosaic of all kinds of races and

religious, who in most cases are very proud and nationalistic. The Christians in Iraq are a major force and have been a major source of US immigration over the years.

There are a lot of interesting aspects of this. We had among our Iraqi employees a preponderance of Christians—something like 95 percent. We wanted to hire others, but could not get as many Moslems as we wanted to. Very few Shi'ans would work for us. A young, able, educated Shi'a could find more attractive opportunities elsewhere. He didn't have to be disloyal to his society or community by working for us. So we had a preponderance of Kurds, Assyrians and Sheldigans. That was not a good practice. In a later assignment, Jerusalem, it was hard work to get an ethnic and religious balance, but we had to do it, even at the cost of keeping on the payroll people who were not necessarily qualified.

Q: What was your impression of the King?

DRAPER: The King was very young and weak. His uncle was generally considered the mastermind. There is a general weakness in the Hashemite family in any case which shows itself in various ways. The revolutionary group found a lot of photographs of the King in compromising homosexual positions. They used those photographs to great advantage to convince the conservative clerics especially that the monarchy deserved to be overthrown. They also hurt King Hussein of Jordan because he couldn't mobilize support for the Hashemites as he wanted to do. So in the end there very few tears even by the former supporters of the monarchy.(Nuri as-Said was another was another matter. He was well respected). The King was clearly out of touch. I would occasionally attend the Assembly which was almost a joke. Nuri would not permit any opposition or criticism in public and he used rather ugly means of controlling various groups. A critic stared to speak he would be drowned out by cat-calls from Nuri's faithful. The Assembly was largely a facade. Nuri was an old man by this time and didn't interest himself in day-to-day developments. He didn't have his finger on the pulse. But he was recently austere; he was not a disgrace. When the revolution occurred, he disguised himself as a woman

and survived a couple of days before they caught up with him. He ended in a rather violent death, being dragged through the streets.

Q: How did you evaluate the Ambassador and the Embassy?

DRAPER: There was a division in the Embassy between those who predicted an early over-throw and others who felt the situation being relatively stable. The Ambassador, Jack Jernegan or his predecessor, Waldemar Gallman, was undecided. Some of the senior officials were far too complacent. They seemed that way even at the time. They were out of touch. A lot of us younger officers felt that we had a better feeling for the society because we were out in the country side, talking to everybody from archeologists to reporters to soldiers to shop-keepers. Some of our senior officers only talked to other diplomats or senior Iraqi officials of the establishment. They were never seeing a cross-section. That is always a danger for senior officials anyway. They didn't take trips and see the whole picture. We of course saw it more clearly when the revolution came. You wonder why one didn't see it sooner. But it is very hard to predict such events in some societies. For instances, if an American goes into a market and gets spit on, you know something is brewing. But in many cases, as diplomats, you live a protected life even when we are strolling through the market.

Q: Tell us what happened on July 14, 1958 and thereafter.

DRAPER: Said allowed an army division to move through the town for the first time. Baghdad is like Paris in that if you want to get from one part of the country to another you have through the city. This time the division was allowed to carry its ammunition with it. So it took over the government at about 3 or 4 in the morning. Many including myself heard firing; that was not uncommon in Iraq, but this sounded somewhat more intense. Many of ours were awake. I was to take an Iraqi airline flight to London later that day for a conference. One of my colleagues drove out to the airport thinking that if there had been a revolution, the airport would have been taken. Strangely, it had not happened for

many hours. So he returned at six a.m. and drove into the Embassy driveway, when his car stalled. A stray bullet had gone through his radiator and the water had run out. All our normal contacts were unavailable or hard to find, but much of the Embassy and the Baghdad Pact Secretariat felt that something was going on, although none of us were sure what it was. Most people thought it was another palace coup which probably would not succeed.

In any case, I went to the airport and I tried to find out from people I knew there, including the pilot of the plane, what was going on. There was military presence at the airport. I had driven near the Presidential Palace, but by this time all of the killing had taken place. So I got on the plane to London. After an hour, while flying over Turkey, the crew came back and explained that they were being ordered back to Baghdad, but the captain refused to do so. He wasn't sure he would survive if he returned. He didn't really know who they were. General Sararef who led the rebellion was not well know in Iraq; no one was quite sure what would happen. It could have been a plot inspired by Nasser, but no one knew. In London, there was a major meeting of Prime and Foreign Ministers and others including MacMillan, Dulles and Menderes of Turkey. Iran was there but no one from Iraq. There were a lot of intelligence people because at that time there was an informal network of intelligence people from Iran, Turkey and Israel. That dissolved in that year. By the end of the first day, it was pretty well agreed that the coup had been successful and that the old establishment would not survive. The question then arose as to what to do about the Baghdad Pact. Menderes felt strongly that it should be preserved and in the final analysis, the decision was reached to maintain the alliance without Iraq. Its headquarters would be re-established in Ankara as CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). It was essentially a decision to save face because everybody knew and almost admitted in so many words that the organization was just a facade. But the Turks felt very strongly and also the Iranians felt that you needed a bulwark against the Nassers of this world.

All Embassies in Baghdad were still operating and sending communications about what they saw. They described what had happened—the rioting. When you organize for a

crisis you can collect considerable amount of information on personalities. By that time, we knew which army division had been involved. All our military attach#s knew what the division size and strength was. We had learned a lesson when Nasser had come to power because the group of officers who took over the Egyptian government did not reveal who the true leaders were for a long time. We didn't know for about six months that Nasser was the genuine leader and that Naguib was only the nominal leader. We learned our lesson from that. So by the end of the first day, we were pretty certain on what had happened and who was in charge. There was never any question of intervention. The only question to be resolved was what to do about King Hussein of Jordan. We felt that his regime was threatened and that was one of reasons later on, in connection with the Lebanon issue, that led the British to send troops to Amman.

Q: There was a story about one of our officers trying to get his family out. Can you tell us that?

DRAPER: That was horrible. He was a communicator and came to duty early in the morning, about 5 or 6 o'clock. He heard the shooting and decide that he better return to his house to get his family. They lived across the river close to the Presidential Palace area. So he did that, collecting his wife and three children and as he was driving back to the Embassy in his car, he had to cross a bridge that had been bombed in the fighting then going on. The traffic was stopped all of a sudden; he heard rumbling and soon he saw a huge crowd trying to cross the bridge leaping from car to car. They were dragging with ropes some people they had killed. So the crowd jumped on his car, hundreds of them, smashing it. The kids had a picture of sheer horror and the family was thoroughly frightened. Scenes like that were repeated regularly and went on for months and months. Property was destroyed, usually by younger people. We evacuated all Embassy dependents; the Embassy was taken over by the Iraqis. They did not occupy the building, but had a tank out front pointing its gun at the building. They were obviously trying to intimate us; they tried to stop us from communicating by radio. They generally harassed us. We decided we just couldn't keep the Embassy at the size that it was; so we

evacuated a good number, including myself. I joined my family in Athens and waited for the Department to send me to Nice to study French. When the new class started, I went to Nice and was there about three months brushing up on my French. Then I returned to Baghdad, this time as a political officer in the Embassy, starting in the summer of 1959.

Q: Let me return to the question of the Embassy's evaluation of the situation prior to the revolution itself. You mentioned some division among the staff. Please expand on that theme, if you would.

DRAPER: The number two in the Embassy derided some of the ideas of the junior officers, when they reported that trouble was brewing in Iraq. He refused to believe it and was very insulting in staff meetings when he would shoot down this theory. He of course turned out to be wrong. The more junior officers had been prescient. He was also remarkably insensitive. After the revolution and the Iraqis were harassing us; they surrounded the Embassy and caused all sorts of problems. When our dependents were leaving, the Iraqis were particularly difficult, trashing suitcases and behaving in a very hostile manner. They were atrocious to the women and children.

In any case, the number two lived in a large house on our compound, separate from our chancery and the Ambassador's residence. Many of our Embassy people had crowded into the chancery, sometimes living in very close quarters, eating out of cans and have rare showers; nevertheless, the number two man and his wife lived in lonely splendor in their house, living as if nothing had happened. They showed absolutely no interest in the rest of the staff; it was an appalling show of insensitivity. Fortunately, there aren't many of that type in the Foreign Service. The number two job in Baghdad seemed to be held by a succession of people who seemed to be made of the same mold. The predecessor and his wife of the person we are discussing used to inspect the fingernails of the Americans coming to their parties.

We had a competition early in my career to see who was the worst wife in the Foreign Service. There were a lot of candidates. One lady won hands down.

Q: You mentioned that the Iraqis were giving us a rough time and that the American community was barely hanging on. Tell us a little more about that.

DRAPER: The Iraqis allowed us to collect basic economic information—the status of the oil industry, etc. Beyond that, they were very tight lipped. Essentially, they tried to isolate us. We couldn't routinely go to the Foreign Ministry to discuss events. To get appointments with some of the new Ministers was essentially impossible.

The Iraqis were driven by anti-Western, anti-American sentiments and a healthy dose of fear. Their security apparatus was all over the place. The Iraqis have always behaved this way. After they broke relations with us in 1967, the same thing happened; not until 1982, did we have genuine exchanges. I was the first senior American official in Baghdad who received an invitation to meet the Foreign Minister. They liked to keep us isolated. It was very, very difficult. It was like living in an Eastern European communist state. It is very hard for Arabs to isolate someone. They are normally talkative, lively people; even the Iraqis. So it is not normal for them to isolate others.

Q: The late 50's were the heights of the Cold War. Was that reflected in Baghdad?

DRAPER: Back in 1957, we had joined the Baghdad Pact. Eisenhower had convened the Richards Commission, headed by a distinguished Congressman.

That Commission had some objectives and lots of money. The main objective was to form an anti-Soviet coalition; the Eisenhower administration was very fearful of the Soviets, stemming in part from the assistance the Soviets were providing Egypt. The Richards Commission was designed to build at least an informal coalition. He went to many countries, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and others—even Lebanon. The Commission led to many “understandings”; it later became evident that Richards had

set the stage for our 1958 Lebanon intervention, among other. Essentially, however, the Commission was a failure. The forces of nationalism were far more significant and the Soviets had hitched their wagon to that drive, taking advantage of it. They listened to these Arab states and provided them arms and propaganda. Those of us who could separate our policy from ideology had another kind of fear, which had permeated the Middle East experts for many, many years. The Middle East was an area which could have been the battleground for a Soviet-US confrontation. Russia was close to the area; both countries had a lot of clients in the region. Our worst nightmare was that we would plunge into this confrontation; in fact, we came very close to it in both 1967 and 1973 when the Soviets had decided that they would have to help their Arab clients and we had decided that we had to defend Israel. It could have been the beginning of World War III.In light of that context, the American diplomats were both anti-Soviet and fearful of Armageddon. That was our worst nightmare. In fact, it was very interesting to become acquainted with the Russians at this time. Some were always trying to creep out from under their restrictions; some would try to establish dialogues. We did a lot of that. But the Iraqis were a different matter. Whether they were listening to the Soviets or for other reasons, it was very difficult to establish contacts with them. The Iraqi security people followed us on motorcycles all the time. We would go out to dinner and hear the noise of the cycles all the time. The followed us everywhere. It was worse than in Czechoslovakia.

Q: During this period, we sent troops to Lebanon and the British sent troops to Jordan. What caused that?

DRAPER: It was a confluence of events. The Lebanon situation was heading toward a denouement and Chamoun, the Lebanese President, wanted help. The British could be counted on to support King Hussein. The Washington perception which was shared in some other capitals was that Hussein would fall momentarily either by coup or other ways. There were plenty of coups plotters that were being uncovered. It was our feeling that we had to do something. Our show of force in Lebanon was just that; a show of force. It was remarkably successful. We have never had anything like that before or since. The troops

that came to help Hussein contained the situation in Amman; he was very close to the end —a misplaced bullet would have ended it all for him. It was a close call. But the show of force by the US military, followed by our quick withdrawal, combined with Eisenhower's 1956 stopping of British, French and Israeli attack to recapture the Suez Canal, made for a positive atmosphere in the Middle East, all things considered. It was an intervention, but of the most benign kind. It was the first time we had landed on a foreign beach with no casualties—Lebanese ice cream vendors meeting out troops. It would not have worked another generation later.

There was of course the question of Arab pride. Fortunately we had Robert Murphy out there as special envoy. He had some experience with Arabs in North Africa. He was able to patch things up in very short notice. Deals were made. It was one more piece of evidence of the essential truth of the Middle East: it is a bazaar. You have to know how to make a deal.

Q: What was the Embassy's assessment of who the people were who ruled after the coup?

DRAPER: There was a fight for power among those who took over. There were also other groups throughout the country who were vying for power, including the Baath factions. At the time, we had not quite focused on the character of some of the new rulers. They were erratic. We had difficulty therefore in determining our courses of action. In all cases, even a regime of a repulsive dictator, you should try to communicate. You have to establish something and know what direction the regime might be taking. That was very difficult in Baghdad. In later years, there were terrible fights and coups in Iraq at about the same time that the Syrians were going thorough their bloodless changes. The situation in Baghdad didn't settle down until about 1968 or '69 when the present Baathist party, aligned with the military, took control.

The situation was very unstable. I mentioned that the development experts were happy with the pre-coup situation in Iraq. The upheavals in Baghdad brought the whole program to a halt. Major development programs were abandoned for few years. The money went to the military forces. The Iraqi had 70 divisions facing us in “Desert Storm”. Prior to the military take over, there were something like 6 divisions.

The Iraqis kicked out Parsons and Co. and the other major construction firms that were working in the country. They treated Parsons so badly that the company said it would never return. People were arrested, jailed and tortured. Plans were discarded; a lot of dumb things happened. We had an experimental farm testing dry soil farming, managed by one of our universities, which the Iraqis completely destroyed. There were something like twenty generations of plants growing; that was a life-time's work.

The new rulers were a combination of pure thugs and some ideologues. One of the first things the revolutionary group did was to give all the students passing grades from high school on up, regardless whether they took a test or had done acceptable work. The students were demanding it. They were demonstrating in the streets all the time. That is sort of self defeating, but it is what happens. The regime was appeasing one group after another. People did learn to survive under this stress, even when a new security apparatus was installed with new rules. Groups vied with each other; in the military, there were wholesale retirements and discharges of officers who were viewed as disloyal. The same process took place in Egypt, except there it was done without violence. When there is a change of government, even in democratic states, different leadership emerges; in Iraq and other dictatorships, there are continual changes as stronger and stronger leaders emerge and succeed each other. Saddam Hussein himself was preoccupied in the early years in trying to bring Araf down. He was the bully for his cell of the Baathist party. The party was organized in cells in the same way terrorist organizations are. This means that sometimes a cluster of cells can organize and not have the slightest idea what other clusters might be doing. I don't think what happened in Iraq is necessarily a model for any

other revolution, including what might happen there in the next few months. After all it took about ten years for stability to be restored in Iraq. By 1968, the Baath party, together with the military was in power; interestingly enough, it was Saddam Hussein and others in the Party who re-embarked on the development track with some success. There have been a lot of Iraqi achievements that have been commendable. All, of course, has been destroyed in the last month or so.

For example, the Iraqis decided that they should have an agricultural infrastructure as good as the one that existed some four thousand years ago. So they gave some incentives to over a million Egyptians to farm in Iraq. They set them up on farms; the Egyptians were good farmers and they helped the Iraqi economy to a considerable extent. Now most of the Egyptians are gone; the farms undoubtedly lie fallow and the Egyptians will probably never return; they will have lost confidence. But there were major changes in Iraq since 1968 that were positive.

Q: So the US role following the 1958 revolution was just a holding operation in a hostile environment. Was a new Ambassador appointed?

DRAPER: Gallman was there during the revolution and was succeeded by Jernegan. Jernegan was a very savvy officer; a good stabilizing force. He was more engaged than Gallman. Jernegan was a real student of the area and very much engaged. He had the ability to get information from his staff.

Q: After Baghdad, in 1959, you went to Arabic language training in Beirut. Was this at your request?

DRAPER: Yes. I had shown an interest in long-term Arabic training before. This was one of the reasons I had been assigned to Baghdad—to see whether I could survive in the Middle East. A lot of people changed their minds after serving a tour or two in the Middle East. So when my tour in Baghdad came to an end, I went to Lebanon both for

language school and to attend certain classes at the University of Beirut in Arabic culture and history.

Q: Arabists have been the focus of much attention in the American media and other circles. Could you describe your training a little and tell us a little about your colleagues? I am also interested in your attitude toward the Arab world and Israel at the time you went to school—1959-61.

DRAPER: The term “Arabist” is often used in a pejorative sense by Israelis and by journalists of all nationalities. The term implies that students of the Arab world are single dimensional in their views of the Middle East and are automatically hostile to Israel and at the same time automatically sympathetic to all Arab views. Some of the people trained as “Arabists” were if not hostile of Israel, certainly skeptical. There were many that to the end of their careers were always critical of American policy towards Israel. But this point of view was changed radically when people like Roy Atherton, Joe Sisco, Hal Saunders became leaders of the Near East Bureau. They and others just would not tolerate any one sided view of either Israel of the Arab world. They insisted on a balanced position. They actually got rid of people with a one sided point of view. This did not mean that there was not room for sharp debate about Israel or any other state, but one's position had to be defended objectively. Their views created a more balanced policy. So today, I would say that it is not possible to advance in the Middle East Foreign Service ranks without being balanced and objective.

Q: When you entered the Middle East group, were you aware of the importance of American domestic politics in the foreign policy of the area?

DRAPER: Yes, indeed. That is true still today. It is very easy to dismiss some one's views by saying; “Oh, he is an Arabist” or “he is anti-Israeli”. That is very unfair, but it does happen. This phenomenon must be watched carefully. Israel has a large constituency, far beyond the Jewish community, which is all-encompassing. There are some fundamentalist

Christian groups which are probably more united and vocal in their support of the concept of Israel than even the Jewish groups.

There is another thing that has changed the views of the Arabists and that was the 1967 war. It was the almost universal view of all who had served in the Middle East that the Arabs had made colossal mistakes and miscalculations and deserved to be beaten by the Israelis. The view that the Arabs had only themselves to blame for their 1967 debacle was very strongly held.

Q: How was the Arab training program?

DRAPER: It was both good and bad. A new director was assigned when I was half way through the course. He changed many of the exercise materials, for the better in my point of view. His changes greatly improved the training.

One of the problems is endemic to all language training. At some time during your training, you reach a certain plateau of competence; getting to the next one is very, very difficult. Beirut, as a locale for studying Arabic, was too competitive; there was more French spoken in Lebanese society than Arabic. English was also widely spoken. So it was not easy to immerse oneself in Arabic. The British tried to get around this problem by setting up their school in a little mountain village where Arabic would presumably be spoken all the time. In fact, over the years, the villagers became almost fluent in English. So Arabic training in Beirut was a problem. But on the whole, the training was good. It could not compare with the discipline exercised by our FSI instructors in Spanish or French training because Arab has more dialects and other vagaries, but the training nevertheless was reasonably good. The studies at The American University were excellent; they gave us a chance to explore other facets besides language. You can go stale just repeating language exercises for eighteen months.

Q: What was your view and that of your fellow students of the Arab world at the turn of decade of the "60s?

DRAPER: We were seeing the oil revolution which was changing the traditional societies almost overnight. While I was in Beirut, we had opportunities to travel around the area —the travel was subsidized. This gave us an opportunity to broaden our knowledge. I saw the Gulf States for the first time. I saw Kuwait and what was going on with the transformation of a traditional society. There were a number of books being written at the time, tracing the changes in traditional societies in such countries as Turkey. Many of us saw the Arab world as promising ground for evolutionary change—modernization —while maintaining the best of their old traditions. We did of course note the occasional violence in that world. We detected underneath all the rhetoric certain sympathy, support and understanding for the United States. There were people who were very critical of our policies, but their view was not universal. In general we saw the Arab world as a promising environment to work in as Foreign Service officers.

Arabic is useful in something like twenty countries. Its roots are similar to Hebrew's, and Farsi and Turkish are also related, as well as Swahili in Africa. Later on, the Department began to assign some of the Arabic speaking officers to Israel to study Hebrew. David Korn was one of the first of those officers, and it became a regular practice; not only did the officer's breadth of view get expanded, but it also served in bridging the prejudice against the Arabists that some Israelis seemed to have.

Q: Your first assignment after training was Jeddah, where you served from 1961 to 1964. What was your assignment? And what were your observations of Saudi Arabia during this period?

DRAPER: Initially, I was the number two in the economic section. When the head of the section was re-assigned, I took his place as Economic Counselor.

Saudi Arabia was also going through a transition phase. When I arrived in 1961, King Saud had fled. The Saudis were experimenting with “popular” government during which people like Tariki was the oil minister. He was one of the first Saudi “moderns”. He went to American University where he specialized in petroleum engineering and the politics of oil. He had become quite a figure and a role model for many young Saudis who were not members of the royal family. The then Prime Minister was of course a Saudi Prince, but he was one of the “black sheep”. He wanted to bring Saudi Arabia into the 20th. Century more quickly. But there were problems. Some of the resources were mismanaged. While I was there, Prince Faisal took control in a sort of a palace revolution; he set Saudi on a course which it maintained for at least the next decade—more efficient management of the resources, which by then had become enormous. Faisal said there couldn't be modernization without secularization.

It was during this period, that the Egyptians had intervened in the civil war in Yemen against the Saudis, who had supported the ruling clan. So the country was going through some critical periods in the first part of the "60s. The United States was asked for support and we assigned a squadron of jet aircraft to Jeddah as a symbolic show of strength. We carried out some joint exercises, we stepped up naval visits and took some more actions of this kind to show that we would not stand by idly while the Saudi government and society were being shaken by threats from Egypt. It was a very interesting period.

Heath was my first Ambassador, but he wasn't there very long. The Middle East was not his area of expertise. He was followed by Pete Hart. Hart was a consummate professional. He had had long ties to the Arab world having been assigned to many key countries, particularly Egypt. He spoke Arabic well and studied it well. He was very serious about his role. He was a very effective representative of the United States.

Hart was a very methodical man. He cultivated the key Saudis and paid attention to the press—American, Saudi and foreign—without overdoing. He established a good working relationships with the Foreign Minister. At the time there were three capitols—Jeddah, Taif

and Riyadh. But only the Foreign Minister had permanent residence in Jeddah. The rest of the Ministries were in Riyadh. I spent a good deal of time just going to Riyadh because the ministries that I wanted to see were located there. Because I got to know Riyadh so well, when Ambassador Hart would visit there, he would take me along.

Q: What were your impressions of the various Saudi government officials you had to deal with?

DRAPER: They were absolutely top-flight in the Ministry of Petroleum and the Development Board, which was managed and led by foreign experts—Americans, British and others—but which had a good infusion of younger Saudis who had been Western educated and were very able and enthusiastic. Primarily, they were not members of the royal family; they were essentially young technocrats in their late 20's and early 30's, thrust into very important positions. Some of the old line ministries were not well staffed; they had some terrible people placed in positions of power through family connections or for religious reasons. The Education Ministry was dominated by a well-meaning man who belonged to the most rigid religious family which had been a long time ally of the royal family. So the strongly religious ideologues always got their grips on the Education Ministry—as is true in many Arab countries. But there were changes even there taking place; we encouraged them to develop school for girls—eventually even at the university level.Schools and hospitals were being expended all over the country. An internal transport system was being developed; roads were poor, but air transit was extremely popular and strained the budding Saudi Air line. So there were many changes, driven in part by the availability of oil money and in part by the influences of Western cultures.

In many ways, the Saudis handled this transition very well, in part because they had never been blessed by colonization. So they always had their self-respect and didn't feel inferior to Westerners the way some colonial peoples did who thought that the British were always looking down on them. But Saudi is still an exotic culture by any standard which caused problems. Every day life in Saudi Arabia was far less restricted than it is today. The Saudis

were open to westerners' approaches. There were parties and dinners with men and women mixing. My wife drove her car around Jeddah; not into the heart of the city, but she did drive which would not be possible today. The social engagements were lively—swimming parties, water skiing, lots of sports—with Saudi families which allowed their women to be shown. Today, I am told that there is nothing comparable. The Saudis have retreated to their homes and palaces. The role of the enforcers of “modesty”—religious morality—is far more conspicuous today then they were when I was there. The society has become much more conservative.

Q: As an economic officer, you undoubtedly had considerable contact with ARAMCO. How was it viewed during the early "60s?

DRAPER: ARAMCO's relationships to the Saudis was far superior to anything that British Petroleum, Getty and others were doing in Iraq and Kuwait and other places. In the first place, ARAMCO was very sensitive to Saudi's temperament and need for respect. Early on, ARAMCO had introduced Saudis into key technocratic positions in the company; the company was not proceeding along this line as rapidly as the Saudi government wished. There was a lot of mutual respect between the government and the oil company. The ARAMCO senior representatives in Saudi were first class. They saw to it there be established in ARAMCO an Arab Affairs Section, staffed with first class scholars and people with a feel for the Saudi culture and mentality. It also had excellent cartographers. They handled matters extremely well, despite the strong undercurrent of resistance to Saudis. It is clear that ARAMCO could have moved more rapidly on some of its efforts to bring more Saudis into the company. There was a “ghetto” mentality among many of the rank and file ARAMCO workers who lived in their compound and who resisted bringing “others” into their midst. For example, they did not allow the children of the American Consulate General to attend their school, forcing the US government to set up its own school. They didn't want to be associated, at least in Saudi's eyes, with the American government; they didn't want to risk being seen as an arm of our government.

But ARAMCO did set the stage for the eventual turn-over of the company to the Saudis. They managed to do that while protecting their interests very well. When the turn-over took place over a period of time, there was very little friction.

Q: What did the Embassy perceive to be American interests at this time?

DRAPER: First of all, access to oil. We would probably have been established by the amount of reserves and actual production that subsequently developed. ARAMCO was very closed-mouthed about the extent of the reserves, although from time to time some inkling would creep out, giving us some idea of how large the reserves really were.

We were not so much supporters of the royal family, but we did want to maintain a friendly regime in power. The ties that had developed in the "30s and "40s, despite all their ups and downs, were good. We wanted to deny Saudi Arabia to another power—not necessarily the Soviets, but other Arab powers that could be hostile, such as Iraq.

We were also interested in a managed stability which would permit American interests to continue to operate. We were seeing changes in the Arab world and we were encouraging some, but not at a pace that would shatter stability. Saudi was also a large land mass, a geographic cross-roads that had some importance to us—control of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. We were interested in seeing that American industry was getting a fair shake when it came to Saudi development programs.

Q: How was Nasser being viewed in the early "60s?

DRAPER: We saw it in some ways through Saudi eyes as a threat to the Royal family and the regime. We thought we had to help them, without micromanaging Saudi relations with Yemen, which was one aspect of the struggle against Nasser. On the other hand, we were not totally anti-Nasser. He did stand for some sort of modernization in the Arab world and reassertion of Arab pride. But to a Westerner, he was often a ridiculous figure—the long winded speeches which made him the Castro of his day. He had no business going into

Yemen using poison gas. His troops hated their involvement, but oddly enough he did build a foundation for later Yemeni modernization. He brought doctors and dentists and other skilled people and had in a curious way impact on Yemeni life which lasted even after Egyptian withdrawal.

Q: Were there not some arm shipments to the Saudi opposition?

DRAPER: There were some raids on a number of towns on the Red Sea coast. In fact, I was in Abha shortly after one of these raids on a hospital, but I don't remember any arm drops to Saudi dissidents. I believe that there was money being given to the dissidents and there were Saudi exiles in Cairo who were supported to some degree by the Egyptians. Nasser had built a tremendous intelligence apparatus, but it operated mainly in Egypt and was not that effective outside the borders. Saudis and others were always fearful of what Nasser might do to do stir things up. There were always threats on the radio. If Nasser had called for uprising against some of these traditional regimes and organized them, he might well have had visible impact. As it was, the traditional Saudis felt very threatened.

There were a number of Palestinians who had come to Saudi. Most of the teachers in Saudi had been Egyptians; they became viewed as foreign agents for Nasser. The Saudis made a deal with King Hussein of Jordan to screen Palestinians to insure that no trouble-makers would come to Saudi. When that was done, there was wholesale shift of personnel with the Egyptians being sent home to be replaced by the Palestinians. There were also quite a few Syrian professionals who liked the opportunity to progress in Saudi, which they could do more rapidly than in their home country. They also probably earned considerably more. The Saudis always had to import some professionals; for example, it was unheard for a Saudi to become a nurse—male or female. So all nurses were foreigners. It had only been a generation earlier that the Saudis had begun to go to medical school. So many specialists were imported. They were all screened for political leanings. By the time I left in 1964, the anti-Egyptian sentiment was very strong. Very few Egyptians came into the kingdom.

Q: What did you and the Embassy do to encourage Saudi use of American companies?

DRAPER: Pete Hart was very good at this effort. He felt very strongly that television could be a unifying element and a major educational tool. He talked to the Saudis about his concepts and that Saudis finally agreed. The Saudis were always concerned about fraud or being oversold by Western investors. There had been a history of bribery and corruption. So Hart brought in the Corps of Engineers which was ideal for Saudi's needs. The Corps managed the early development programs taking fully into account Saudi sensitivities—movies were screened to make sure that nothing too daring would be shown. They developed programs in such areas child care and public health. The Corps made an important contribution to Saudi development, which as in India, proved to be a unifying force. We had Americans in key positions on the Development Board and there were also many private contractors who gained the confidence of the Saudis. One example was the Bechtel Corporation. But there also fly-by-night operators who were primarily interested in making a quick buck.

It was during this period that we set up a commercial office in Jeddah separate from the Embassy. But as all other American establishments have found, it was very hard to recruit Saudis for middle and low ranking positions. A man of education who could speak another language or two, his opportunities were considerable and rewarding. So we always had problems with recruitment and had to rely from time to time on Palestinians, Pakistanis and other non-Saudis to do the work.

Q: What did you do about the fly-by-night operations?

DRAPER: Fortunately, there weren't many? The Saudis were very restrictive in their visa issuances. They also tended to be negative against Jewish owned businesses, although not Jewish doctors, oddly enough. That was a problem for us because we could not be seen supporting a regime that showed such religious biases. The usual route taken by the flight-by-nighters was through the cultivation of a member of the royal family. When the

Saudis would consult with foreign bankers or ARAMCO, they received very conservative appraisals and in many cases a negative appraisal of these entrepreneurs. But there were major American firms that were not at all interested in Saudi opportunities including enterprises that had been there before. For example, Carrier Industry; they wouldn't answer letters from Saudi, they would not repair machinery which they had sold and installed at an earlier time, they would not support their agents. I could never understand that attitude which I found disgraceful.

In a country, where the name of an automobile was automatically “Ford” because it was the first car to be seen in Saudi, American car manufacturers were paying scant attention to this great market. It was hit or miss approach. The Saudi loved to buy Cadillacs, but Americans failed to recognize what a huge market Saudi Arabia would be in a short time. The growing middle class, the Bedouins were all shifting to cars or light trucks. The first signs of Japanese commercial penetration came when the Saudis bought a huge shipload of small vehicles which became a tremendous success. The Japanese thereafter signed up agents right and left. Their cars met the Saudi demands: reliable and inexpensive.

Q: You left Saudi Arabia in 1964 and were assigned to Washington to the Personnel Office. What did you do there?

DRAPER: I was in charge of Foreign Service training and a counselor for political officers. It was quite a compliment in those days to be assigned to Personnel because you had obviously been selected by other members of that Office. It may still be considered an honor. The problem with the personnel system is that it is being constantly changed. There is a feeling even among personnel specialists that it is a good thing to shake things up every three or four years and that change is, by definition, good. At the time I joined Personnel, there had been a major reorganization under Bill Crockett, the chief administrative officer of the Department. The organization was still shaking out. The people I worked with were very good at working the system as it was in place at the time. They had learned how to cut corners to get what they wanted. It was competitive; there

were panel meetings once or twice a week during which assignments would be made. I found myself arguing with those who had to fill positions for keeping an officer out of a work environment for six or twelve months of training, which I thought he or she should have—anything from languages to extended training like war colleges. I had a very difficult time because there was tremendous pressure to fill empty positions. That pressure was very acute when family requirements had to be weighed. Rotations take place normally in the summer for family reasons, primarily schooling. But that is also the time when many of the training courses would begin. So I found myself in many competitions and I lost more battles than I won. Training was not considered by everyone as the highest priority. If there were a vacancy that had to be filled desperately, the answer would always be that the training could take after the next assignment.

In Personnel, you do learn what makes effective officers—how some are better than others in “shaking the network” tree, where aggressiveness pays off, etc. We had a particularly problem during my time because we had to assign officers to Vietnam who didn't want to go. Officers resigned or took steps to circumvent the process. We almost had to draft people and tell them that it was either Vietnam or they would have to leave the Service. We were pretty heavy handed. There was tremendous opposition to serving in Vietnam, not because of the danger, but because of the policy which was viewed very skeptically in the Department. Later on, a coterie built up around Phil Habib of people who had served in Vietnam. These officers were recognized by Henry Kissinger as very useful, so that many of people who served in Saigon did do very well and zoomed up in the Service in a hurry. They were given a lot of recognition.

Our problem with the assignment process in Vietnam was that most of our staff was being assigned to the provinces and not the Embassy. They were being sent as assistance specialists. Some did extremely well, despite their youth and managed large development programs quite well. They became enthusiastic. Others were assigned to various army groups and they were not too happy.

Q: You were also a "career management" officer. That called for a review with each officer on his past and potential career. What were your views of the process?

DRAPER: I enjoyed the job very much. The way the process usually started was that an officer would call on the phone and say that he or she would be coming to Washington from an overseas post in the very near future and that officer would like to see a career counselor. We would give the officer an appointment for a few days hence during which time we would review the file. I would look for patterns in the annual evaluation statements which would give me some clues as to the officer's strengths and weaknesses. That would give me an opportunity to review his or her career quite frankly with the officer. Then we would discuss how the assignment process worked. There were a lot of problems with that process. It was during my period in Personnel that some of the class action suites against the Department were begun. Alison Palmer, for example, was at that time seeking an assignment in Africa. It was really ridiculous. After performing quite well in the Belgian Congo, during its revolutions, she couldn't get another assignment in Africa. And this was after she took some training at the University of Pennsylvania. She was a first rate officer, but couldn't get an assignment, even in Ethiopia. It was terrible. We in PER sympathized with her, but just couldn't get her an assignment, despite our efforts. We just couldn't over-ride some senior Ambassadors who refused to have her or any women at their posts, besides secretaries. This was particularly true at dangerous posts.

A lot has changed since then. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs was far better than any of the other bureaus in opening positions for women even in countries with traditional societies. We have no problems in making these assignments. Assigning women to countries like Egypt was of course no major problem, but from early on, we sent women to Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait and the north African states. But the African Bureau was much more conservative. Alison Palmer was so indignant at the time and became very resentful of the system despite the efforts of Hep Funk, who was her counselor. But he just couldn't overcome the resistance. It made an antagonist out of what would have been a

very productive member of the Foreign Service. There were of course other prejudices and problems.

Q: Was the system relatively open, subject to competition or were there a lot of Bureau prejudices?

DRAPER: There were a lot of prejudices that were difficult to knock down. We were trying to broaden officers and to get them away from seeing repeatedly only one or to foreign cultures. We were encouraging broadening assignments. There was a lot of enthusiasm for this approach among some specialties. For example, morale was always high among the Russian language experts, but that was not the case among the Chinese experts. Of course, this was the period of high tensions between the US and the PRC and the officers didn't want to spend their time serving only in Taiwan, Singapore of Honk Kong. The Foreign Service is a pretty conservative organization and its members don't usually take a lot of chances. They are not adventuresome, at least not as much as they were when they entered the Foreign Service.

That is one of the reasons why you didn't get much inter-Bureau transfers. Furthermore, Bureaus were highly protective of their “stars” and fought very hard to keep them. There were other reasons. Crockett maintained that there was very little “selection-out”. So we worked very hard and tried to crack-down to increase the number of people who would be “selected out”. It was a terribly painful process and very unjust in many respects because the difference between the low and the middle level performers was so marginal and small. We tried to screen out any material that was prejudicial because of such matters as personality differences. We relied to a considerable extent on Inspectors Reports because often they were sent to a post to handle problem cases. The role of the counselor was peculiar because he or she had to let an officer know what was happening. It was often kinder to say to an officer that the future looked bleak—i.e. that there would no promotion until some of the black marks in the file were overcome—and he or she should consider resignation while still young enough to start a second career, rather than to be “selected

out". So most of the so called "selection-outs" were the result of counseling rather than of the formal promotion process. People retired or resigned rather than any formal action being taken. Nobody liked the process, but Crockett insisted. This led to problems like a suicide and a lot of broken families. It was counter-productive.

During this period, we lost a number of people to medical problems especially in Africa. The medical process was very inefficient. That problem was turned around very quickly, but it took some catastrophes to do it.

Q: As I recall, this was the period during which the Department for the first time tried to develop a professional personnel system, including such matters as an effective medical support effort. It was in these days that PER even began to consider career development including the preparation needed by an officer to reach a certain position several years hence.

DRAPER: That is quite right. We even proposed a track system which would include training which would permit us to make reasonable projection of an officer's career. We didn't have the rigid "cones" as we do now which was a God-sent in terms of flexibility. We tried to produce an officer with an understanding of more than one discipline—one that could handle both economic and political reporting, for example.

Q: But there was no great break-through on training. Training still took second place to other requirements.

DRAPER: That is true except for certain elementary programs which were absolutely essential. Training in world languages went on without serious challenge because we needed people with those skills. Training in certain administrative work, like general services, was imperative. During my stint in PER, Ambassador Reinhardt stimulated interest in economic training because he maintained that our economic officers were poorly equipped to analyze the world's economic and commercial issues. We began to send more and more officers to post-graduate economic work at various Universities, but

they tended to become lost at the end of their training due to competition. We developed a short course in economics at the FSI, which is still in existence today. It was a huge success right from the beginning and got a lot of interest.

But the real reason people went to training was not due so much to PER's efforts, but rather because of their own determination to get training. If a person wanted to go to Japanese language training, he or she took the initiative, he or she sought out the counselors, he or she wrote the letters. Then people paid attention. This was virtually the situation for all training. If the officer wanted training, he or she could get it.

Q: You left PER in 1966 and were assigned to be the Turkish desk officer. How did that assignment come about?

DRAPER: Although I had never served in Turkey, I was interested in the country. I had studied Turkey while in college and became interested. Originally, I was assigned to be the Iraq desk officer and in fact I served as that for a few weeks. But the Country Director for the area wanted me specifically for the Turkish desk. Essentially, it was the network at work and the Turkey assignment sounded more promising.

So I served on the Turkish desk from 1966 to 1968. Our major problem with Turkey came in 1967 with a new eruption of the Cyprus crisis. The coup in April, 1967 in Athens affected the Cyprus situation. Although I was the Turkey desk officer, I had to keep abreast of all that was going on in NATO and Greece. When the crisis became acute, I chaired the Task Force that was working around the clock in Washington. I got a lot of kudos for that effort.

Turkish policy was directed to prevent enosis—the union of Cyprus and Greece. After the coup in Athens, the Turks became very fearful that the colonels of the new Greek regime would try to take over Cyprus. The Turks, of course, had a lot of good reasons to be suspicious. In the days just prior to the eruption, Makarios (the President of Cyprus) himself had made some moves that aroused Turkish suspicions. So we had a full blown crisis on our hands. The Turks just went out of control. We sent Cyrus Vance who was

at the time Under Secretary of the Army as Lyndon Johnson's special emissary. Vance's assignment was to patch something together which would diffuse the crisis. That was the first “shuttle diplomacy” because Vance flew from Ankara to Athens to Nicosia and back again until he had arranged a deal. He had some help from the U.N. and others. It was a very close run thing.

The crisis of course made us very nervous because it involved two NATO allies. We had atomic weapons in Turkey—not in Greece at the time—and we were very concerned what might happen to the NATO alliance in addition to our bilateral relationships.

Q: Who participated in the Task Force and how did it work?

DRAPER: It was a model for subsequent task forces. We worked around the clock; I slept in the Department and was on duty all the time. To man the Task Force, we drew on people with some experience in the area. It became a clearing house for decisions. We coordinated the Department's relations with Defense and CIA as well as intra-Departmental relations between NEA, IO and other bureaus. This was the time when Turkey and Greece were still the responsibility of the NEA bureau; a few years later, that was transferred to EUR, which pleased both the Greeks and the Turks.

Our relationship with Turkey was essentially on an even keel. We had a State visit by the Turkish President in early 1967. We had a major military assistance programs in Turkey, substantial economic programs and a very large presence in the country, including “listening” posts, air fields and other facilities.The Turks were getting nervous about this large American presence and were cutting back on some of our activities, as they did from then on for several years. There was also a budding terrorist movement in Turkey—a dissident rebellion. Turkey was an important country to us, located on the border of the Soviet Union.

Q: Who was our Ambassador in Ankara while you were serving as desk officer?

DRAPER: Part of the time it was Parker Hart and it was very helpful to have an old friend in Ankara. We understood each other and I knew Pete's personality. he loved Turkey which he found much more fascinating than the Arab countries in which he had served. He wanted the Turkey assignment as the culmination of his career. Both he and his wife became Turkish enthusiasts in all their manifestations. They were great bird watchers; Turkey is a paradise for bird watchers. I found my two years on the desk to be very interesting with some significant developments occurring.

Q: Did you encounter the power of the "Greek" lobby in the US?

DRAPER: Yes, indeed. The American Hellenic Educational Foundation (AHEPA) was very strong, while the Turks had very little political power in the U.S. and not a lot of political sense. They didn't know how to make friends or how to cultivate Congress. The Turkish Ambassador for part of the time was skillful in the traditional, classic sense, but he wasn't very good at "rubbing elbows" or drinking with Congressmen. A lot of things happened that were near catastrophes which he didn't handle very well. I found the younger officers at the Turkish Embassy were very savy; they knew what had to be done. They did a lot of leg-work, talked to journalists, not with the skills of some other Embassies, but they were learning the process and more importantly, they were traveling around the country. For example, the Armenian community in California wanted to set-up a monument to their sufferings, which of course drove the Turks wild. But in the process, the Turks learned something about influencing public opinion and the innate good sense of people. In the final analysis, the city manager and city council of this small city in California, although they were of Armenian descent, decided that the dust they would raise wasn't worth the fuss—that all it would do was to re-fight and re-argue events that had taken place in 1916. So that their idea for a monument died by itself. There are always these kinds of problems.

The Greek lobby worked very hard on maintaining adequate assistance levels which was based on some formula which kept the Greek program in some consistent relationship

to the Turkish one. The Turks were good people to work with; they are reliable and good friends.

So I enjoyed my tour on the Turkish desk. I might just mention that in 1967 there was another Israel-Arab war which took me off the desk and on to a task force to deal with that war. It was over in six days. As I mentioned earlier, all of us so called “Arabists” agreed that the Arabs had gotten themselves into a mess. There was a series of miscalculations on Nasser's part. The Israelis were in great political disarray at the time and Nasser felt he could intimidate them. So he tried to close Israel's access to the Gulf of Aqaba by calling on the UN to withdraw from the Sinai. I am not sure that he knew what would happen, but one thing led to another and pretty soon he had a war on his hands. Both Egypt and Israel had the right to call on the UN to withdraw, but U Thant, the then Secretary General of the UN, pulled the UN troop out with “indecent” haste without trying to negotiate, which was his style, but for which he was roundly condemned—for good reasons. Then the problem became acute. Nasser was basking in the adulation of the Arab world and saw Israel in a terrible domestic political mess. But the Israelis pulled themselves together and formed a government of national unity with Dayan in charge of the war. The Israelis struck one morning at the airfields in Egypt and that was the end of the war. The Egyptian air force was destroyed and without air cover, the Egyptians were helpless. The Israelis over-ran them. It was a brilliant military campaign in every respect—land, sea, air. Other Arabs, including King Hussein of Jordan, made catastrophic miscalculations in part because they were deceived by Nasser into thinking that the Egyptians were winning the war. In the process, Hussein lost Jerusalem and the West Bank; his army was humiliated. All across the board, the Israelis were unbelievably successful even in the very difficult task of taking the Golan Heights, which was really a military feat. The Israelis deserved credit for their military prowess. They devastated the Arabs, comparable to what the United States has done recently to Iraq.

A year later, when I was assigned to Jordan, the humiliation was still present and showed itself in various ways. It took the Jordanians a long time to gain their self-respect.

Q: You were in Amman from 1968 to 1970. What was your assignment?

DRAPER: I was the Political Counselor and for part of the time, I was acting as the Deputy Chief of Mission, after our Ambassador, Harry Symmes, was asked to leave.

The country when I arrived was living under martial law, suffering from major economic dislocations, trying to absorb a new flood of refugees from the 1967 War. It was also trying to rebuild its army. El Fatah, headed by Yasser Arafat, had taken over control of the PLO. It had gained some prestige from its operation against the Israelis and it became a powerful force within Jordan—sort of a third force consisting of tens of thousands of armed fighters. They lived in Jordan and trained there. They swaggered down the street, behaving pretty badly in many respects. They controlled total areas of Jordan, including parts of the city of Amman. They operated their own system of justice; they constituted a powerful threat to the stability of the monarchy. They also were a target for retaliation from Israel for the raids that they engendered. In fact, one of the little known facts of this period is how often the Israelis flew strikes and dropped bombs on the outskirts of Amman. I remember one picnic we had in an apple orchard with some Jordanian friends watching the Israelis dive-bomb targets about a mile from where we were.

The Jordan Valley itself was practically empty because of the threat from Israel and because of the problem of getting water. The many development projects we had financed in the past were, if not in ruins, seriously underutilized. This was the richest Jordanian farm and it lay fallow primarily because the Palestinian resistance fighters were moving across the Valley and the River causing the Israelis to patrol the area and shooting at anything that moved. It was not widely known or reported that the Israelis killed some perfectly innocent people—landowners who would want to see their farms would drive in and be bombed or strafed by an Israeli plane. From the Israeli point of view, however,

since the area was controlled militarily by the Palestinians and since it contained only a few well known Jordanian army positions, everything outside those positions was hostile and therefore the Valley was a battleground. In the process, of course, the Jordanians lost all their banana groves, their vegetable crops and other farm developments which had been financed by the United States. The whole situation was a big problem for Jordan.

The major problem however was the one that got Harry Symmes kicked out of the country. He had been telling the Jordanians that they had to get control of the Palestinians or continue to be at the mercy of the Israelis and suffer from their retaliations. This was of course quite true, but the Jordanians didn't like to hear the lecture. There were other issues as well. The Jordanians for example were still shell-shocked from the war and their retreat. This syndrome manifested itself in various forms. We had an Assistant Army Attach# who had gone to the Jordanian equivalent of the War College. He was there when the war broke out. All his fellow students went off and returned two weeks later, dragging their tails. They didn't want to speak to any foreigner at that stage, particularly an American, because then they would have to admit to what had happened to them. It is very hard for an Arab to put someone into Coventry because they like to talk. So it took the Arab officers weeks, but gradually, they came out of their shell. This was just an illustration of a wider syndrome, particularly for the Jordanian military in general.

The United States had to put on a balancing act. On the one hand, we wanted King Hussein to be strong enough to resist the Palestinians and overcome them, if a threat developed. For that, he needed police weapons, weapons for his army, training, helicopters; he had very little money to pay for this equipment. The Saudis were not subsidizing him to the extent he had hoped; they were afraid of the Palestinian reaction. Our military equipment supply policies were limited by the efforts of the Israeli lobby. Throughout all of this, we were supporting the concept articulated in Security Council Resolution No. 242—”Territory for Peace”. U.N. emissaries and others were trying to get some life into the peace process. That was the major occupation of all our diplomats in Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. We were experimenting with new ideas, some of

which, such as a partial Sinai fall-back, were adopted by Kissinger later. We had our own emissaries coming to the region—people like George Ball, Joe Sisco and others, all with their own formulas. On the whole, they were acceptable to King Hussein, but they didn't get very far. He himself was preoccupied by the budding Palestinian threat. Then of course the Palestinian did challenge the King in summer, 1970.

That challenge took two forms. At one point, the Palestinians had become so arrogant that ordinary Jordanian citizens were being stopped at check-points; there was a lot of looting and robbery, some rapes, which is rare in Arab societies. The Palestinians had developed a state within a state. It was the way Lebanon became later after the Palestinian fighters fled to Lebanon from Jordan. They set up their own state within a state there as well.
In Jordan during the late '60s, the nominal peace was becoming more and more fragile because the temper of the Jordanian army was becoming increasingly anti-Palestinian. Many of the senior generals—Bedouins—were anti-Palestinian anyway and deeply resented the Palestinians' successes, especially in the economic sphere.

The tensions had been growing steadily toward the end of the '60s and early '70s.I myself was held captive by George Habash's Palestinian group for a couple of days in June, 1970. I had already sent my wife and children to Athens, knowing that tensions were building. My wife was getting very apprehensive. On the day of the incident, I was driving in the evening to meet a friend of mine, who was also a source, when I was stopped at a road-block. Unfortunately, I had a map of the area with me to help me locate this friend. This made the Palestinians suspicious; so they took me to one of their local hang-outs. It turned out that these fighters were a cell in George Habash's group—The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLA)—a part of the PLO network, but not in its main stream. Habash is a Christian and considered one of the more radical Palestinian leaders. So this cell held me for a sort of a ransom—they wanted King Hussein to dismiss the Army Chief of Staff and the head of the Intelligence Directorate. Both were outspoken foes of the Palestinians. Hussein was opposed to such demands. He said that if I wasn't returned right away, he would destroy that part of Amman where the resistance was centered. So I

was released in a complicated pick-up and delivery operation. The next day, real warfare broke out between the Jordanian Army and the PLO forces, mainly in Amman but also in some of the garrison towns in the east as well. This flare-up only gradually cooled down; during it more Americans were briefly taken hostage. In a very unusual occurrence, one American woman was raped. Some of the Palestinian gangs spilled over into the suburbs, creating great concern among people living there, including Americans. So we evacuated most of the Americans with the exception of a handful of Embassy staffers. We had to put people into sanctuaries, like the Italian Embassy. The Egyptian Ambassador and others provided sanctuary for some of our people. We worked through the Red Cross to get aircraft into Amman so that we could evacuate people. It was very touch and go. King Hussein was isolated in his palace with some of his entourage. None could leave. We couldn't communicate with each other except by talkie-walkie and an occasional phone. As these episodes do, they sort of die down; cease-fires were established and matters returned to something like normalcy. We brought some of the dependents back, but only after a debate in the Embassy. Some thought that this was the first stage of what would be a major show-down; others thought that peace would be restored for a while.

I had been assigned to Athens earlier in the summer. The crisis slowed my transfer. Henry Tasca, who was then our Ambassador in Greece, decided that he would not wait forever for me. Jordan was in such a touchy situation that Washington didn't want me to leave until my replacement had arrived. So came late August and early September and I still hadn't left Amman. So Tasca said he didn't want to wait any longer—it would have been a couple of months more because I wanted to take some leave after two years in Jordan. Of course, my wife was already in Athens, measuring our “future” house for new furnishing. Joe Sisco called one day and told me that he thought I should go to Ankara in lieu of Athens. I said fine and ended up in Turkey.

Q: Before we leave Jordan, tell me what your estimation was at the time of King Hussein?

DRAPER: We thought he was pretty wishy-washy much of the time. We had a lot of sympathy for him. He has always been a favorite of lot of Americans, although they at the same time they told jokes at his expense. We always referred to Hussein as the BLK (Brave Little King), which had a certain tone of disparagement. He was criticized in private for his colossal mistakes—e.g. the 1967 war. There were people who thought that he deserved the defeat he got. There was also the feeling that he might not be strong enough to withstand another challenge to his throne. We were constantly measuring the opposition and his own strength of will. Hussein is really a very attractive personality. When you talk to him, he fixes his attention on you. He seems to hang on every one of your words. He has a good memory for all that had been said; he is extremely polite and generous. Most American officials don't fall under his spell, but are attracted to him, especially when he is in an up beat mood. He tends to go through cycles when he is extremely depressed; then he isn't that attractive. His father ended up in a mental institution and one of his brothers, Mohammed, is also known for his erratic behavior.

Q: As Political Counselor, did you do a lot of "Hussein watching"?

DRAPER: Of course. One of my most important sources was the head of the Royal Court, who was a childhood friend of the King's and who became one of his closest advisors and remained so until a few years ago. He became Prime Minister several times since 1970. We watched Hussein almost on a daily basis. We were more worried about the challenges that were arising than we were about Hussein himself. We wondered whether the Army would stay loyal, because there had been mutinies in the past. The CIA people had particular good relations with Hussein and his entourage and with the Jordanian intelligence and military establishments. We had many good sources in other parts of the Jordanian world as well. But we had very little intelligence on the Palestinians. We had to rely on other intelligence services for assessments of the Palestinian intentions and strengths. That included the Israeli intelligence services as well as such services as the Kuwaitan. We put a lot of CIA resources into these efforts. There was a good cooperative

arrangement with the Jordanians. They kept us well informed on broader developments in the Arab world—e.g what was happening at Arab League meetings.

We were encouraging Hussein to contact the Israelis which he did. There was at the time a fair degree of exchanges. There were some face-to-face meetings between Hussein and the Israelis which we hoped would lead to some understandings and an eventual peace treaty. On many occasions, I heard Hussein remark about his respect for the Israelis and their achievements, although he feared them and hated their arrogance, as he put it. But he respected their achievements they had made in their land. He had considerable respect for the achievements of some of the individual Israelis. He thought that at some stage he could do business with them.

Q: Did you have any contacts with the Palestinians leadership?

DRAPER: At that time, we had more freedom to do so than we do now. Among those Palestinians we cultivated for example was Yasser Arafat's brother, who was the head of the Palestinian Red Crescent organization—the Arab equivalent of the Red Cross. The problem was that the Palestinians were afraid to talk to us, especially to the political officers. We were all considered spies. Some newspapers in Turkey had speculated that I was the head of the CIA Middle East organization and that, under cover, I was directing all CIA activities in the area—Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, etc. So I had special problems. The CIA station chief in Amman was very amused by all of this, but he also saw advantages of the situation. We were doing what we could to penetrate the El Fatah, but it was the Palestinians who really shied away from us—at least the ones we initially cultivated. There were of course exceptions, but in general, despite all my efforts, there were very few beneficial results—very little hard information was obtained.

Reporters and journalists such as Peter Jennings had the same problems. They would be brought to Palestinian training camps; they would take pictures of people charging bayoneting this and that and doing exercises, but they never really got a lot of useful

information. In fact, my days as a hostage were more revealing in some ways than I would have had ever suspected.

Q: Did you think that the Popular Front was a central part of the PLO?

DRAPER: The PLO has always been a very loose organization. El Fatah was more non-political than the rest. It was non committed to a definite ideology. Habash's group wanted a socialist state and had other agendas. Fatah was non-partisan in those terms which explains its success at the time. But these various PLO factions shared information and met in loosely organized meetings and talked one to another and maintained a certain loyalty to the PLO charter. It was advantageous to all to have this kind of relationship because a lot of money flowed through the PLO. If Habash had gone off entirely on his own, his source of funds would have been uncertain as he discovered a few years later when he had to become exclusively dependent on Syrian support, who would sometimes would make demands on him.

Q: Tell us a little about Harry Symmes' forced departure? First, tell us a little about his modus operandi?

DRAPER: Harry Symmes had been in the Middle East for a long time. He had been the Deputy Assistant Secretary in NEA before becoming Ambassador. He was a fine individual, but, as I learned only after my arrival in Amman, he was essentially a pacifist at heart. In World War II, he had agonized whether he should declare himself a conscientious objector; he finally decided to enter military service as an artilleryman, which caused a further problem because it made him slightly deaf—he couldn't hear certain pitches. There were some sounds that just didn't penetrate because some of the delicate mechanisms of his inner ear had been damaged by artillery explosions. In any case, it was very difficult for Symmes, as a pacifist, to recommend that more weapons be sent to an already heavily armed area, to deal with the Palestinian threat with military means—all the actions that are an anathema to a pacifist. Some of his personal views came out in, for example, his

hesitation to endorse military assistance programs. He would support them, but he had little enthusiasm for them. This lack was visible to many of the Jordanians. Harry had been one of the people who before 1967 who tended to downplay the influence of King Hussein. The Arabs have long memories for these kind of views.

As I mentioned earlier, Symmes knew what was going wrong. He knew that a serious challenge to the King was brewing and he thought he should warn the King of it, which he did. He told Hussein that he had to get control of the Palestinians and the border areas; he told the King that unless that was done, the Israelis would continue their retaliation and that Jordan would continue to suffer from these Israeli activities. Hussein finally became exasperated and sent veiled warnings that Symmes' lectures were getting out of hand. He sent these messages through the CIA chief; I got a very strong hint from one of my sources in the Palace. Finally, Hussein took action and although it obviously had not come out of the blue, Harry was very shocked. He was quietly told that he would have to leave; the Jordanians told him that they were not going to declare him persona non grata, although the King thought that that was what he was doing, although he wanted to leave Symmes some leeway. He didn't really want to have a confrontation that a PNG process would engender. Symmes was in shock; he really didn't believe it and then he wanted to negotiate for time.

[tape 4, side B. this stuck and is an attempt to reconstruct]

DRAPER: Henry Kissinger had noticed little signs that instinctively compelled him to conclude, I shouldn't have said jumped to conclusion, that this assassination was not bringing tremendous grief to the nation.

Q: Not like the death of Nasser?

DRAPER: No, that was more like the death of Kennedy. Kissinger was absolutely right, this turned out to be increasingly clear, although it was not that clear at the time. Of course many Americans had sort of betrayed themselves into thinking that because he was our

pal that all the Egyptians loved him. We may be doing the same thing with Gorbachev now [Soviet leader]. So Kissinger was right on the mark, and I can think of other instances when his instincts were so good. He is so quick witted.

Q: The people you were associated with were mostly Foreign Service, he did use the Foreign Service. This was not as we talk about today with Secretary James Baker who sort of has his own coterie.

DRAPER: Kissinger relied on the Foreign Service almost one hundred percent; he got on all right with political appointees and he had them in various positions, but his immediate staff, including some he brought over from the White House, were almost all professionals. He had on his staff a young person named Peter Rodman who later went on to think tanks and other such things. He attracted very bright young people, extremely bright, quick-witted people and people that tended to be socially conservative, politically conservative. He had a sprinkling of others; he had a special assistant who used to parachute on the weekends, so this was typical of people who worked for Kissinger, who throw themselves out of airplanes.

Q: Did you feel at that time, the emanations you were getting, that here we had a president who was very much a person who studied the foreign scene. Nixon felt that he, with a lot of justification, had a firmer grasp of foreign policy than did most of our presidents.

DRAPER: I came to Washington when Nixon was heading downhill, and there was a very painful transition period before Ford came on board. It came after Vice President Agnew was forced to resign, it was a pretty bad time. Then when Nixon tried to revive his fortunes with a trip to Cairo, and all those things, it was a difficult period, very difficult. Kissinger was one of those who was not losing his head, he was keeping his head above water, and at that time was certainly untouched by the scandal. It was like being in the eye of the hurricane, in a sense. Morale in State Department, despite what was happening to the presidency, under Kissinger was extremely good, extremely high. It reflected power, not

only power but leadership. Even though this was causing all kinds of problems for us in terms of diplomacy and our relations with other countries, but there was kind of a feeling that we were going to pull out of it.

Q: Then you moved over to become country director from 1976 to 1978. Looking at this list of names I can't think of a more god awful combination, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Talking about moving from the eye of the hurricane right into the hurricane.

DRAPER: The Lebanese were then going on as in the past. Jordan was a bright spot, but we were having our problems with Jordan for they were seeking more arms and more security vis a vis Israel. We were bumping up against the supporters of Israel in that respect. Our relations with Syrian were kind of interesting. This is another place where Henry Kissinger sort promoted a modest aid program. It was quite substantial. We had some interesting people in Washington who were content to go along with it, allotting money to Syria for behaving itself and holding to the withdrawal agreement. The AID people in the woodwork were making sure that no real money was being spent in Syria.

Q: The program was sort of a quid pro quo?

DRAPER: It was a quid pro quo for the withdrawal from the Golan Heights and the easing of tensions. This was pre Camp David. We were very interested in maintaining the relationship in preventing another outbreak. And we were kind of hopeful Assad was a pragmatist and that under certain circumstances he would work something out with the Israelis. Of course Syria was vitally concerned with stability in Lebanon. In the summer of 1976 we squared a three way deal with the Christians, the Syrians and ourselves. There was a lot of very interesting things going on and it is still true fifteen years later.

Q: What were our interests in Lebanon?

DRAPER: We had sentimental interests, the University of Beirut, it was a sanctuary for the Palestinians, was flashpoint that could explode between Israel and Syria and others into another major conflict in the Middle East. It was a source of great instability.

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This was a dramatic reversal of customary Turkish attitudes, so much so that the Chief of Staff of the Turkish army resigned in protest.

Q: What drives the Turks on this issue?

DRAPER: The Turks controlled most of the Arab world until World War I—the Ottoman empire. The Turks remembered this period from their parents or the parents of their schoolmates. The memories are not good ones. The Turks by and large detest the Arabs; they consider them uncivilized and refer to them as “flies”—you can't get them away from one's face. I saw a headline once in an Istanbul newspaper some years earlier which said: “Forty-five thousand dirty Arabs expected to visit Istanbul this season”. It is like “Those damn Yankees!”. The words “dirty” and “Arabs” just go together in the Turkish lexicon. There is also the heritage from the “Young Turk” movement. Ataturk set a foreign policy which essentially did not involve himself or the Turks and stayed out of foreign adventures. There is a phrase in Turkish which calls for peace at home and abroad. That was interpreted to mean that Turks would stay out of foreign affairs unless there was a threat to Turkish independence. So becoming part of NATO was viewed as a self-defense measure. Designed to defend Turkey and other European states from potential Soviet encroachment. That philosophy did not extend to other situations.

The Turks had retrieved some of their territory from Syria in the 1930s through negotiations; they did not pursue a possible and potentially respectable claim to Northwest Iraq which they had controlled in the Ottoman days. There were complicated reasons for this reluctance including the major Kurd ethnic minority which occupies parts of East

Turkey and parts of Iraq and Iran. Essentially, however, the Turks didn't want to get involved in intra-Arab squabbles. The sole exception was the Turkish membership in the Baghdad Pact which came from British wooing. Later, the Turks felt that they had made a serious mistake in joining the Pact.

Q: Were we involved in any of the various Kurdish uprisings?

DRAPER: Yes. I am very familiar with this issue because at a later stage in my career, I was in touch with the exiled Kurds—Barzani in particular—when they came to the United States. Kissinger had authorized support for the Kurds when they were rising up against the Iraqis at the instigation of the Shah of Iran who wanted to cause trouble for the Iraqis. It was a very mistaken policy because the Kurds depended on us for support and were shocked when it was suddenly withdrawn after the Shah and the Iraqis reached an accord on their border disputes. When the Shah reached agreement, he saw no reason to further support the Kurds and therefore we stopped our assistance. The Iraqi's, as soon as they could, started getting even with the Kurds forcing the leadership to flee. Many went to Iran where they were treated very badly by the Shah and the establishment. It was a very bad scene. It was one of those episodes of power politics which made many people very uneasy, which left a very bad taste in everybody's mouth. It is lesson in not giving aid and comfort to people unless it is for a long run. It is all too easy to stir up people—there are always dissatisfied people somewhere in the world—, but if you give them support, then you better consider the longer range implications, the reasons for the assistance and what the objectives—both short and long-term—are. In our case, we helped the Kurds for almost trivial reasons: to help the Shah because he was a “good” friend.

The Shah was considered one pillar of our “two pillar” policy in the Middle East. He was one of the bulwarks against the Soviets; he was one of the core pivots around which our policy circled. Some people in the US administration then in power felt that the Shah was almost indestructible—he had survived a number of assassination efforts; he returned to power after being run out of the country by Mossadegh. He was proud and confident.

Q: During the period 1970-74, did our Embassy in Ankara see the Kurds as Turkey's weak point?

DRAPER: The Turks referred to Kurds as “mountain Turks”. They were very embarrassed by them and gave them very little leeway. Kurdish was not taught in schools nor used as a language. The Turks really cracked down on them. The Kurds were always rebellious and in fact, Ataturk, as President of Turkey in the '30s, at one point had to send troops to get Kurds back under control. They have always been a restless minority, in Turkey or wherever they might be—Iraq, Turkey or Iran. The Turks always saw an unstable situation in Iraq as threatening because they feared spill over of population and troubles into Turkey. The same thing is true for Iran. There was a common understanding in the area about the Kurds and other ethnic minorities. Under Ozal, the current President of Turkey, some of these perceptions are changing. The Turks are reaching out to bring more Kurds into the political process in a natural way. There have always been Kurds in prominent positions in Turkey; some reached high ranks in the military and the government, but these have been exceptions. Essentially, the Kurds have remained a rural population, out-of-touch and insular, living a difficult life, a feared minority in a part of Turkey that has always been a center of smuggling among other activities.

Q: How was the Soviet threat seen from Ankara in the early '70s?

DRAPER: Turkey's ability to withstand a Soviet threat was based on its linkage to NATO and its large standing army. There was a belief that if the Soviets broke through for any reason, the Turks would retreat to their mountain passes and be able to hold out there until help would come. In the meantime, it was expected that the Turks would inflict a lot of casualties on the invading Soviet forces.

The US was prepared to consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons if Turkey were attacked. There was always some discussion between us and the Turks about the

possibility of using atomic mines. This subject was also an issue with the Germans, among others; the decision was finally made that these mines would not be used.

The Turks have historically been very hard on the Russians. They have always been determined to retain their integrity and independence. While I was in Turkey, there was an incident during which a Soviet citizen hijacked a Russian plane and flew it to Turkey. The Soviets wanted the man and plane returned; the Turks would not let the man go. There have been other incidents here and there of this nature in which the Turks took an independent stance.

Q: Did you feel that the Soviets were ready to invade Turkey during the early '70s?

DRAPER: No, I didn't, but many Turks did. They saw the threat as real. They also felt that if there were an East-West show-down, they would be involved. They were enthusiastic about planning. They also spent a lot of time considering counter-moves in the tank-country in the European part of Turkey. There is a pretty strong anti-Russian xenophobia feeling in Turkey going back to the days of the Mongol invaders. There have been many wars between Russia and Turkey over the years.

Q: Let us discuss Greek-Turkish relations which have bedeviled the US for so many years. How were they viewed from Ankara?

DRAPER: Of course, I had a good deal of experience with this relationship when I was involved with the Cyprus crisis as Turkish desk officer. Both Greece and Turkey behaved in highly predictable ways. There is a racial enmity between the two which is manifested in various ways. For example, if the Greeks decided that they wanted to carry out some seismological expedition in the waters between the Greece and Turkey, you could predict with complete accuracy what the Turkish reaction would be. Both countries took actions to challenge the other. You can blame both for the high tensions.

Nevertheless, there were a few efforts from time to time, encouraged by the US, to bring the two countries together on some understandings, particularly about Cyprus. There was a wide-spread feeling that if we could get the Cyprus problem into a negotiating process, then other pieces would fall into place because neither Turkey or Greece wanted to threaten their NATO ties. The continued enmity between the two countries was a terrific obstacle to the kind on intra-NATO cooperation we were seeking. We were not hesitant in expressing our views to both sides.

Q: From our Athens' Embassy view, it appeared that the Greek ties to NATO were strictly counterweights to the perceived Turkish threat. I gather that Turkey did not see it that way?

DRAPER: No, it didn't. The Turks felt genuinely threatened. The Turks have a great striving for acceptance which the Greeks never had a problem with. The Turks wanted to be accepted as Europeans and not as Anatolian savages. This view is a very important aspect of the relationship, although the issues of defense and security are the principal ones. The Turks would not have maintained such a huge army if they hadn't felt threatened. They also saw an opportunity to progress out of their economic backwardness. The Turks even then were active players in CSCE (Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe). Confidence building measures were being developed which might reduce the tensions between the USSR and the Europe.

The tensions between Turkey and Greece were exacerbated by the nature of the Greek regime—the Colonels. The Turks were very uncomfortable with a militarily dominated Greek government; they preferred a Greece ruled by democratic demagogues, if necessary, but not by the military.

Q: While you were in Ankara, Spiro Agnew, then Vice-President, came on a visit. Tell us a little about that.

DRAPER: I was kind of ashamed as an American by what I was seeing. When Agnew traveled, he traveled just like the President—same entourage, separate airplane to carry limousines, etc. It was a reflection of the Imperial Presidency which extended to the Vice President. It was a great contrast to the visits of other American officials, who were much more modest in their demands. Agnew insisted on knowing in advance his schedule, almost step by step. His advance people worked out with the Turks and others such matters as the length of the red carpet, where he turned, where he would speak. It was all very elaborate.

He moved mechanically after the schedule had been all checked out. It was like a ritualistic dance; there was no informality or change of plans. He did not make a terribly good impression, as I recall. Nixon did not visit Ankara while I was there.

Q: What was your next assignment?

DRAPER: I came back to Washington as a special assistant to the Secretary of State—Henry Kissinger. I was responsible for special projects—i.e. Kissinger's interest in setting up joint bilateral commissions between the United States and key Middle East countries. The relationships with these countries were not be governed by full treaties of alignment, but each would have special aims—human rights or other social contexts. Kissinger saw this procedure as part of the post-1973 Arab-Israeli conflict and the oil strategies. He also saw these commissions as a device to link certain countries, such as Saudi Arabia. to the United States. He wanted, for example, a joint Commission with Saudi Arabia under the joint chairmanship of a Saudi and an American official. This commission would link the two countries together not in a defense sense, but in the economic sphere, so that the Saudis would think twice before they would cut oil off again. Kissinger visualized the Saudi-American Joint Commission as a device for bringing American know how—economic and technological—to bear upon Saudi's economic modernization. He got the Secretary of the Treasury appointed as the American co-chairman. We set up an organization under Treasury Department paid for by a trust fund that Treasury could use

without Congressional approval. We set up an economic office in Saudi Arabia to help bring American contractors and experts to Saudi. When the Commission was established, the Riyadh electrical grid had just about broken down in terms of capacity. The Saudis didn't know how to expand it; they had of course let many large contracts through their Development Board, but the process was very slow. Bill Simon, the Secretary of the Treasury sent out a task force of people; the Saudis responded enthusiastically. One thing led to another and before we knew it, the United States got a lot of contracts and got involved in a lot of the economic development. In return for the operation managed by Treasury, the Saudis bought huge amounts of American Treasury securities, which was a big plus for us. In fact, the Saudis guaranteed a certain level of purchases for every year.

We set up commissions with other countries—Iran, Jordan, Egypt, etc. But a lot of these commissions were just a facade. For example, the Egyptian one didn't produce the flow of experts that the Saudi one did because we already had a large AID program there. The Egyptian one was more a vehicle for bringing American and Egyptian private businessmen into joint ventures. The commission tried to break down the bureaucratic obstacles that were strangling Egyptian commercial life. The commissions were very difficult to manage; it was also hard to build a long-range base of support for them. My own role was to bring together working teams to establish terms of references for these commissions and then to start them going. Once you had a commission, you had to have meetings. The first meeting g is always interesting, particularly if the Secretary of the Treasury is the co-chairman. After a while, the meetings become tiresome. If the Secretary also had to go to Morocco to show equal treatment, then the planning got quite complex. Kissinger himself was enthusiastic about the concept at first, but he did not want to be involved in the continuing process. If he had attended all the meetings or many of them,, he would be traveling every six weeks to various capitals and that wasn't acceptable. So when Kissinger didn't show, a certain amount of enthusiasm was lost. Except for the Saudi Commission, the others sort of petered out though inattention over a period of time. The Saudi Commission lasted for several years and didn't cease until just a few years ago.

Q: When a commission went unused, what was done?

DRAPER: There were some things that had to be done. I and a lot of my colleagues knew pretty much that the process would in fact end up in disuse, but sometimes you have to be a good soldier and carry on, doing the best you can. There are moments in relationships between states when a connection must be established. The commission idea was less than what was desired, but gave these countries some of the relationship with the United States that they wanted. Kissinger himself was interested in establishing this extra bilateral dimension. If we had had a huge bureaucracy with all sorts of titles to dispense, the process might have worked. Any bureaucracy must have a continuing work-load; otherwise, interest wanes. We were always putting life into NATO; we didn't do that with SEATO with the expected results in both cases. NATO did go through a lot of crisis; it found that it had to deal with many other subjects other than military security to keep alive. There are always civilian adjuncts to a military structure. The NATO Council of Ministers was always careful about not meeting too often; it is a big risk to get into these organizations. The commissions may not have been as much as hoped for, but they didn't do much harm either.

Q: Did you find hard to find people to work on these commissions?

DRAPER: It was not that difficult. Many of the government departments could see advantages in participating. The Labor Department, for example, was asked to send experts because some of the governments wanted help in organizing rudimentary unions or in establishing arbitration fora. The Post Office was asked to assist improving mail delivery in other countries.

Q: The American Post Office?

DRAPER: Yes, if you can believe that. The Fisheries and Wildlife Service was asked to give some expertise. Commerce was quite enthusiastic and was able to spread their

assistance into areas others than those for which help had been originally requested. So we could call on people; there was a network which was available. I could say that Henry Kissinger wanted to be responsive to the Iranians, for example; that would open doors so that American experts would go to Tehran or Iranian ministers would be invited to Washington. So we didn't have any trouble in getting attention. Some of our bureaucrats just slobbered at the thought of getting close to the Iranians or the Saudis because they knew how rich these countries were. We often set up parallel business councils; the American business community was overjoyed by the opportunity to establish links with certain countries. Some American states were setting up trade councils and we could get to governors, some of whom were very active.

We had a big meeting with the Iranians at an early stage of the Commission—in approximately 1975. The Iranians said then that they couldn't afford their development program anymore and that they were going to cut back. They had apparently over-extended themselves and were facing major economic problems. They also said that they weren't getting the results out of the development program that they had expected. Even so, there were still; areas in which work could be done, although after this time, the Iranians stopped paying for everything. Then they started to break contracts and the development program became a real mess. Eventually, all this led to the Shah's overthrow, but in 1975, you could see the first harbinger of ill times ahead.

Q: You worked on these commissions for about eighteen months. This was kind of non-mainline job, wasn't it?

DRAPER: It was different. It was so unique that there weren't any precedents. I was doing things that no one had done before. That was often an advantage which allowed me to move independently. On the other hand, I did encounter bureaucratic inertia. I was a coordinator. With Kissinger's interests, that was very helpful. He carried considerable weight. I must say that the other agencies, like the Pentagon, were more responsive than State which was a little stuffy. My colleagues, both above and below, anticipated that the

concept would not work out very well and that the process would eventually peter out. They considered that inevitable.

I was not in Kissinger's immediate office and I didn't need to see him frequently. He was just happy that things were moving and I got credit for that. I had other assignments from time to time, primarily working for the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs—Roy Atherton. He had me assigned as Country Director as soon as he could.

Kissinger was very demanding, but I enjoyed working for him. He treated people pretty badly, but it was exciting to be around him because he had such a great mind. He always thought of the long-term. He had a fascinating sense of humor. You would bring a paper to him and he would give back to you with a request that it be changed in certain ways. He demanded excellence and people responded. The memoranda of conversations had to be verbatim, which is very hard to do. But he insisted on it. The people who had to take notes somehow learned to do it. He detested the standard way of synthesizing a conversation. When you did good work, he would occasionally let you know—rarely, but sometimes. I got a letter of appreciation from him later which—one of his assistants told me—was unique and nothing like it had been sent in the two years that the assistant had been with him.

But he had his weaknesses. He couldn't do math, although he was fascinated by the subject. He was also well known for his paranoia and his negative features. But the main thing was that he was exciting. He was at the height of his success. He had done all these things in the Middle East. He had gotten various agreements at high speed and with great style. He had a vision of the future and he insisted that all of us think beyond the next hurdle. It was very exciting to think about the 21st Century. It encourages creativity.

Q: As a Middle East expert, did you feel that Henry Kissinger understood the area? Or was his viewed skewed by the East-West conflict?

DRAPER: He looked at the Middle East as sui generis. There was no connection to other world events. His analysis of individuals and mores and traditions was fascinating. He was a very astute observer, not only when he focused on a problem, but all the times. He noticed things; when in a room, he noticed the style of the furniture, the curtains, etc. Many years later, I was part of the delegation that was sent to Anwar Sadat's funeral in Cairo. The delegation consisted of three formed Presidents, Henry Kissinger; it was very interesting. We landed at the airport and were motorcaded to a hotel on the outskirts of Cairo—close to the airport for security reasons. We met in a conference room of the hotel as soon as we arrived to be briefed about the schedule. Kissinger remarked quietly that none of the Egyptians were showing any liveliness or sense of mourning. It was odd. He jumped to the conclusion at that point that Sadat's death was not entirely unwelcomed by the Egyptian population.

Q: You were hoping that Assad, as a pragmatist, might recognize Israel.

DRAPER: Not recognize Israel as much as striking a deal with that country. We had some hopes which were not large, but not minuscule either because Assad had lived up to the withdrawal agreement that had been negotiated by Kissinger. Even the Israelis said that they would trust Assad to carry out any agreement that he signed. The trouble of course was to getting him to sign. We were not at all that sure about Syria, but we thought it might be highly profitable to intensify the dialogue. Assad himself is one of the most fascinating figures in the Middle East. A curious man, who had interrupted one of his own coups because he wasn't quite ready. He was also the man who in 1970 stopped the Syrian Air Force from supporting the Syrian tanks who were at the moment fighting the Jordanians. He was certainly unconventional. For this and other reasons, we wanted to probe to see what the Syrians could live with—whether they could ever come to an agreement with Israel.

As I mentioned earlier, we saw Syria as a potential force for stability in Lebanon. The Syrians had close connections with many of the Palestinians and other forces and had a

great deal of influence with the Beirut government which at the time was led by Franjieh —a very close friend of Assad's. As it turned out one point in 1976, we made a three way deal with Israel, Syria and Lebanon allowing Syrian military forces to enter Lebanon without Israeli threat in order to protect the Christians who were in danger of being massacred by the Palestinian. The Syrians marched in, attacked the Palestinians and forced an uneasy cease-fire in the raging civil war.

Q: Was there a perception that the Palestinians might dominate the situation?

DRAPER: Oh, yes. By 1976, it was quite clear that the Palestinians had already set up a state-within-a-state. People had predicted this outcome starting in 1970 because as the Jordanians were kicking Palestinians out of their country, the latter had no other place to go but Lebanon. In Syria, they would have remained under tight Syrian control; in Lebanon, the government had been traditionally weak and the army and police forces were ineffective. So they went to Lebanon and by 1976, the Palestinian dominated the total area south of Beirut to the Israeli border.

Q: What was the situation in Iraq when you were there?

DRAPER: We did not have diplomatic relations with Iraq at this time. We had an “interest section”—a small staff—which was part of the Belgian embassy. There was virtually no dialogue. Our people did not see senior Iraqi officials. The Iraqis largely stone-walled on issues such as compensation for the seized American Embassy, which they had turned into their Foreign Ministry without a cent of compensation. There was some commercial business. The Iraqi were buying from America. American businessmen were interested in trade because the Iraqis paid well from their oil revenues. Saddam Hussein was not yet in full power; he was in the shadows until 1978. We knew who he was; he was one of the two most powerful people in Baghdad. He was during this period having some problems with some military rivals; he had made an alliance with one of his cousins from the Tikrit area. That cousin, General Bakar, was the head of the Armed Forces. Saddam had not

yet consolidated his power. By 1978, it had become quite clear who was running the country and that the power was his unless he got on the wrong side of the Iraqi military, who resented him because he had made himself a general even though he had had no military experience. They also were uncomfortable with the way he moved people around and changed appointments. We weren't certain what his future would be because in a transition phase, a man like Saddam is quite vulnerable until he has his own coterie around him to protect him.

Q: Did we view Syria and Iraq as Soviet satellites?

DRAPER: No, not at all. To call either of them satraps of the Soviet Union would have been to overstate the case. They were very dependent on the Soviets for military assistance—their armies were completely sovietized—, but both countries retained considerable freedom of action and were very careful that there be no perception of Soviet domination. They did not want to join the ranks of the Eastern European countries. Both Syria and Iraq were reluctant to sign “Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation” with the Soviets. They dragged their feet for a long time. These treaties were the means through which Moscow got a grip on the affairs of the other country. Both eventually signed the treaties, but that didn't make Iraq and Syria close friends. Quite the contrary! They were intense rivals.

Q: Did we make any attempts to bring these two countries together?

DRAPER: No, they were completely different. In fact, we liked the idea that they were rivals. We never wanted a coalition of Arabs because that would just increase the strength of the forces arrayed against Israel. The Iraqis did not join in the 1973 war and played only a very minor role in 1967. It was just as well that these rivalries existed. Our principal concern with Iraq at the time was the support that was being provided certain Palestinian groups, including some of the most radical. That was always a bone of contention.

What we really wanted then from Iraq was similar to what we want from Iran today: a modicum of dialogue. It is very awkward to have an important country in a strategically important area of the world with huge reserves of oil which is not willing to talk to us. It doesn't mean that we have to love them, but it is important to have some sort of dialogue. The absence of that is very frustrating. We were always fearful of what might happen when Iraq would become a major player in the Middle East. We watching carefully what equipment and material was being sold to it. The Iraqis could almost match what the Syrians were buying, even though this was long before Iraq had embarked on its major procurement program which it did when the war with Iran broke out. The Iraqi Army was sizeable, but not gigantic. The Air Force was puny by comparison with others in the region like the Iranians. The Shah was still in power and he was building up his forces—on paper at least, the Iranians were stronger than the Iraqis and we were content to let it be that way because even then, the Gulf States, including Saudi, were nervous about Iraq and had every right to be.

The relations between Iraq and Jordan were very poor as they had been ever since 1958. The King of Jordan was not very keen about the Iraqis. They were doing some dreadful things, such as hanging people. Their human rights record was as bad then as it is today —maybe even worse. The Iraqis had embarked on a development program—housing compounds, factories, parks (they were planting million of trees). Egyptians had been invited to take up farming and increase agricultural production. Some of the development projects were very interesting. There were some American business interests in Iraq, over and beyond oil investments.

Q: Did our policy toward Iraq change after Carter took over from Ford?

DRAPER: There was some change. The transition of administrations was managed by Phil Habib, who stayed on as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. That made for a very, very smooth transition. It was also exciting because, as is customary, we prepared transition papers on every country and every issue. On the Middle East, around Christmas

time—that is after election, but before Inauguration—we had reason to believe that the Secretary of State-designate and probably Carter himself had looked over our papers and were considering a major initiative. If historians will ever examine these transition papers, they will find that the quality was very, very high. Moreover, we were encouraged by Habib to be imaginative and not to prepare the papers just as a bureaucratic exercise. I remember the period quite vividly because I submitted an paper early on the Lebanon problem, which Habib circulated to the bureaus as a model of what he wanted in terms of the thrusts and options. So there was a lot of excitement in the Near East Bureau at the time which may not have been shared by others. Of course, Carter was also introducing other concepts into our foreign policy like the emphasis on human rights. Our relations with the USSR were also of great interest to the new administration because Brzezinski was obviously going to be major factor in the new higher councils. Many of us knew Vance from his days at the Council of Foreign Relations and in the Pentagon and from his efforts in 1967 to mediate the Turkish-Greek battle over Cyprus. He was widely admired as one of the post-war Establishment figures—in the same tradition with Clark Clifford, Dean Acheson and so on. In any case, we had some signals even before the Inauguration that there would be some initiatives in the Middle East. Very early on in his administration, it was clear that Carter had decided to go beyond the Kissinger concept of step-by-step agreements—we had had three of them—to a major over-all effort designed to bring general peace between Israel and all of its adversaries. This was far too ambitious and was not supported by any State official, but we were all good soldiers and accepted the decision to try with great enthusiasm. Carter embarked on a series of meetings in 1977 with the major players—Sadat, Begin, Assad. He met them in Washington and overseas. Assad didn't want to come to Washington for various reasons—he has never been there. His Prime Ministers and others have, but he wouldn't in part because of his linkage to the Soviets and of his image in the Middle East—he didn't want to be seen as an American errand boy. So we met him in Geneva in a hotel suite. Vance and Carter pursued their goals with great determination.

In the summer of 1977, a number of things happen which almost destroyed the peace process. One was the issuance of a Soviet-American communique about the next steps in the Middle East peace process which Israel felt had brought the Soviets unnecessarily into the picture. The communique was seen as the two super powers talking for their respective clients. The Israelis went ballistic and Sadat was equally upset because he saw all the peace possibilities die.

Also the realities of the Middle East became known. It became clear that an over-riding, all encompassing peace was not achievable; something less ambitious was called for. The Israelis were very insistent that an over-all agreement was not desired, but that bilateral understandings with each Arab country was the right goal. That objective eventually resulted in Camp David and the agreement between Egypt and Israel. Sadat took the initiative when he saw that the total peace package was not achievable. Sadat saw the Israeli reaction to the US-USSR communique as a disaster for the peace initiative and he stepped in to try to turn things to a more positive level. He had been cynical about the Carter-Vance initiatives, but he had gone along with them both because he wanted an over-all agreement but also because he wanted to be seen as associated with the Saudis and others in a peace effort. He decided that nothing would happen unless he took his own initiative. Of course, he knew that he would isolate himself in the Arab world, which he did ultimately, but he was a brave man. When Sadat made his move, all of us in the Near East Bureau were overjoyed with excitement and went full blast to do what we could to help the process along. We encountered disappointments and problems, of course. As a matter of fact, they were not long in coming. After Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the nitty-gritty bargaining started and it was pretty bad. The atmosphere between the Israelis and the Egyptians was not good.

Q: Did the Bureau feel that the Begin government was not responding adequately or that each side was too preoccupied with tactical advantages?

DRAPER: In general, we felt that Sadat was in a dangerously exposed position in the Arab world. He was threatened with isolation and weren't sure that his own people would follow him. As a consequence, we felt that Begin was too rigid, too patronizing; he was handling Sadat in the wrong way—not showing enough respect. He talked about the ancient Israelis having built pyramids while Sadat had been brought up to believe that it was an Egyptian civilization that had brought all these marvels to earth. This was typical of the problems that arose. Some of the Egyptian negotiators, including some of his closest advisors, lacked Sadat's confidence and style and were holding him back. They were advising a go-slow approach, pointing out problems with the Israeli positions. The haggling was very enervating. The process was beginning to die when Carter decided that as a last desperate measure to invite everybody to Camp David where he forced the parties to think about the alternatives.

This was in the summer of 1978 by which time I had become a Deputy Assistant Secretary. I had been appointed as an ex officio member of the inter-agency working group that had been convened long before Camp David and was chaired first by Atherton and then by Hal Saunders. Roy Atherton became the chief US negotiator for Camp David and the aftermath. My portfolio covered Egypt, Israel, North Africa, Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. It was about 11 countries. I also had the NEA press man reporting to me. It was a big job.

Q: While you were a DAS, what were your reactions to Congress, the Israeli lobby and the press?

DRAPER: It was during this period that I spent a lot of time on the Hill, both in formal testimony and in informal contact work. I briefed key members of Congress and their staffs; I worked to get support for our positions. I enjoyed it tremendously. I got to be very friendly with certain members and remain that way even still today. The relationships were good even with some who were hostile to or cynical about our policies. I accompanied Vance when he went to the Hill on Middle East issues. There were a lot of phone

conversations; a lot of correspondence. I think a lot of our success on the Hill was due to the amount of effort we made to keep the members informed and engaged.

As for the Israeli lobby—the friends of Israel—there was a benign attitude: as long as it did not appear that we were pressuring Israel and that we were trying to protects its interests we were not attacked. As soon as the lobby thought that our policies and actions were swinging against Israel, it went into action. It was for example very critical of the US-Soviet communique and essentially critical of the objective to have one sweeping peace agreement. But as soon as we backed away from that objective and as soon as Sadat went to Jerusalem, there was a change to a very positive attitude toward the administration. It was always complicated when we tried to get approval of an arms package for Saudi Arabia or Jordan—that was to be expected. But on the whole, the organized Israeli lobby was benign for a short period.

Q: How did you feel about the Israeli lobby? Was it the voice of Jews and their friends in the United States or was it a spokesman for Israel?

DRAPER: Let me put it in another way. There were, and are, the friends of Israel who are not necessarily organized in pressure groups. They include many non-Jews, Christian fundamentalists who for supported Israel for religious reasons, a great many non-Jewish Congressmen. There is basically a positive feeling toward Israel among Americans in general—a little democracy that faces millions of angry Arabs.

That is one group. Then there are certain pressure groups ranging from the non-political which are interested in health, education, refugees to AIPAC (the American Israeli Political Action Committee) which is a very energetic and active lobby group. That is a very effective group. Then there are money raising groups some of which concentrate on the election of certain individual political figures.

When the organized groups such as AIPAC take a strong position, you feel it, despite the fact that many members of Congress deeply resent the pressure that is being applied, but

thy can't resist it all together. In addition, during the period we are discussing, there were individuals who were playing dirty tricks of various kinds, quite blatantly. For example, there were supporters if Israel—both Jews and non-Jews—in the Pentagon that forced Jordan to accept conditions in exchange for certain armaments—the Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. These conditions were incredible; they forced the Jordanians to set the missile launchers in concrete, thereby defeating their mobility. Some of these people were just terrible. They were a small minority who almost acted as Israeli agents. The average Jewish member of a pressure group would go ballistic if you suggested he had dual loyalties. That charge would not be tolerated by most of these people and was deeply resented.

Q: As a practical matter, wasn't there dual loyalty? Wasn't that also true for Greek-Americans and other ethnic groups?

DRAPER: I don't know. I do know that some of the most outspoken defenders of Israel were extremely defensive about the possibility of being perceived as having dual loyalties and as not having 100 percent allegiance to the United States. They never saw any conflict. I first questioned this attitude, but then I became acquainted with too many people who were thoroughly convincing on this issue. Most American Jews are not that crazy about living in Israel—there was never much migration from here to there. Many attitudes changed over a period of time. In the late 19th Century and early 20th, so many Jews were assimilated into American society that they became Unitarians and Episcopalians. When Israel became a state and after it had fought its enemies to a stand-still in 1948, a certain amount of Jewish pride returned accompanied by support for Israel. The converse of this is that in America and in the halls of Congress, the Arabs have never been wildly loved. In fact, they have been disliked. The stereotype Arab is not a pleasant sight in the eyes of Americans. So there is a group which is not particularly supportive of Israel, but which distrusts and dislikes Arabs.

It is one think to see lobbyists who are always supportive of Israel—that is a natural phenomenon in the United States where lobbying is a fact of life. Groups do lobby to achieve their goals. The crunch came when it was clearly in the US interest to give, for example, a certain amount of support to Saudi Arabia for the construction of airfields, for the sale of AWACs, etc. Recent history—Desert Storm—showed that all these assets were very useful to the US. History also shows that these assets were not a threat to Israel. Yet much of the Israeli lobby fought us tooth and nail when these sales and activities were originally proposed. Fortunately, we squeezed through the sale of AWACs and other assistance programs by a few votes in Congress, but it was a narrow victory. Many of the supporters of Israel genuinely felt that arms in the hands of even moderates like the Saudis or King Jordan would eventually be turned against Israel. A lot of Israelis felt the same way. These are always close calls, but sometimes the US national interest seemed to come out second best. That is were it was tricky.

In the Carter administration, there was another complication: the UN. Much of the UN was going through an anti-Israel phase and we had lost some of the grip on it. We weren't using our veto power—that was not really used until the Reagan years. Also Andrew Young, our UN Ambassador caused difficulties. He was caught meeting with the PLO representative and that led to his resignation/firing. That affair came about because I was in an office of a friend of mine in the Bureau for International Organizations—UN Affairs—when a call came from a reporter who had heard that Young had met with a PLO representative. So we called Young right away and he admitted over the phone that he had done that. This was on a Saturday morning. We got the word to Vance and he eventually had to ask Young to resign, not because he had met the PLO representative, but because he had not told the truth about the meeting. That was very hard on the Secretary.He was in real pain for the next couple of days—depressed about what had happened.

In the State Department, we were under tremendous pressure from supporters of Israel not to have anything to do with the PLO. Kissinger had made a commitment that we would not deal with the PLO unless certain things would happen. The Israelis really held us to that commitment. Interestingly enough, the Democratic administration, under Carter, had more rigid rules on this issue than the Ford administration. Kissinger had always left a little wiggle room. Carter sent word that there was to be no room. We were under pressure to close PLO offices in the US even though they were manned by American citizens or "green card" holders or legal aliens. We were under pressure to kick the UN PLO Mission out of New York, despite the UN headquarters agreement we had. The pressure extended to Palestinians who were not PLO members who may have been invited by colleges and universities to give speeches. It was an incredible effort by Israel and its allies to shut the Palestinians off. Under Golda Meir and other Labor governments, the attitude was quite different, although no one could accuse those governments of being "soft". But Begin was very ideological and rigid and the pressure was tremendous. We had problems in places like Lebanon where the Palestinians were strong; we had to consider what constituted a threat to American lives and property. The best way to head off these potential threats was to have a dialogue. We were of course also trying to penetrate the Palestinian movements. The pressure for no "wiggle room" made it very difficult for us to do anything except clandestinely.

So our relationships with Palestinians was a troublesome problem for us. The pressure against any contacts was as strong as it could be.

Q: What role did Brzezinski play?

DRAPER: The rivalry between Brzezinski and Vance existed but it did not interfere with the orderly conduct of our foreign policy. Differences existed about other issues—Africa, Iran—but on the Middle East, Brzezinski cooperated well with Vance. Of course, we had a President who couldn't go to bed at night unless he had read the latest cables. We also knew that "night reading" and other memoranda would eventually get to the President,

even if they might have an accompanying note from Brzezinski. So there were many ways of getting our ideas to Carter's attention. That all changed with Reagan; he didn't want to read that much and therefore got in some cases only papers that the ideologues had approved. If a proposal didn't quite fit a campaign promise, the NSC had no compulsion in just ditching it.

So, as far as the Arab-Israeli issue was concerned, the Vance-Brzezinski rivalry was not a big thing. It did emerge on other issues. Carter himself was closer to Brzezinski than to Vance. Carter felt that Zbigniew was a fascinating personality and that he had a fascinating mind.

During 1978, I became deeply involved in the problems raised by the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. An Israeli bus had been attacked by Palestinian terrorists on a road just north of Tel Aviv. The Israelis, a few days later, moved into southern Lebanon intending to destroy all the Palestinians there. They bombed the hell out of the area. They came up to the Tyre area, close to the Litani River. It was not a very well conducted military exercise. The Israeli tipped their invasion and allowed the Palestinians to retreat to some safety; it was a sloppy exercise in many ways. But it created problems. Previous minor incursions and other incidents had involved Carter personally. In this case, we were afraid that the Israelis would not withdraw and would remain about 20 miles inside Lebanon. That would have raised many difficult questions, including what Syrian reaction might be. One of my major career achievements had been participation in the establishment of UNIFIL (the UN peace keeping force) which had been created primarily at my suggestion, when I was chairing the Task Force on Lebanon. Secretary Vance did not think that the UN would approve it, but after working night and day on it for a few days—on the phone, in New York—putting a couple of UN resolutions together which described the force's mandate, we got them approved. The Soviets might have vetoed them, but they didn't—Vance talked them out of it. Very helpful was the UN Under Secretary for Political Affairs. We were fortunate in getting a Security Council meeting together before the Israeli Foreign Minister was able to reach New York. He was still on route when the Council met;

so that the resolutions were all approved before he had an opportunity to interfere—he would probably have objected to them. It was all put together so quickly that there really was no effort by Israel or its supporters to interfere with the process. So we put this UN force together which was designed to take over the territory and stabilize it as the Israelis withdrew from it. We got troops from all sorts of countries—Ireland, Canada, Sweden, Iran, etc—all of which had recognized Israel and Lebanon. The Israelis withdrew very slowly and a lot of pressure had to be applied to them. They would not however move from a very narrow strip north of the Israeli border; they stayed there and build up a local army of Christian Lebanese who became their allies. That strip became almost a permanent irritant in American-Israeli relationships because the Lebanese and Syrians and others were always pressuring us to get these Israeli troops out of the strip, but Israel was not about to do that. To this day, that strip along the border is maintained. UNIFIL was very useful; it was the first time that we were able to put together a peace-keeping force of that nature that quickly. Despite the heavy criticism that has been levied against it, it has become a stabilizing force.

Q: Let us then move to Camp David. What were your experiences with that major event?

DRAPER: Camp David took place in 1978, following a year and a half of major efforts by the Carter administration to revitalize a peace process. It reached the point at which President Carter decided that he had to take some chances to jump start the process. Everything that we had tried up to 1978 had been disappointing. It was clear that President Sadat of Egypt was behaving personally and through his policies that he wanted the United States as a full partner in the negotiating process. Carter took this tremendous gamble in bringing the two parties together at Camp David. Many of us were not wildly optimistic by any means that anything could be accomplished; the animosity between Sadat and Begin was by then well established thanks to a lot of fruitless negotiating sessions. On the other hand, by that time Carter had a pretty good idea of what was achievable; he knew the positions of the two parties. Sadat was willing to do what no other Egyptian before him or at that time was willing to do; namely, to make a separate peace

with Israel without necessarily getting anything in return on some of the most sensitive issues to the Arabs, like the Palestinian problem. The trick for the Egyptian side was to see what could be achieved to save Sadat's face. On the Israeli side, it was to see whether Begin would be willing to give up all of the Sinai when certain groups in Israel, like the Labor Party—Dayan in particular—, had made it clear that they would never, never give up either the Israeli settlements in the north-west quadrant of Israel or Sharm el Sheikh—the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. So the whole concept of the Camp David meeting was based on some wild surmises made by Carter, his advisers and even us in the Near East Bureau. The concept of frameworks, rather than fully detailed agreements, was the brain child of several people like Bill Quandt, Hal Saunders, Roy Atherton which Carter readily accepted. The President insisted on a limited agenda which was also a daring diplomatic tactic. He kept everybody at Camp David under extraordinary security for thirteen days.

I was working on the back-up team in Washington for the inner working group. There were limits to how many people could be squeezed into the bedrooms of Camp David and therefore not everyone could be there. I had organized much of the logistics and other arrangements. We were preparing and issuing papers like mad, using forests full of paper pulp. Our own delegation at Camp David was limited to the President, Secretary Vance, Brzezinski, Saunders, Atherton, Ambassadors Lewis and Eilts—our Ambassadors to Israel and Egypt—and two or three secretaries. We did not move people in and out and people just had to share bedrooms and facilities as best they could.

We were preparing the background papers and also the rudimentary skeletons of the framework agreements that were finally approved. One was dealing with Sinai and the preparations for a peace treaty; the other was on the Palestinian issue, the West Bank, Gaza and the refugees. Of course, by Camp David, we had gone through an immense number of negotiations, which had resulted in some minor breakthroughs. For example, at Leeds Castle, the Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan took a conceptual leap which was most helpful. We had a list of what was possible and one of what was not. We knew some of the hidden traps and of Begin's rhetorical problems; he was a stickler on language. The Camp

David outcome was in doubt until the last minute; it was late at night when the meeting broke up and when people returned to Washington with the agreements. Carter made the announcements, then briefed Congress later. We, who had stayed in Washington, were not sure how the process was going because security, particularly telephone, was very high and information coming from Camp David limited. Carter wanted it that way and it did contribute to the success. The press never did find out what was going on, although they were at the gates of Camp David in hoards. We had press spokesmen, but they didn't have much to say.

All of us were most pleasantly surprised by the excellence of the framework agreements. They were better than most of us had expected. If we had taken bets before Camp David, people would have wagered heavily that there would not be a comprehensive agreement and that there probably would not be any good framework agreements. So when the drafts were approved and when they were so detailed and good, we were just ecstatic and felt that we had a fighting chance to persuade other Arab states and even the Palestinians that a good deal had been reached. We thought that there was a fighting chance that Sadat's role in the Arab world would not be diminished, even if he were to be vilified at the beginning. We knew that there would be major problems with King Hussein of Jordan because Jordan had been locked into a concept without consultation. The King was enraged, but we thought the situation was still manageable. Then disappointments arose in the following weeks and months. But at the time of Camp David, we were very enthusiastic.

No one on the American side felt that the “store” had been given away. There were Americans that were disappointed that firmer commitments on some issues had not been obtained. One of these issues was the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and that problem arose almost immediately, causing a tremendous rift between Begin and Carter. Carter felt that he had a commitment from Begin not to build new settlements while peace negotiations were going on. Begin felt that the suspension of construction applied to a much shorter period and therefore resumed building not too long after the Camp David

meeting. There were a lot of misunderstandings that arose, in part because of fatigue and language problems.

There were a number of interesting events in the aftermath. King Hussein did not take a public position; he was equivocal. He was not causing problems for us except that privately he mentioned how disappointed he was, etc. But he did pose a series of good, tough questions which were very penetrating about certain features of the agreements. We saw this as an opportunity to reassure Hussein and other readers of the answers and to explain to the Palestinians and Syrians and Saudis and others the meaning of the agreements. The questions were extremely penetrating; as good as any top flight analyst or lawyer in a US administration could have conceived if he were probing for weaknesses. There must have been 20-25 questions. We in NEA prepared the answers and then began to clear them with other parts of the US government. There may have been some consultations with the Israeli Ambassador, but there was no formal clearance process with either the Israelis or the Egyptians. However, the Israelis could not have been surprised by the nature of our replies. We had taken into account some of their views; they may have been uncomfortable with some of our positions, but they could not have been surprised.

The Vice-President, Walter Mondale, played a very a strong role in the clearance process. He weakened the thrust of our replies significantly in several areas. He introduced a certain amount of “wiggle-room” and made the answers less persuasive. I attribute Mondale's efforts to domestic political concerns and the influence of the friends of Israel. Of course, Mondale had considerable influence with Carter. The answers were made less specific. For example, in reference to Jordanian probing of our position toward a possible eventual Palestinian state and other Palestinian representation questions, we had to walk on eggs. So Mondale significantly weakened our draft answers, but that probably did not alter the eventual outcome. At the time, we were hoping for very clear, crisp answers that would excite the Palestinians in the occupied territories. It obviously did not come out that way. We had also hoped that King Hussein would give straight into the peace process

after reviewing our responses. In fact, he did not dive in as we had hoped and in fact distanced himself from the process and from Sadat and from the United States.

Hal Saunders, among others, made a magnificent effort to persuade the Palestinians to join the peace process. He went to the area and he did see King Hussein, Prime Minister Begin and others in both countries, but really concentrated in getting the word across to Palestinian leaders in the West Bank and Gaza, emphasizing what the Camp David accords would mean to them. Essentially, he struck out; the Palestinians were not ready. That was a huge disappointment because no one knew more about the framework—the skeletons, the pluses, the minuses—than Hal Saunders. He returned quite deeply disappointed, but typically moved on to the next task. A lot of the joy of Camp David evaporated in the follow-up process.

But one point in the framework agreements stood the test of time: the Israeli-Egyptian negotiating framework. Right after Camp David, we immediately began the preparations for the peace negotiations which were scheduled to take place in Washington. A lot of observers and historians will find it quite remarkable that the United States was in fact a third party at the negotiating table of a bilateral peace treaty that was conducted in the Capital of one of the participants. There were a lot of historical precedents to this process that were studied. On the question of dealing with Palestinians we had precedents from all over the world. I for example researched history for precedents on territorial boundaries and other questions, mediation commissions, supervisory efforts, passports and other identity documents, riparian rights, etc. We looked into all sorts of techniques including what had happened before the 20th Century. There were many precedents that we could point to in which people had achieved their independence although with diminished sovereignty, at least initially. Algeria was a particularly good precedent. We looked at trusteeships and researched how the United States handled the sovereignty issue for certain South Seas islands. There were a lot of useful precedents that we explored.

The Jerusalem issue alone was so filled with dynamite that it made all of these other problems pale in comparison. But we developed formulas and options for many the issues. In the case of the peace treaty, that was essentially a bilateral problem, but Sadat was still concerned about his isolation in the Arab world. He was hoping that in the process, he would get some concessions from Begin which would reduce his exposure. Begin had genuine agonizing doubts about the peace process. It was particularly hard for him to agree to destroy the settlements in the Sinai. There were questions of surveillance, safety, security matters. Eventually they were resolved.

I was responsible for some of the pre-conference preparations, like finding a suitable venue. I went all over the Washington area and looked at properties owned by the Smithsonian and by various other museums and establishments. We wanted a place where the delegates could meet in informal ways so that they could get to know each other, sit at the same tables to eat meals together and in generally become better acquainted. Although we were not entirely happy with our selection, we ultimately chose Blair House because it had advantages that some of the other locales did not enjoy. It is a charming place. We had to make all sorts of promises to the management because we were going to use the facilities for months. We held all of our plenary sessions there, but gradually the delegates began to meet each other in their hotel rooms. The Madison Hotel became the locale for many of these informal sessions. It became increasingly the site for meetings of the working groups. The hotel people were very good about giving us access to their facilities.

I remember well the opening day. We came into the White House—all three delegations—and began with group photographs. These were taken in the front hallway. Then we all marched into the East Room where an interesting development occurred. The White House protocol people had organized events so that TV and radio were ready and rolling, but no flags or placards were displayed so that people would know where to sit as they would have been in the State Department. So when the three delegations entered the

room, no one knew where to go and sit. So everyone milled around. The Egyptian and Israeli military gravitated toward each other and started conversations particularly about their roles in the war. They then sat down together, so that you had this view of Egyptian and Israelis sitting together without regard to protocol or the nature of the occasion. It didn't happen so much with the civilians, but it certainly happen with the military. They just conversed with each other even when the ceremony was about to begin.

That was a very good moment. Carter said all the right things and then Egyptians and Israelis made their statements. Then we all marched out of the White House, across Pennsylvania Avenue, which the police had closed to traffic, to Blair House. This was about 10:30 or 11 in the morning. In Blair House, we all sat down in a somewhat crowded conference room on the second floor; we Americans took the initiative and proposed an agenda. We tabled a paper out which is a very good bureaucratic idea because he who controls the paper is one step ahead of the rest. The agenda was essentially agreed to almost with the speed of light. We had of course softened up both delegations before hand, although Vance wasn't quite sure what his subordinates had been up to. He came to us about 12:30 completely overjoyed because the process was going so smoothly and the atmosphere was so good. The initial understanding was excellent. Vance decided that he would interrupt the meeting for lunch, but didn't return in the afternoon and left the job of chief negotiator to Roy Atherton. He said that he thought we would get an agreement in two weeks if the rest of the conference would proceed as well as that morning had. Of course, it turned out to be five and a half months.

There were some bad moments in that period. But the first day was truly magic.

Q: During the conference, were there any differences between Brzezinski and Vance?

DRAPER: Not really. A lot of issues were ironed out. The relationship between Bill Quandt, who was the NSC expert on the Middle East, and Hal Saunders and Roy Atherton was so close that a lot of potential differences were resolved quickly. Roy was the main negotiator

and he was very good in keeping the White House-NSC and other interested agencies well informed with careful briefings. There were no surprises, so that the inter-agency coordination worked quite well.

Carter and Brzezinski recognized that this conference was a major political achievement. That made the domestic side of the White House—Hamilton Jordan and others—pleased.

Q: Was there any political pressure applied by groups outside the negotiating process?

DRAPER: The Labor Party in Israel was opposed to the surrender of these settlements, which had been built when it was in power. The hard-line Israelis were concerned about territorial concessions because they were concerned that they would go beyond the Sinai. There were some very tense moments.

The pressures from AIPAC and other friends of Israel were nothing compared to our concerns about Begin and Sadat themselves. There were always chances for them to blow up in one of their sessions.

We could see problems arising as time went on. The Israeli domestic scene had to be watched very carefully. Dayan, in one mysterious episode, certainly backed away from positions that he had been advocating. He said that he was sick and that he had to take a rest. What actually happened was that Dayan felt that his political position back in Israel was being undercut. He was disturbed by one of Begin's comments that he had made publicly in Canada. For a while, we didn't know what was going on. Everyone was a great actor and we couldn't be sure whether they were serious or just posturing. It is kind of spooky. Dayan was so smart. People always thought that he was just a simple soldier; they never fully appreciated the subtle mind he had; his instincts were fantastic. Some of the decisions he had made years before will look great to the historians. He was the hidden hero in our eyes because he was protecting both his own position as a Labor Party stalwart and as the Foreign Minister in a Likud Government. It was a tricky situation of Dayan. Maintaining Begin's confidence was not an easy matter because Begin was well

known for his suspicious nature—almost paranoid. Even during the last week, when Begin and Sadat came to Washington to sign the treaty on the front lawn of the White House, there were some perilous moments. There was a bad moment when Begin said he would leave ratification of the treaty to the Knesset without imposing party discipline or taking a position on the treaty. That certainly was no way to back a treaty!

So we had a lot of tense moments. There was a virtual shouting match between Begin and Sadat at one crucial point a couple of days before the signing of the Treaty. The Israeli Ambassador Evron, who was a very wise man, was deeply involved in the whole process. Evron had been a prot#g# of Ben Gurion, who had been a political enemy of Begin's of long standing. He was with Begin the morning of the signing ceremony. He recounts that Begin was thinking aloud of whether he was really doing the right thing for his country—i.e. protecting Israeli security. He had doubts about the wisdom of giving up that large strategic area—the Sinai—and therefore running certain risks. Evron pointed out that he thought that Ben Gurion would have saluted Begin as a hero if Israel. That seemed to give Begin a great deal of satisfaction, knowing that one of his former adversaries whom he had battled for so long, would have approved of the action he was about to take.

The whole negotiating process was a fascinating and memorable period. It had lots of ups and downs.

Q: How did you find the Israeli and Egyptian working groups?

DRAPER: On the military side particularly, the groups were very good. In other areas, the situation was very tricky. That was particularly true on the issue of oil reserves and the turnover of oil installations. Israel wanted to be sure that it was guaranteed oil production at special discounted prices for stated periods. This was a very contentious issue because the Egyptians wanted maximum income from the oil production while paying the minimum for the equipment they would take over. The discussions were not really getting anywhere. Finally, Sadat broke the deadlock as he did many times on

other issues. He just instructed his delegation to give the Israelis essentially what they wanted; he agreed to something that his government did not want to agree to. There was an understanding that the United States would support the oil guarantees made to Israel to insure that country's security—the US would supply Israel in case of crisis. So there were a number of supplementary guarantees by the United States which made Israel feel more confident about its security. Oil was one of the guarantees. We also agreed to relocate at our expense certain Israeli military installations—two big airfields. We guaranteed not only funding, but construction of the new sites within a certain period of time. The work was to be done under the supervision of the Corps of Engineers with American and other contractors. There were understandings about intelligence collections. These supplementary understandings required the US to spend some considerable amounts of money—the airfields themselves were gigantic undertakings costing billions. The questions of location and other logistic issues had to be resolved. These were large problems which required the cooperation of many parts of the US government. We had to consult Congress to insure the availabilities of substantial amounts of funds, both for Egypt and Israel. There was also a questions concerning the form that these funds would take. There were already substantial contributions which had started after the first disengagement agreement, which had been negotiated by Kissinger some year earlier. But the administration would be requesting major increases in appropriated funds.

There was also a change in relationships, particularly in the US-Egyptian one covering security, intelligence and economic assistance. Our AID mission in Cairo was expanding to become the largest in the world in terms of staff.

Q: Did you ever have the feeling that the United States was playing the role of "county cousins" being taken by the two city slickers? Was the feeling that no problem could not be overcome by US financial assistance?

DRAPER: There was some of that feeling, mostly directed at the Israelis. The Israelis are superb negotiators and much wilier than most. But also aggravating because we

couldn't always be sure that we knew their full agenda. Right from the beginning, we knew that the pot had to be sweetened. The only question was “how much?”. All of us felt that contributions were worth it if they would bring peace. It was reasonable to move a couple of airfields if it would increase the Israelis' sense of security. It did; so we considered a worthwhile investment. On the Egyptian side, we felt very strongly that Egypt was in danger of economic collapse. It had a fast growing population and a lot of things had to be done to assist the Egyptian infrastructure. We did not want to see a peace treaty signed, only to watch one of the partners enter a period of social an economic disintegration. So we had complex concerns.

But we didn't really feel that we were being taken. We had taken the initiative in the beginning. Carter led the process through Camp David. He had prestige and authority with both Begin and Sadat. On the first day of the negotiations, it was our papers that were tabled first suggesting how things should proceed. That initiative carried through right to the end. We were the ones making most of the proposals. We were the ones that were splitting the differences and were developing bridging formulas. That is what we did constantly.

Q: Did either the Egyptians or Israelis individuals come to the American delegation saying that they were having trouble within their own delegations and suggesting certain American initiatives?

DRAPER: There was quite a bit of this from the Israeli delegation. They had many splits. But they also showed a certain amount of unity. They didn't like to show their differences. We had to detect many of them, without being told explicitly about them. I mentioned the Dayan situation; we kept very close track of what was going on in the Israeli domestic political scene. This was particularly true when it came to Knesset ratification; we couldn't take any chances then.

The Egyptian situation was altogether different. There was a split within the Egyptian military that oddly enough gave Sadat more “wiggle” room. The split prevented the Egyptian military from taking a firm position and they showed some ambivalence in certain areas. Sadat showed unbelievable bravery in agreeing to certain positions, particularly when he had to overrule some of his closest advisers and counselors. There were many examples of that. He astonished Americans continually and in the process gained a lot of admiration from the administration and the American public. He was not seen only as a sympathetic person, but as a heroic one. There is of course a certain tendency in American culture to sympathize with the under-dog, as Sadat was clearly perceived. We were concerned about Sadat's Egyptian domestic support and his position in the Arab and African worlds. We sometimes forget that Egypt is an African country and that it has a significant influence in many parts of Africa. We were concerned about Sadat's isolation in the Moslem world and did what we could to ease it and set the stage for ultimate restoration of Egyptian-Moslem relationships. The Egyptians were quite sophisticated about some of this and were rebuilding bridges even while the peace negotiations were going on. In ways that were almost too subtle for Americans to appreciate, the Egyptians went to work in the African world. There was of course domestic opposition to Sadat's strategy, but that was harder for us to get a handle on.

Q: When did Sadat and Begin join the negotiating process?

DRAPER: Not until the end. They didn't have to meet face to face until the end. There was a lot of transatlantic telephoning. There was no question that Sadat and Begin were in complete charge of the negotiations. Nothing was decided by the Egyptians unless Sadat approved it. The same thing was true for Begin and the Israelis. The only question on the Israelis side was whether Dayan could manipulate Begin adequately to get approval for some of his positions. Dayan was very concerned about this. There were a couple of eruptions because of some obstreperous session of the Knesset or some difficult Sunday

Cabinet meetings. Dayan couldn't defend himself being in Washington when matters erupted in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. That was quite tricky.

Both the Egyptians and the Israelis are both part of the Semitic race, although many Egyptians deny that. They were both certainly Middle Eastern. They got to know each other extremely well. A funny kind of relationship developed between individual delegates which was very friendly in many ways. They often spoke the same kind of language; in all cases their second language was English. The Israelis got a good feel for Egyptian sensitivities; there were continual examples of that. They began to be careful about patronizing comments. On the other hand, the Egyptians became to appreciate Israeli humor and insecurities to the point where they could joke about it. This part of the process was very interesting. At the end, a lot of the Egyptian and Israeli delegates were personally closer to each other than they were to Americans.

The relationship between the three delegations was somewhat mysterious. Before Sadat made his famous visit to Jerusalem, the Israeli and the Egyptians were sounding out each other secretly and clandestinely. One of the most important episodes occurred when Dayan secretly went to a place in North Africa to meet an Egyptian representative named Tahami, who was then Deputy Prime Minister. Dayan was convinced by that meeting that Sadat really wanted peace and that a deal could be reached. That was an important turning point even though it was kept secret. One would think that Tahami was a pretty important Egyptian personality. He was among the Egyptian delegates that came to Washington. But he was a very mysterious man. He was hard for anyone to understand—particularly his mystical views. The Israelis didn't know whether to make him an object of fun or whether to take him seriously. They couldn't be sure. With absolute dead seriousness, he would tell people that he could make his heart stop. In the final analysis, Tahami did not play a major role in the peace negotiations. That is an example of some of the odd things that happened.

Q: What did you do after the peace negotiations?

DRAPER: I was a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near East Affairs. My bailiwick included Egypt and Israel and all of the front line states—Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya and North Africa. So I was very much a participant in the peace negotiations although I had only ad hoc assignments in the process which led to the signing of the treaty in 1979. The treaty itself called for a staged withdrawal over a three year period. So there were many follow-up actions ranging from the move of the airfields, economic and military assistance programs to intelligence cooperation and surveillance. One of the major problems was the military presence in the Sinai. Initially, we wanted a UN presence. There were many contingencies we had to plan for, including the possibility that the USSR would veto a UN presence. So we had to have a back-up plan. This was one of the issues I spend a great deal of time on. It was just exhausting over the years. Over the three year period—by April 1982—we had to ready a naval aerial surveillance and build a multi-national force that is still in the Sinai today. That force includes a contingent of American troops who learn scuba diving quickly, among other things. That was the first American peace keeping force ever deployed in the 20th Century. It had always been the view of the United States since the inception of the UN in 1945 that we and other great powers—the USSR—should not participate in such peace keeping forces. So we had to change rapidly some strongly held views. The Pentagon was cooperative. Our problems was more with international commanders and other potential participants. We wanted as many countries as possible to join the force, but they had to have diplomatic relationships with both Israel and Egypt. We had some great luck and were able to get some outstanding people—the Scandinavian generals. But there were a great host of problems for such forces. What can the host countries put up with in terms of armaments—how do you define “light” weapons? There were many follow up areas in which I was very much involved. I spent considerable time on the aid programs, getting them through Congress without restrictions, making sure that they were equitably provided.

There were many things that entered into the process. For example, in light of the Israel-Egypt peace, we could then consider a number of other initiatives. So we obtained funds

for peaceful activities and cooperation. It didn't start out with a boom, but it was very interesting. There were common problems—diseases that infect both countries. There were scientific exchanges that we pushed under our auspices and with some seed money. Scientists and educators from both countries began to meet. It is always easier to do things like that with scientists. We also promoted trade which was a much harder problem. Tourism boomed, particularly from the Israeli side—they went off to Cairo in great numbers. The Egyptians didn't reciprocate in the same way in part because there were some religious problems—the Egyptian Copts promised never to visit Israel unless their claims to their major church in Jerusalem. This was a big problem. Then there was one other problem that kept expanding and we knew it would come to a head in 1982. That had to do with the projected border between Egypt and Israel at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba where there were 700 meters of territory that the Israelis didn't want to cede. They had built a hotel there; one could see that problem looming. It took years and years to resolve and wasn't settled finally until 1990. It was very tricky.

Marking the boundaries was complex. We had to go back to the Anglo-Egyptian survey records. It was very fascinating.

Q: Did the developments in Iran have any impact on your activities?

DRAPER: It had a personal impact because so many of the Americans were close friends and colleagues. Since so many personnel assignments had been made by people at my level, I had seen to it that certain people had gotten their chance in Iran. And they ended up as captives. In the early days—1979—, we were volunteering for night duty on the task force that had been established. I spent some time getting in touch with Islamic scholars to see whether there were some Koranic or other religious phrases we could use to condemn the Iranian take over of the Embassy and the holding of our people. There were, of course, many citations, but they didn't make difference to the Iranian leadership. We were able to talk regularly to the kidnappers on an open phone. At one point, I pretended to the father of Frank Mantrinko, who was one of the captured. I wanted to find out what was

happening to him because he was one of the ones we were most worried about. He was very exposed; many Iranians thought that he was a CIA agent.

Among other tasks, I was trying to get the PLO to use their influence to get our personnel released if they were willing because they had very good relations with the Iranians. The PLO were at least partially successful in the initial release of our female and black staff members, which took place a few days after the Embassy take over. I also served as liaison with churchmen who were allowed to visit our people at Christmas. We debriefed them afterwards. Father Hare of Georgetown was one of these churchmen. We were making many efforts to get our people released. Hal Saunders, as the Assistant Secretary, was the main point-man in the Department. As subsequent books later related, he was involved in a lot of secret, special activities. Pierre Salinger, in his book, detailed some of Hal's activities. Hal would sometime disappear from his office for extended periods, leaving us, the Deputies, to cover for him. We of course could not tell people that he wasn't in his office; he would be “just around the corner” or on “ the phone”. It was not always easy to protect him because an Assistant Secretary is on instant call from a Congressman or other people. Than it was sticky. It was a painful period.

Q: You mentioned your contacts with the PLO. Were we not under some kind of Congressional restriction on this?

DRAPER: First of all, we had our own commitment to the Israelis made originally by Kissinger not to recognize the PLO or to negotiate with them. But there is a long history of communications with the PLO for security reasons, primarily in connection with our people in Beirut. We had established a security channel and kept it open. The PLO made possible the successful evacuation of the American staff from Beirut in 1976. There were other episodes, so that we just broadened that channel to include our staff captive in Tehran. This of course has never been made public, but we felt it was justified on the basis of the security requirements for our staff. We did enlist PLO support along with many

other efforts. There were a lot of people talking to the PLO, some with Carter's personal approval. So we could get messages to Iran in a variety of channels.

Q: What were the Department's views about Iran at this time?

DRAPER: Our Iranian policy was based on our perception that Iran was basically an important country. It was a neighbor of the Soviet Union and we did not want Iran either invaded or dominated by the USSR. We always had to see Iran as a major player in the area. What we said that and what we are saying today is that we recognize that we are not going to overthrow the revolution. It has occurred. But we would like to have some kind of relationship which will permit a dialogue between us about our common problems. It doesn't have to go beyond that. We were prepared to wait it out. I think some of the old Iranian hands were astonished at the viciousness of the Iranians—the hatred of some Iranian groups toward the US The latter included some that we had trained in the United States as warrant officers and enlisted men. Dave Newsom, then Under Secretary for Political Affairs, a watcher of Iran for a long time, was certainly astonished. There were many people that were surprised. We were worried throughout the last stages of the Shah's regime whether we were getting the facts. We issued a call for Iranian/ Farsi speakers to volunteer for some special assignments in Iran—to pay visits to the country. I talked to one person, whom I had found and asked whether he would be willing to go if we could get him released from his present assignment for three months. He didn't want to go; he was afraid that the attitude of the top echelon of the Embassy in Tehran would damage his reputation. It was only after we provided all kinds of assurances that he agreed to go. He spent three months in Iran, traveling about, seeing his old friends. He was a middle grade officer. After his return, we got more penetrating insights on the situation in Iran than we had ever seen. We were really behind the curve there. That was quite clear. The officer who went came back reported that the bazaaris had completely turned against the Shah. Washington was assuming that these people and the military would stick with the Shah

to the bitter end. By the time we got this report, the Shah's fall was imminent and the new intelligence we had obtained was almost too late.

The Iranian events influenced out Iraq policy. I was with Secretary Muskie in the last days of the Carter administration—1980—when for the first time an Iraqi Foreign Minister—Saddam Hammadi—met with a Secretary of State in New York at the UN I'll never forget that meeting. Hammadi was elated because the war against Iran had just started and he was belittling the Iranians. He was predicting victory in a very short period of time. He saw Iraq doing a favor to the civilized world and the US in particular. He was so ebullient and almost arrogant. He was so sure that it would be a “walk-over”. Even then, we knew how bad the Iranians could be, but we were certain it would not be a “walk-over”. We thought that the war would last at least a year. It was another example of badly the Iraqis can miscalculate. Hammadi could not have spoken to an American Secretary of State unless he was echoing the views of Saddam Hussein.

Up to 1978, Hussein had shared power with one of his distant cousins—General Bakkar. By 1980, he was in full control. During those days, we kept thinking of balance-of-power politics. We viewed Iraq as a bulwark against revolutionary Iran. We knew that Saddam Hussein was blood-thirsty man who would put down any pro-Iranian fever or insurrection with great force. Once the Iran-Iraq war started, the situation changed a little bit. Nevertheless, it was the general feeling among those of us who had had experience in the area that Iraq was basically not a country. The Sunni Muslim minority —35 percent of the population—was running this country with Shiite majority and Kurdish elements essentially left out of the power structure. The Sunnis were very harsh on others. The Baath Party was not that admirable. Iraq maybe the most blessed country in the Middle East. It has water, fertile land. It was once the granary of Rome and of the Assyrian Empire. It has enormous oil reserves. It was conducting an economic development program which was quite admirable. Much of its revenues went to its military, but there was still considerable amounts left for other activities. We felt that ultimately Iraq could become a good trading partner, as it had been at one point. But we couldn't in the late '70s

and early '80s, brake down the residue of suspicion that had developed. Interestingly, Iraq had taken a position on the Israel issue that was intriguing, to say the least. The Iraqi felt that they would have no problem existing in the same area with Israel if the Palestinian could agree to a settlement of some kind and be satisfied. That has changed since that time, but in the early '80s, although we didn't consider the Iraq position as a major breakthrough, we found it an interesting variation. Iraq did not seem to insist on driving Israel into the sea. All it wanted was that the Palestinians be satisfied. That formulation gave Iraq considerable “wiggle” room, but it suggested that it was not as preoccupied as other countries with Israel's existence.

The Syrian-Iraqi rivalry was very intense which created a lot of problems. So our attitude toward Iraq was essentially to keep knocking on its door—not begging—but making it clear that we were prepared to talk at senior levels and thought that it was stupid not to do so. At the time, we were working through liaison people. We had a small mission in Baghdad and Iraq had a small mission in Washington. Our people were highly restricted; they could only see certain people. Travel was restricted, but these limitations were gradually easing. But we just didn't have any dialogue at senior levels. The Iraqis had rejected all overtures, although we had sent a special doctor to examine Saddam Hussein, when he asked for help. There were a few other things that were happening. We had decided that we would take advantage of any opportunity that might arise; we showed an interest in Iraq in various ways. We kept in touch with various Iraqis all over the world. The largest group of Arabs in the United States originated in Iraq—many Christian Arabs, living especially in the Detroit area and in Chicago to some degree.

During my stint as Deputy Assistant Secretary, we had major problems with Libya. They were a threat in the world. We had a certain amount of interest in destabilizing Libya even then.

We had sort of a stupid policy toward Morocco, dictated in part by members of Congress who were suspicious of Moroccan policies. Yet Morocco had been a very good friend

of the United States for many years. Moroccan kings going back to Hassan V had been very protective of the Jewish community. They has shown certain balance. There we were holding back, under tremendous Congressional pressure, on arms sales. Whenever we had to ask Morocco for cooperation—for example, when we asked Morocco to send troops to maintain order in the Belgian Congo—, they responded positively. But when the time came for us to help them, we couldn't do anything. It was a very bad situation; we couldn't get even get C-130 transport planes to evacuate Moroccan troops who had gone somewhere at our request or suggestion. We were frozen by all the restrictions levied on us by well-meaning Congressional members. We were for example restricted in taking action in Angola by human rights enthusiasts.

Q: It has been said that much of Congress' attitude toward Morocco was instigated by Congressional staffers who were true believers in the Polisario movement and therefore had their own agenda. Did you see the problem in that light?

DRAPER: Yes. There was one staffer particularly who was really infamous. He was a real booster of the Polisarios. There were leaks, but he wasn't the worst staffer from that point of view. The avid supporters of Israel were much more blatant than he was. But this staffer was a true believer; he felt that Morocco had a repressive regime—which it did. He was a formidable critic and he influenced many, many Members of Congress. There was an attitude that was spawned in the 1970s which was directed against Kissinger and US intervention in particular. So we had to deal with the African lobby and the Black Caucus. It was similar to the Israeli lobby and its friends. That lobby put strings on us. We had to be very careful about our contact with the Polisarios.

One of the first things that the Reagan administration did was to change our Moroccan policy over-night. It instituted a much more flexible policy. There were a lot of people sympathetic to Morocco who were fed up with its ambivalence on negotiations with the Polisarios and not being willing to carry through on understandings reached. There are people who to this day believe in democracy and are suspicious of monarchies—that view

was quite understandable, but tied our hands considerably and caused us problems. We could have used Morocco as a staging base. We could have used it as a partner in our coalition against Iraq. We needed a country like that. Furthermore, King Hassan, despite all of his problems, is a formidable politician who was an adviser to the Shah long before his fall. He suggested actions and policies that were intended to keep the Shah on his throne, but the King was ignored.

We never established a good working relationship with Algeria until the end of the Carter administration when we enlisted Algerian intermediation with Iran. The Algerians were very good at that. We could not have freed our hostages or made the necessary financial arrangements without Algerian mediation. So in the last year of the Carter regime, we began to get some insights into what the Algerians were doing. We had a much more open relationship with them which opened new opportunities. The progress was slowed by Algerian disappointment over our inability to change our oil policies. They were trying to improve arrangements for the shipment of Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) into the US Algerians are not a communicative people in general; they are rather dour.

As for Libya, a lot of us didn't think that Qadhafi was a serious threat. His power was exaggerated, but we explored what might be done to make his policies more difficult for him. We tried to protect Egypt and the Sudan; it was outrageous what he was doing. The Libyans are some of the most passive people in the world; it surprised me that they put up with Qadhafi's nonsense, including the so called “Green Revolution”. The Libyan emigres are a poor sort; they sat in villas in the Arab world, unable to organize any kind of counter-revolution. We never knew quite how to handle the Libyan problem. There was one area which I found very disappointing. It had always been our policy to promote freedom of the seas. So twice a year we send a destroyer or two into the Black Sea. Traditionally we sail through that part of the Mediterranean that Qadhafi claims for his own—including the Gulf of Sidra, which has some oil fields in it. In the last year of the Carter administration, I attended a at the White House sub-NSC meeting which was devoted to the question of moving vessels in that area and what we would do if we were challenged by the Libyans.

The Department was eager to have such a challenge and wanted the US government to be prepared, including shooting some Libyan planes down if necessary or to take whatever action was required to uphold the freedom of navigation. However, the NSC representative vetoed the idea for inane reasons. That view changed when the Reagan administration took over; although we didn't mount any overt challenge immediately, it was clear that the administration's attitude was different. The issue was not only the freedom of the seas; it was in fact the need of maintaining and carrying out a consistent policy; when something is not done which had been done for years, it is interpreted as a sign of weaknesses and a lack of determination. Certainly the Carter administration had every reason to fear the perception of weakness of American power in the world at that time, which was not very useful.

Q: Why was the State Department's position over-ruled?

DRAPER: It was based on the facts that elections were coming soon and by concerns that the operation might have been perceived in a negative light. It was close in time to the failure to rescue the Iranian hostages. Oddly enough, we received a lot of cooperation from such countries as Egypt. That fact is barely known. In retrospect, it is easy to criticize that effort, but it was a “penny-wise, pound-foolish” operation based on terrible intelligence. People were not even checking the weather with the earnestness that it deserved. I have visited Iran many times and I can tell you that one of the things that is least fun is flying even at moderate altitudes over areas from the Gulf to Tehran. It is very turbulent. Yet in reading the accounts of the operation, it is clear that the helicopter crews were not even prepared for such weather conditions at that time of year. In general, it was another “Bay of Pigs”: poorly prepared exercises that we sometime undertake, compounded by rivalries within the Armed Forces and lacking adequate resources. In the initial days after the seizure of the hostages, we had scores of private Americans getting in touch with us, offering their services and expertise—people who had worked on Iran's telephone

system, power grids, etc. Had we used them, we could have brought Iran to a halt at least temporarily.

That Iranian situation has always been difficult to judge. It would have been hard to bring enough military power to bear, although that was very tempting. There was a well-grounded feeling that we could have bombed the hell out of the Abadan refineries and other installations, but the Iranians would probably not have been influenced greatly; they liked being martyrs. There was a feeling that the Iranians would have put up with almost anything and that we didn't have the power to force them to do anything against their will. We certainly had a lot of resources and assets in Iran. It was very ambitious to believe that we could have extricated the Americans even with a few losses, but even if we had, the Iranians just would have seized others or would have killed some people in Lebanon or taken some other actions. The situation might just have gotten completely out of hand. In 1982, when the Israelis invaded Lebanon and fought the Syrians, the Iranians sent to Syria a few plane loads of Revolutionary Guards. Initially, the Syrians didn't know what to do with them; so they put them into a training area a few miles north of Damascus. Sooner rather than later, the Syrians began to feel uncomfortable with all these crazy Iranians around and therefore let them cross the border into Lebanon. There they seized a part of the Baalbek Valley and established their own Iranian colony. If the Syrians had sent them back to Tehran the day they arrived, a lot of problems would have been avoided. These things can be seen in retrospect.

Q: On a new subject. What were your impressions of the change over in administration in 1981 when you were Deputy Assistant Secretary in NEA?

DRAPER: I was virtually [the only one] at my level who was carried over from the Carter administration to the Reagan one in any of the geographic bureaus, I think, and certainly in NEA. We had prepared, as usual during transitions, papers describing the problems and opportunities that the new administration faced. We sent these papers to the transition team which was located on the ground floor of the Department. The transition team people

who were assigned to look at the Near East and South Asia were well known to us. One man, Carleton Coons, had worked for me until the election. We did not make a lot of recommendations in those papers unlike those we had prepared for previous transitions. It didn't make a lot of difference because the team met with Secretary-designate Haig in either late December or early January and gave him the papers. He said: “Thank you very much” and filed them away. He didn't pay them the slightest bit of attention. The transition team, staffed primarily by strong conservatives and Republicans, who had been generally critical of many aspects of the Carter administration's foreign policy, were genuinely non-plussed by Haig's attitude, although many were subsequently given high level appointments both in Washington and overseas.

Many of us had known Haig from his previous service in the White House. Hal Saunders, who was the out-going Assistant Secretary, had worked very closely with Haig for many years; therefore we had some knowledge of his personality. Generally, the professional Foreign Service officers were pleased by Haig's appointment. He knew a considerable amount about national security; he was a likeable person; he had been successful in his military, business and White House careers; he had been a hero behind the scenes during the final days of President Nixon. On the whole, the career officers were pleased. We knew something about his manic personality but that didn't seem to be a major factor. When he first took office, he indicated very strongly that the traditional friends of the United States were going to be given greater leeway, greater attention and more assistance than had been the case. They would not be criticized as they had been for such matters as human rights abuses. Morocco was the outstanding example. Within 24 hours of his assuming office, Haig gave us the signal on that relationship. Within days, he had assured a despatch of naval vessels to Morocco for port visits. Morocco was going through a bit of a hard time at that moment. Haig made it very clear that our attitudes toward that country had changed. We welcomed that policy change. Morocco was a particularly ornery case because of the opposition that had developed against it particularly on the Hill. There were legislative restrictions that had been mandated in the Angola and Kissinger days which

limited the kind of assistance we could provide; they all affected our relationships with Morocco. It was not just the Moroccan policy that was changed. Either Haig or some of his new associates gave indications that other changes would be made as well.

The real preoccupation in the early days of the Haig regime concerned whether the new team would approve the deals made with the Iranians in Algeria to obtain the release of our hostages. Warren Christopher, the outgoing Deputy Secretary, had made the basic financial and other arrangements—with the help of the Algerians—which brought about the release of the hostages on Inauguration Day—January 20. The financial document was very complicated; it dealt with the transfer back to Iran of some of the funds that we were holding and with the litigation and mediation that would take place under various auspices to settle the outstanding claims of American companies and institutions against Iranians —claims which are still being adjudicated today in 1991. It was a complicated document. There were some people in the new Reagan administration who believed that a deal had been made which was injurious to American interests. They suspected that Carter had gone all out to do anything for the Iranians so that the hostages would be released before the election. Many of the new Reagan appointees were extremely suspicious of the Carter hold-overs like myself as well as of the agreements made during the end of the Carter administration which had not yet been inspected. Among others, Paul Wolfowitz, who was the new Director of the Policy Planning Staff, was asked to review the Us-Iran agreement. We sort of held our breath for two or three weeks, but finally Paul said that it was a fair deal which should be honored. Until then, we were wondering whether the Reagan administration would back out of the deal which would have had major implications.

Q: How did you deal with the US-Israel relationship?

DRAPER: We first checked all the Reagan campaign statements carefully. We were in close touch, driven by the needs to conduct our day-to-day business, with various elements of the Jewish community in the United States. It was clear from the election that Reagan was not dependent on the Jewish vote. On the other hand, a lot of Jewish

support for Carter had eroded particularly among the very conservative elements of the Jewish community. But there wasn't anything hard or fast about it. American Jews have a long agenda which goes far beyond support for Israel; for example, support for traditional liberal domestic social causes has always remained very strong. That leads the Jewish community, particularly at the Congressional and gubernatorial levels, to vote as it always had. Haig was very sensitive to the Israel question and actively wooed the Jewish community and Israel. That was quite clear from the start. It wasn't that he was strongly pro-Israel; he was more against previous policies which had rotated around Israel. He told us very clearly that the Palestinian issue was not the hub of the Middle East as it had been regarded for many years. His view was that even if the Palestinian question were solved the next day, there would still be chaos and many problems in the region. He felt that the real problem was the Soviet threat of domination. He therefore sought to develop an anti-communist coalition with Israel, if possible, playing a prominent role. This was a mysterious policy in many ways; Haig had trouble, as he always did, in articulating precisely what he wanted. On a practical country-by-country basis, this meant that countries that had been friendly and supportive of us, such as Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, would be receiving a lot of help and basic support. Countries such as Syria would be frozen out; in fact, there would be a considerable amount of hostility towards them. This new approach was not made clear in speeches, but it became increasingly apparent from his comments and positions.

Q: Was this new policy a problem for you and NEA?

DRAPER: I have over-simplified the new approach. The basic guidance was that we would turn away from past policies. That translated into that the American efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict in all of its dimensions were going to be relegated to the back burner, at least for a few years, while Haig and the new administration would attempt to build this new anti-Soviet coalition. The Palestinian problem would be somewhere in the back-ground; Israel would be given a lot of understanding and sympathy and the nit-picking that was allegedly being exercised by the Carter administration would cease. In the UN, we

were going to support Israel up and down the line and would veto anything that seemed antagonistic. That was the way is was to be. But to try to articulate this new direction on the large Middle East scale was very difficult. It was going to be very embarrassing to suggest that the United States would give up or put on the back burner the resolution of such crucial issues. In fact, those issues could not be put on the back burner. There were developments that made that impossible. It was easier to deal with bilateral issues with countries like Morocco because those questions were peripheral to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The new administration also took a much tougher line on Libya. Chet Crocker, the new Assistant Secretary for African Affairs and others, took office with a strong mandate to do something, if possible, about Qadhafi. The initial inter-agency meetings we had on North Africa concentrated on Qadhafi. The new administration was concerned about Qadhafi's support of terrorism which was directed against Western Europeans and Americans all around the world. He was supporting the Irish insurrectionists and the Moslem extremists in the Philippines and other armed uprisings. He was trying to destabilize Egypt and the Sudan and undermine Chad. He had threatened Tunisia in the past. He was an obnoxious gadfly. In previous administrations, we would have tried to destabilize Libya, but we looked at the nature of the opposition which we found in a pathetic and deplorable state. Also the Libyans population was as passive as any in the world. So destablization, even if successful, did not look very promising. Many of our Middle East friends, including Mubarak of Egypt, felt that we should become preoccupied with Qadhafi and that the more attention we paid to him, the more pleased he would become. We were subject to a lot of conflicting advice. By the early 1980s, we were pretty upset with Qadhafi; he had sponsored a lot of foolish activities in the United States including efforts to assassinate Libyan dissident students. Ultimately, we put more and more pressure on the Libyan Embassy, which they called “The People's Bureau” and finally closed it. We did permit the establishment of an Interest Section which essentially took care of Libyan students. In contrast to the Carter administration—its attitude I described earlier during the discussion

of exercising our rights of freedom of the seas—, Reagan decided to send the navy into the areas claimed as territorial waters by Libyans. It was not done in a confrontational way, but rather as a routine naval exercise, which was wise. We would send vessels through the Straits of Sidra, which is really a huge bay. The important thing was that the Reagan administration's signals were read pretty clearly by both our friends and adversaries. The new direction set off a round of talks with the Egyptians and others on how to contain the Libyans. Sadat was still the President of Egypt and he was eager to improve his relationships with the United States, but he had to bring along his own bureaucracy and administration, which was not always so easy. So he didn't always press very hard.

We reviewed many established policies. Carter had promulgated the so-called Carter doctrine, which Newsom has since made clear, involved very little coordination among Washington agencies. Carter made a promise which in effect would protect the Persian Gulf, but he didn't insure that he had the necessary forces to do so. The Reaganites sort of built on this in a way; they expanded the concept of the Rapid Deployment Force, but saw to it that the essential staging bases were available. That is how Morocco, Egypt and Israel became very useful. Some of the Reaganites felt that Israel could become a great strategic asset, but it became clear that it was not an ideal staging base for political and logistical reasons. It was too small and the political consequences would have been too great. But the Israeli understood the Reagan thrust and sought a closer strategic relationship with the United States. So during 1981, a lot of efforts were made to intensify training exercises and other similar activities. The Israelis had more success with the political side of the new administration that it did with the military side. That was standard.

What was somewhat disturbing in the early part of the new regime was the weakness of the NSC staff. In the first place, Richard Allen, who was the NSC Adviser, didn't enjoy the authority that he had, unlike most of his predecessors, even those that had worked in great anonymity. He was not in the right chain of command. Every president has his own style, but a weak NSC raised problems in the coordination of State and the NSC. We were accustomed to working closely with people who were personal friends and

lunch time companions—people who recognized each other's nuances and interests and molded them. We also felt very strongly that we had to make our government function as effectively as possibly. Allen came in not only in a position of weakness, but his appointments were strange, to put it mildly. For example, there was no recognized Russian expert on the staff. There were big gaps. And then there were a lot of ideologues. We found that when we sent recommendations to the White House in the usual manner, the NSC would put covering notes on the memos, or change them, or hold them as they normally would do. We found after a while that the staffers were “poisoning the well” by putting in their covering memos such statements as, for example: “Mr. President, this recommendation suggests that we provide more arms for Kuwait. You will recall that in November, 1979, you said before an audience in Atlanta that you would.....”. They were using his pre-Presidential statements as limitations on his actions as President. Some of the campaign statements were merely that; they just complimented Israel or bashed something that was easy to bash. The campaign statements were used to distort our recommendations. On the other hand, Reagan didn't want to see that many recommendations anyway, unlike Carter who wanted to see all the details of what was going in the world. The Reagan White House was set up entirely differently from Carter's. It had the troika—Meese, Deaver and Baker—running the show. It was a far more efficient White House than Carter's. The latter's staff consisted of people who never showed up at meetings or were late, didn't do their homework. Hamilton Jordan was a good example. In all of the four years during which I observed the White House, there was never a time when Jordan showed up on time for a meeting. So often a meeting would start, then he would show up fifteen minutes later and then we would have to take time to bring him up to date. In the Reagan White House, everything was efficient. People were not tardy and the process was kept moving. Oddly enough, Haig was an extremely good boss to work for. He would take criticism; you could tell him when he was going off on the wrong tangent. He respected his staff. He would compliment the staff which was probably result of his military training. He tried to insure that morale was good. Haig was different from the man described in the press; in conversations with small groups, he was quite

good. Consistency was not his strongest point; he would leave the track, but he would return to it. He was never critical, even when Begin sent him a letter in 1982, in which the Prime Minister has strongly criticized some things that I has said to the head of Israeli intelligence. Haig kind of laughed at it and never said a word.

Q: I find it interesting that a Prime Minister of a friendly country would delve into such detail. Was that an unusual modi operandi?

DRAPER: It was peculiar. It is of course not unusual in our history that a foreign government would complain about the activities or statements of an Ambassador. After all, we have kicked people out of the United States for actions that we didn't like. In my case, my statement concerned something that the Israeli wanted very much: preparations for an invasion of Lebanon. I was trying to stop it and they didn't like it. It was not a large incident; it just showed Begin's temper. You always have to be careful with the Israelis. There is a tendency, even among the sanest Israelis, to regard any criticism as anti-Semitic. I remember sometime after this incident reading in the newspapers an analysis by Simka Denitz, the Israeli Ambassador in Washington, of the attitudes of various State Department officials. He viewed me as anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli. He had absolutely no cause for that conclusion; it was just not true. He thought that I had gradually changed to have more sympathy for Israel. I never changed. It was an irritation to see that kind of stuff in print. In fact, Simka tended to regard all State Department officials as anti-Israel. When he got to know them better, he discovered that they weren't. He just assumed that they had changed; he didn't consider the weakness of his analysis.

Q: Let me ask you about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Was it a problem in the early 1980s?

DRAPER: It was not a monumental concern at the time. It was a matter if limited concern and interest for all of us, but we had been seeing its growth for years, going back fifteen or twenty years. TIME and NEWSWEEK did cover stories suggesting that fundamentalism

sprung up with the Iranian revolution. In fact, there had been a steady growth of it for several years in all Islamic countries ranging from Turkey to the Philippines. It was a phenomenon was of concern because it did not parallel American interests, but it was not a dominating element in the early years of the Reagan administration, in part because Haig was fascinated by a book that Claire Sterling wrote about terrorism. The book was deeply flawed, but Haig was greatly impressed by it. The substance of Sterling's arguments permeated a lot of Haig's views. This factor helps explain Haig's quick leap to support the “Yellow Rain” theory in Southeast Asia.

Q: That was the theory that the Vietnamese were using poison chemicals, which later turned out to be b-palm and other natural extractions.

DRAPER: Right. But Haig leapt far too quickly on the theory and really believed it.

Q: We have built military bases in Saudi Arabia and Oman and other places. Did this happen while you were in NEA and were they built to strengthen the anti-Soviet coalition or for other reasons?

DRAPER: This infrastructure construction started under the Carter administration, but you could probably go back as far as the Ford administration and find concepts being developed. It was harder to do so in the Ford administration because of the 1973 war and the consequent oil crisis. But Kissinger was certainly considering this policy. It got a major boost in the Carter administration in part because of Harold Brown, the then Secretary of Defense, who was far sighted person—basically a scientist, a very bright man. He and some of his associates started some strategic thinking which led to weapons such as the Patriot Missile system, which were used in the recent conflict with Iraq. We did work with the Saudis in particular and the Gulf States to build up their own facilities when we couldn't get all the things we wanted from the Egyptians until after the signing of the Israel peace treaty in 1979. When that was signed, we started exploratory discussions with the Egyptians; Sadat was very positive including giving us permission to navigate nuclear-

powered vessels through the Suez. But he couldn't overcome the resistance from his associates and advisers. The whole process of developing a military infrastructure in the Middle East accelerated in the Reagan administration, but it was already well underway. It was basically stimulated by a host of elements including the potential for Russian involvement in the area.

This initiative may sound a little strange now in 1991, but the Carter administration was shocked out of its earlier posture by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That was actually a shock to all Russian watchers. It was the first time since World War II that the USSR had moved into something other than a satellite state. When it happened, not were people shocked by the Russian action, but began to question of what they would do next—Pakistan, Iran, Turkey? The Russians were in the Afghanistan case not trying to protect a communist regime or a satrap; it was an odd action. Since the early years of Russian military exercises, they had been impressive. Then there were concerns about militant Iran and about weak and underpopulated Saudi and Gulf States who were looking for help from us, the British and to some degree even the French. Our logistic military planners were considering pre-positioned supplies in vast depots, vast underground protected hangers and large docking port facilities—all much larger than anything that we would want to use or need for civilian use. All these plans took a decade or more to implement, but they paid off during our mobilization just prior to the recent conflict with Iraq. Basically, the Saudis over-built. This was a matter of concerns to the Israelis and others; we built in safe guards, limiting what Saudis could do in the facilities. For example, the airfields closest to Israel were restricted from deployment of F-15s. It was a very difficult time because we barely won our battles with Congress and the Israeli lobby to permit the strengthening of Saudi Arabia that was necessary. This happened early in the Reagan administration. The first large arms package for Saudi Arabia was a real struggle; we won it in the Senate by two votes. The Israeli position really harmed Begin in the eyes of the White House. Reagan felt that Begin had broken promises in mounting a campaign against the deployment of AWACs and F-15s. We survived, but paid a heavy price particularly in domestic terms.

Most of the administration was in no mood to enter the Congressional fray very often; it was big, big struggle and occupied months and months of 24 hour-day, just lobbying on the Hill.

Q: Begin didn't endear himself with the Reagan administration?

DRAPER: Reagan was not kind of person who held a grudge. He was surprised and upset by some of Begin's actions, but he tended to be forgiving. Reagan was a very nice man. A lot of things did happen. The Israelis felt that they had the warmest-hearted, most supportive President in American history. They never had any one like Reagan. All American presidents had been friendly toward Israel, but they all didn't come through. Sometimes, when they did come through, it was with heavy conditions—for example, Nixon gave them full support, but made the Israelis pay a price in return. So they felt that the Reagan was very benign and they had very good reason to think so, which lead Israel to make some of the most colossal blunders in its history, including the invasion of Lebanon.

Q: Please expand on that thought.

DRAPER: The Israelis, not so much Begin as some of the people around him, thought that the US could be taken for granted. This led them to become extremely arrogant which showed in many ways. One of our major preoccupations in the early 1980s was, that under the terms of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, the complete evacuation of the Sinai by the Israelis in a three year period. That period ended in April, 1982. In the meantime, we were involved in transferring Israeli facilities from Sinai, including two huge air bases. There were many other matters, such as the transfer of the oil fields and security arrangements, which had to be carried out. This process was extremely difficult for Israel, both for security and psychological reasons; giving up the Sinai really hurt. They were particularly unhappy about giving up some of the settlements that had been established near the Gaza strip, including a place called Yammit, which was a beautiful-

resort-agriculture community that was a model. It looked like a small-scale Palm Springs. It had been originally sponsored by the Labor Party which then was in opposition to the Israeli government and therefore the community's evacuation cut across political and other lines. Previous administration had promised that settlers who went into the Sinai would never be kicked out. So the evacuation was a major agony for the Israelis.

As I mentioned earlier, there was also intense Israeli opposition to some of our arms sales. They also knew that we were discussing with Egypt the establishment of an air base at Ras Tannurah and other cooperative arrangements. They of course couldn't be sure what would happen. In the meantime, Lebanon was in a bigger than ever mess. The Palestinians there had armed themselves with a lot of 130 millimeter artillery and T-55 tanks; they were beginning to assume the proportion of a major force. Their power was exaggerated, of course, but they did initiate a lot of minor incidents and border crossings, which upset the Israelis. All the Israeli population in the northern region was supersensitive to Palestinian military activities. The occasional Katusha rocket would fall into a wheat field and cause all kinds of problems, not only from people who were upset by the fire the rocket started, but because communities had to have bomb shelters in school yards and take other protective measures. It was a tense situation and the settlers wanted their government to do something about it. There were all these pressure points and problems, which the Israeli government had to deal with.

In the later years, after Sadat, the administration pushed for concerted Egyptian-American activities against Libya. The Egyptians were very worried and pulled back sharply despite the considerable pressure that was applied to Cairo. I was involved with the extraction of the Falashas—the Ethiopian Jews—from their country to Israel. The Falashas were deeply oppressed and arrangements were made with the Egyptians and the Sudanese especially to get the Falashas out of Ethiopia and clandestinely transferred to Israel. The whole operation was secret, but a lot of it became public later. We can speak of it now because there is new Sudanese regime which was not in power during this emigration.

Many did get to Israel where there was some opposition from those who did not regard the Falashas as real Jews because of their skin color and other reasons.

The human rights drive was downplayed in the Reagan administration, but it was not totally abandoned. We continued to report on the situation and examination. We weren't as shrill about violations as we were in the Carter administration, but we watched it. Human rights has become a more important foreign policy tenet under all administrations.

I was at the White House a day or two after the hostages came home. They were brought to the White House for a ceremony, during which Reagan spoke. A number of people were invited which became a painful habit. People who had bled and died, like Hal Saunders, and who had devoted long, long hours to various release efforts, including secret missions, were totally ignored and were in fact deliberately not invited to the White House ceremony. The Reagan people were very rude and cruel even towards their own. One very prominent, strong-minded Jewish Senator who didn't support a certain Reagan program was made a pariah and was never invited to White House for years, although he was a fervent Reagan supporter on many other issues. Because he voted against the sale of AWAC, he was isolated. The Reagan people played hard ball, much more than any other administration that I knew.

The Deaver-Baker-Meese crowd probably thought that everything was working very well. Meese was not the efficient one; the Deaver and Baker people didn't cause any trouble for the State Department that I could see and they did make things work very well. The problems were with people below that level. In both the State Department and some parts of the Defense Department and in the lower reaches of the NSC, there were people who ultimately didn't stay very long—in some cases they couldn't get a security clearance. Some of them returned to work for Congressmen. One particularly outrageous character in the NSC, who in my eyes was an outright liar, didn't have any qualms about distorting papers that went over his desk to the President. I mentioned that some of our positions were greatly distorted before they went to the President. He was one of the

people responsible for this outrage. Fortunately, he was finally unmasked; the NSC knew that it had to get rid of him and were prepared to return him to academia when they found out that his reputation as an academic was such that no respectable university would accept him for a long time. That was an illustration of some of the workings of the lower echelons. Every administration has a lot of “cooks”; the Carter administration had a lot characters who didn't have any common sense.

Q: Let me return to the invasion of Lebanon. How did you perceive all those events?

DRAPER: In 1981, we had a crisis when Syrians helicopters attacked Christian position. The Israelis sent some aircraft which shot down a couple of helicopters. That brought on an immediate crisis because the Syrians brought into the Bekaa Valley some anti-aircraft missiles, That was a violation of the so called “Red Line” agreement which was negotiated in 1976 and permitted the Syrians to enter Lebanon, but without their missiles. That in effect allowed Israeli reconnaissance planes to fly over Lebanon without being threatened. But by bringing their missiles into Lebanon, the Syrians had violated the agreement. The Israelis were ready to attack. One of the problems at the time was that some of the Reagan ideologues, such as the lower level NSC man I mentioned earlier, were trying to get over the Vietnam syndrome and were hoping for a situation which would permit the Israeli to bomb Damascus with our assistance. Or they looked for other pretenses equally idiotic. We tried to get some sanity into the process. I am not saying that any of these actions might have happened nor that Haig would have gone along with some of the wild ideas. But there were people that he occasionally listened to and who had some influence here and there in Washington that were just too wild.

Haig brought Phil Habib out of retirement as a Special Emissary. He and I went to the region to diffuse the crisis by trying to get the Syrians to pull back their anti-aircraft missiles or by developing some other kind of acceptable arrangement. But whatever could be done could only be brokered by the United States since the Israelis and Syrians were not talking to each other. This was in the midst of a heavy electoral campaign in Israel. It was

a painful period. Phil and I saw early on that we wouldn't get any movement out of the Syrians; so we gradually made an effort to develop a program which would ease some of Israel's legitimate concerns in a pragmatic way. We came up with the idea of reducing the threat to Israel by the Palestinian forces stationed in Lebanon and with Saudi assistance, brought about a de facto cease-fire between the PLO and Israel, starting in July. We were hoping to reinforce this fragile cease-fire with other initiatives later on. We tried that, but were unsuccessful. But that was the first de facto agreement between Israel and the PLO; it was the source of great controversy in Israel. Began heard from many critics for seeming to recognize the PLO, but it did buy us about eleven months of relative peace.

Q: Tell us a little how Phil Habib, who had a long and illustrious career in the Foreign Service, operate.

DRAPER: It was very interesting. Phil knew many of the players because he had been Under Secretary for Political Affairs under Kissinger and had joined him on many of the “shuttle” trips. So he knew the Israelis, the Syrians and others by his participation on those trips. He was of Lebanese origin—his mother and father were both born in Lebanon who had come to the US in their youth. He had been brought up in a household with a Middle Eastern flavor. He did not speak Arabic, but many of the phrases were familiar to him from his childhood, especially the curse words. So his way of dealing with people was influenced by his Middle East background. He kissed, hugged, embraced; he understood the importance of hospitality. He was good with the Israelis who are very demonstrative people. He traveled very modestly; we had a small aircraft provided by the White House, but it was not one of the large planes. He was accompanied only by a small entourage—a secretary and myself. We depended on the staff assistance of Embassies in the region. We had an Air Force crew to handle the plane; they outnumbered the passengers by 4 to 3. Habib was a presidential emissary, but he was very careful to report to the President only through the Secretary of State. He never indulged in back channels communications. He was very much the consummate professional. He made sure that all Embassies were fully informed of what we were doing; everything was kept on the record. The only

exceptions were on matters of a clandestine nature, which were referred only in back channels communications; that was not different from the way an resident American Ambassador would operate. Habib was very wily and he had obvious empathy—he had an often-crude but quick sense of humor and an ease at developing a rapport with people—great instincts. He cultivated his “diamond in the rough” image and was better than any one I have ever know at “breaking the ice” with different people, including Prime Minister Begin. He teased Begin, which no one else ever could get away with. He drew laughs when no one else had ever dared to try to do anything of the kind. Begin was a very formidable character.

Initially, Habib got along very well with Assad of Syria. But their relationship deteriorated to the point at which Assad made it clear that he would never talk to Habib again. Assad unfairly blamed Phil for carrying a message from the Israeli which Assad didn't want to hear. He charged Phil with implying that the Israelis would do something which they didn't do. The record is clear on this issue; maybe there were translation problems. In a nut-shell, the issue was a cease-fire between the Israelis and the Syrians after the Israeli had moved into Lebanon in 1982. Habib was insisting on a cease-fire; he was carrying messages from Reagan. Assad said that he would accept a cease-fire, but he insisted that the Israelis had to move back another fifteen to twenty kilometers. Phil said that he would ask them, but added that he was not sure that he could convince them—there were no guarantees. The Israelis did not pull back and indeed crept forward, taking advantage of the terrain. Assad mistakenly felt that Phil had made a promise when he had not. As a matter of fact, Habib could not have made such a promise since it was quite obvious that the Israeli didn't want to pull back. But the Assad-Habib conversation became a misunderstanding. The Israelis heaped humiliation on the Syrians and Assad transferred some of his frustrations to Habib.

Q: These Habib negotiations lasted how long?

DRAPER: From early 1981—about April— to July when we achieved the cease-fire. The remainder of 1981 was spent traveling back and forth in the region trying to reach a follow-on agreement. We were trying to sell a plan which called for a pull back of forces from the Israel-Lebanon border—that would have pulled the PLO and other Arab groups out of artillery range of Israel. We had other schemes as well. It became clear when Sharon became Israeli Defense Minister that the Israel would move into Lebanon sooner or later to try to destroy the PLO and to set up a regime to their own liking. That was an absolutely stupid idea and in fact turned out to be one of Israel's biggest mistakes. We could see that outcome developing; Sharon practically told Habib and me at one meeting in December, 1981 what he had hoped to do—he did indicate that he did not yet have full Cabinet approval. So some of us spent between December, 1981 and June, 1982—when the Israeli actually invaded—trying to head off what we perceived to be a catastrophe not only for Israel, but also for the West and the United States. I spent a lot of time briefing Haig and Larry Eagleburger, who was then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Unfortunately, my prognostication were exactly on the mark. The image of American supplied aircraft, munitions, arms crashing down on civilian targets in Lebanon created a horrible uproar in the world and isolated the United States in the Arab world. People like Nick Veliotes, then the Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs, made similar predictions. Our trouble was, and it was the same trouble that we always had, that the administration could not develop the political will to confront Israel and to tell it that it could not invade Lebanon. Haig wrote in his memoirs that he warned the Israeli that they couldn't take any actions unless it was in response to an internationally recognized provocation; what ever the Israelis did would have to be proportionate to the provocation. That statement didn't mean a thing and no one understood it. The historians will have to decide whether the United States gave in effect a green light to Israel; many Israelis think so. The most common view is that when Sharon told Haig what he was going to do, he got the equivalent of a wink of approval. Haig did not: “You can't invade Lebanon” and he didn't wink; he just didn't comment in some cases. He listened to what the Israelis had to say; once the Israeli Chief of Intelligence told Haig that Israel would have to invade

if they couldn't get a better control of the situation. At that stage, we should have said: “No, you can not do that”. We might have had to get Reagan to get in touch with Begin or take other measures to impress the Israelis that important US interests were at stake and that they just couldn't proceed. But we didn't. The Israelis wanted not only to knock out the Palestinians, and were trying to provoke a little fight with the Syrians, which they managed to do, but they wanted to install a regime in Beirut amenable to the Israelis. That would have changed the whole complexion of the Middle East and just would not have been acceptable or possible. Lebanon was somewhat of an outsider in the Middle East in any case, but most of the countries of the regime wanted to regard it as an Arab country. Lebanon was a case, like Ireland and Cyprus, where religious strife would intensify political differences. It was a very complicated situation which made outcomes very unpredictable. From a professional point of view, it was very dangerous to have another Arab-Israel confrontation, such as between Syria and Israel, because we had to be concerned with the potential Soviet reaction. In 1967 and 1973, we were very close to an all out confrontation between the US and the USSR over the Middle East, which is what makes the area so dangerous. For all these reasons, we were very leery of any Israeli attack on Lebanon.

Q: When Haig didn't respond as he might have, did anyone suggest to him that he needed to take a stronger position?

DRAPER: Yes, indeed. There were some mild warnings. We wanted Haig and the President to go all out to stop, but the administration was not willing; it did not want a confrontation with Israel having been burned before. They did not want to do what Carter had done—seeming to turn against Israel. As it was, our relations with Israel weren't that good. Israel, in 1982, had attacked the atomic reactor in Baghdad and while many in the administration secretly applauded, we had to go along with a resolution in the UN condemning Israel. Israel had also unilaterally absorbed the Golan Heights, not just occupied them, but had in effect extended its sovereignty. That was very upsetting to us because they had done it without consultation. They had done what Kissinger had asked them not to do—no more surprises. And then there was one surprise after another.

The administration was so exasperated that it suspended the so called “Memorandum of Understanding” concerning security affairs that we had signed a few weeks earlier. That was the way we tried to show the Israelis that we were upset. We also held back the delivery of some aircraft that the Israelis had paid for. So at this juncture —1981/82—, our relationships were not outstanding. But the Israelis had the bit in their teeth and they were going to go all out regardless of what the American administration was saying—unfortunately. So we were not able to hold the Israelis back. Many of us were just holding our breaths knowing that the invasion of Lebanon would come sooner or later.

Q: How did the Israeli incursion begin?

DRAPER: It was set off by the attempted assassination of their Ambassador in London—Mr. Argov, who incidentally is still alive, but permanently crippled and hospitalized—terrible tragedy. But that was the excuse. Sharon had been secretly planning for this all along was able to sway the Cabinet and the Prime Minister. It started out for the first couple of days with air attacks on the Palestinians and a few other similar actions. Then it escalated until Israelis moved across the border with men and armor. Even then, they described the offensive as having limited objectives; they called it “Peace for Galilee”. The announced intention was to drive the Palestinian forces 40 kilometers. When they had reached that line, they went on to Beirut and surrounded the city. There were intermittent cease-fires all along, but none lasted very long. When the Israelis moved on Beirut, the situation changed. The limited objectives had been superseded. The Israelis surrounded Beirut; it was the first time that an Arab capital was in danger of being conquered by the Israelis—that was a major turning point. We desperately tried to diffuse the situation; we helped to bring about the various cease-fires. The Israelis destroyed with virtually no losses the Syrian anti-aircraft missiles systems in Lebanon. The Israelis shot down something like 90 of Syrians first line aircraft. The Syrians were quite bloodied; they dishonored themselves on the ground. From the military point of view, the Israeli operation was not that impressive. With all the resources that they had, they should have been able to move through a small country like Lebanon much more quickly. The Palestinian forces largely

retreated in fair order without too many casualties to Beirut where they could hide in the warrens of the city and where they could defy the Israelis.

Q: As this invasion proceeded, what was the United States doing? What was the Pentagon saying?

DRAPER: The Pentagon was not dispensing any advice; it was basically describing what was going on militarily. The Israelis moved relatively slowly up the coast. What the world did see was vast bombing of essentially civilian areas. It was well covered by the media and TV particularly. The media fanned out over Sidon and Beirut and saw fires from bombs and other destruction; what it saw was a significant military power being applied to a small country that was basically defensive. Women and children were in the camera's eyes to the great embarrassment of Israel. A lot of the destruction was caused by American-made aircraft dropping American-made bombs. Since the US was seen as such a close associate of Israel, we were blamed not only in the Middle East, but throughout the world, for allegedly having given the “green light”. That happened even in the United States. In fact, our laws were being violated because the arms and munitions that we sold can not be used except for defensive purposes. They can not be used to subdue other countries. We had all sorts of restrictions on our arms sales and particularly with the Israel. For example, countries that resold any equipment that they had bought from us many years earlier would have been in violation of our laws. In all cases, we had many rules concerning the use of weapons of terror, like cluster bombs, which clearly barred their use unless the purchasing country had been attacked by another power. The Israelis used them in their offensive operations in Lebanon, clearly in violation of United States laws.

Q: Did we feel that we couldn't do anything about it because the administration felt that the Jewish lobby would not support any US action or demarche?

DRAPER: That was one major reason. For example, under US law, we could have immediately suspended all military, all economic assistance to Israel, for example. But of course we couldn't do that for domestic political reasons. I was overseas with Habib at the time and I don't know where in Washington the decision not to penalize Israel was made. It was not a surprise; it was regrettable. Realistically, it was obvious that we would not go all out to boycott Israel. It was also a fact that Israel had occupied half of Lebanon. We had to make the best of a bad situation and preserve what American interests we could. It could have been quite possible that fanatics might attack American Embassies and businesses; we just had to do something. So we moved from trying to get a temporary cease-fire to a longer range solution. The only was to do that was to get the Israelis out of Lebanon. We immediately looked at the idea of getting the Syrians and the Palestinians fighters out of Beirut and perhaps even out of Lebanon. Ultimately we worked something out.

Q: Where were you physically during this period?

DRAPER: The night that Argov was killed a task force under my chairmanship was established in Washington. Habib was on his way to join the President in Europe; he was planning another mission to the Middle East and went to Europe to consult with Reagan and Haig. From there, he did go to the Middle East where I joined him a couple of days later. I met him in Damascus, so that we were when the fighting started. During the invasion period, we spent considerable time in Israel and visited Damascus again. The we took a dangerous trip through the fighting by back roads to get to Beirut. Phil spent a lot of time in Beirut because he could have secret meetings with the Israelis there. I would occasionally helicopter to Israel to brief the government there. When we got agreement in principle to evacuate the Palestinian fighters, we had to find new homes for them. We flew to Amman, even to London to meet King Hussein, to see whether some could be resettled in Jordan. We also flew to Cairo and then Damascus again. It was a shuttle that never stopped—it went on 24 hours per day week after week. Finally, in August, the evacuation started preceded by lot of preparations which of course raised a number of problems

that had to be raised at the last minute. We had to—very regrettably because we would have preferred not to—find an international force at the demand of the Lebanese and the Palestinians to protect the latter as they were being evacuated. It was a reasonable request, but the Israelis would not accept a UN force which was our preference. We already had a UN force in Southern Lebanon, but the Israelis were adamantly opposed to anything that was connected to the UN. So very, very reluctantly, we put together a multilateral force of Italians, French and Americans. Reagan personally approved this scheme, but both Phil and I were very reluctant to do that, but we saw no other alternative. We still had to get guarantees from the good guys and the bad guys—the Israelis, the Christians, etc—to make sure that the Palestinians' families would be protected. We gave assurances, made all kinds of guarantees in good faith. Unfortunately, many of the assurances were broken later when then newly elected President Gemayel was assassinated and the Israelis moved into Beirut despite their promises. They allowed the Christians to massacre many hundreds of Palestinians in the Shatila and Sabra camps.

Q: Did we believe that the Israelis were implicated in this tragedy?

DRAPER: Of course. One of the items in the subsequent investigation records showed that I personally had been in touch with the Israelis to protest the massacres. When I found out about the events, I dictated a message to Defense Minister Sharon which was given to Israeli intermediaries. I assigned full blame to him for what was happening because he had complete control of the area and could have stopped the massacres if he wished. It was obscene. We did everything we could to stop the Christians; it was a desperate and difficult situation.

We managed to evacuate the Marines and the Italians and the French after seventeen days, which was long enough. We had never contemplated these forces staying more than thirty days. The Palestinian and Syrian fighters had been evacuated and that operation had gone smoothly. The Palestinians and the Lebanese were upset that these troops had left Lebanon, but we had to do it. We certainly didn't want the Marines to stay any longer

than was absolutely necessary. At that time, the situation looked pretty good. The Israelis were behaving themselves; the Syrians and Palestinians were quiet; there were very few problems. In fact, the Lebanese army was beginning to take over its own territory. So by the beginning of September, we flew back to Washington to discuss what our next steps might be.

I returned from those Washington consultations and went to Israel first to start a new stage which called for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. I was starting that negotiation between Israel and Lebanon. We arrived in Israel on September 14, when we got the word that the building in which Gemayel was meeting had been blown up. We didn't know until late that night that Gemayel had been killed in the bomb blast. I was awakened at the hotel around 3 or 4 a.m. by people calling from Washington telling me that the Israelis were moving into Beirut—they had only surrounded before and their move into the city was contrary to all understandings and assurances received. The city was filled with old people, non-fighters, the families of the Palestinians who had been evacuated. So I got in touch with the most senior Israeli I could find—the Deputy Secretary of the Foreign Ministry—and he got in touch with Begin. We had promises that the Israeli troops had not entered the city, but we just occupying the hills surrounding the city. They were occupying checkpoints to keep the various Lebanese factions from fighting each other. I had an appointment to see Begin very early that morning—6:30 or 7 a.m.—; he reiterated some of the same promises that I had gotten a few hours before—that the Israelis were taking only limited steps. In the meantime, Washington had told me that it wanted me to be the official representative at the Gemayel funeral which, according to Lebanese custom, was going to be held that afternoon. I asked the Israelis for a helicopter to get to Lebanon, which they provided. As I stepped off the aircraft at Israeli headquarters in Lebanon, which was in the hills just above Beirut, I saw many signs of fighting—artillery fire, tank fire, small arm fire. I asked to the American who had come to meet my helicopter what was going on only to be told that the Israelis had moved into the city despite what had been said to me only three hours earlier.

Q: Did you feel that the Israelis were trying to deceive you or was the military just proceeding regardless of the civilians?

DRAPER: The whole week showed that the Israelis just couldn't be trusted at that point. Two days later they allowed the Christian militia to enter the Palestinian camps. I don't know for sure that there was a concerted Israeli government decision to take specific actions; they may have just happened, but certainly the Israeli moved beyond the agreed line around Beirut, thereby violating many of their commitments. This fact was accepted by even the strongest pro-Israeli proponents in the administration because within days the Reagan administration had agreed to return the multinational force back into Lebanon. That would not have happened unless we had felt guilty because all our promises and assurances of safety for the Palestinian families had been broken. Our Marines were sent back at that point out of guilt feeling.

Q: This whole episode turned into a real disaster for the United States, didn't it?

DRAPER: It sure did.

Q: How did you get the Palestinians to agree to leave Lebanon?

DRAPER: We worked through intermediaries. We communicated in writing. Our notes were very, very carefully drafted. I wrote 99 percent of them. They are all available in the record. The notes were addressed to Arafat, so that technically you might say that we were in communication. We did get approval in principle to have “proximity talks”—one party in one room and the other in another with an intermediary going back and forth—and perhaps even face-to-face talks. As it turned out, we didn't have to. Of course, there are pros and cons to any method of dialogue. We didn't want to have any closer relationships because we knew that the Israelis would go up the wall. It might even have sabotaged the chances for a cease-fire and withdrawal. There was also the question of security; it would have required us to go into parts of Beirut which were being constantly shelled and

bombed. Habib and I would have been tracked and who knows who might have wished to blow up the building we might have been in? So it was very difficult to decide how to negotiate with the PLO. We were prepared to have “proximity talks”, but didn't have to, as I said. We used to joke about it; when we told the Lebanese Prime Minister that we might do this, he agreed and said: “ You Americans can go into the dining room, the Palestinians will go into the living room and we Lebanese will go into the bathroom”. Despite all the fighting, we did get messages back and forth. There were delays at times; there were no mechanical methods of communications—telephones, telexes, etc. We had to wait for the emissaries to weave their ways through the fighting. It was all very complicated; we had many deals worked out, including a special checkpoint which allowed the emissaries to travel back and forth without being seen by an Israeli soldier. That was known as “Checkpoint Draper” because I had negotiated it between the Lebanese army and police and the Israeli army and intelligence and other factions. We had all kinds of special ways. Sometime, we might be able to get a telephone call through to some people. We had a very active Lebanese intelligence service working with us. The Israelis permitted the telephone lines to remain open so that they could tap them.

We finally got an agreement, but it depended on putting a multinational force into Lebanon for a while and an agreement that all the factions in Lebanon would not attack. I got that from himself—he was the leader of the Christians—. We put it all on paper to the PLO. The evacuation was carried out in safety; it was difficult moment, but no one was hurt. By and large, the process worked.

We were very lucky that the Tunisians agreed to take the PLO. That took a great effort, which we did at long distance. Habib was hoping that the bulk of the Palestinians would go to Egypt, but Mubarak would not agree. He did not want the PLO headquarters in his country. We wanted the Palestinian fighters to go some place where strict control could be exercised over them. Egypt was one of the few places we thought would satisfy that objective. It had a strong army and a good intelligence and police force. But Mubarak was completely unwilling, at least as far as the PLO headquarters was concerned.

Jordan would accept only limited numbers; Yemen agreed to take some back, but the whole resettlement process was full of complications. The PLO did not want to go to Syria for obvious reasons—Assad was so angry at Arafat. As it turned out, the Syrians were the most accommodating. For a while, we despaired of finding even a temporary home for these people, but the Syrians accepted quite a few and that eased the problem considerably. The Iraqis were willing to take some Palestinians, but there were other problems. We thought if they went there, it would just create other problems; so we were never serious about that possibility. We were trying to evacuate thousands and thousands of men who were leaving wives and children in Lebanon. The Red Cross was very upset with us for a while because they felt that families should not be separated in evacuations of the kind we were fostering. We gave some thought to moving all the Palestinians out of Lebanon, but that would have meant a difference between 12,000 and probably 140,000. The only comparable transfer was between Greece and Turkey after World War II. One of our original ideas was to move the fighters and their families and others to Northern Lebanon in an unpopulated area in sort of an enclave. The Lebanese would not accept that; they hated the Palestinians. There was a lot of sympathy for the Palestinian political cause, but not for their behavior. The Palestinians were very bad. The Shiites in Southern Lebanon had moved the Palestinians out of their area and had welcomed the Israelis to some extent, which the Israelis ruined, of course, later. The Lebanese hostility toward the Palestinians was such that they wouldn't consider leaving the fighters at least in Lebanon. After going through all the options, we reached the conclusion that we just couldn't send all the Palestinians out; we had to settle for just getting the fighters evacuated. We settled on that to save Beirut and American prestige; the situation just had to be diffused so that it would be possible for the Israelis to withdraw in good order with their own “face” saved. That was to be the second stage. There was no other choice to what finally happened; we tried to do the maximum, but had to settle for something less. We did the best we could.

Q: During your “shuttle”, did you find any division among the Israelis on the Lebanon invasion?

DRAPER: In the first week, there was completely unity across the board, including the opposition parties. That gradually waned as it became quite clear that the operation might not be as moral as originally sold. Three or four weeks after the invasion, an Israeli Colonel, who had been a real hero, resigned making it clear that he could no longer kill women and children in the Beirut area. A lot of under-currents of dissatisfaction developed. You could also detect differences when you observed how their various clandestine services were behaving. They obviously all held different views. Military intelligence was very skeptical about the possibility of setting up a friendly Lebanese government; they were very skeptical of the capacity of the Christian militias. Other elements of the Israeli intelligence community felt differently; there was strong support among some of these organizations for Gemayel and his family and for the Falange. There were others who had differing views on how to handle the occupied zone in South Lebanon and the Shiites which were 80 percent of the population in that part of the country. There were other differences over how to handle the Druze; there was ambivalence about what to do with the territory that the Druze occupied. The Israelis initially disarmed the Druze and then resupplied them later. We saw a lot of funny things happening.

As time passed, the Shiite element in South Lebanon, who had initially welcomed the Israelis, turned against them, partially for economic reasons. The Israelis did not let them harvest their orange crop. That was the end of the farming seasons for them. There were other things that the Israelis barred them from doing. It was stupid, but the policy was fostered by a lot of Israeli merchants who were shipping goods to the Shiites from Israel and didn't want competition for their own wares. There were a lot of reasons; I think there were many Israelis who thought that they could treat South Lebanon just as they treated Gaza and the West Bank. That view was not of course held by all Israelis, but there were many who didn't understand how counter-productive their policies were. When you interfere with the livelihood of already poor people, it is pretty traumatic. This policy gave the Shiite fundamentalist and other fanatics an opportunity to regain power and gradually

over a period of months they turned the whole population against the Israelis and made the situation more and more difficult.

Q: When you protested the Sabra and Shatila massacres, did you have instructions?

DRAPER: No. Habib and I, while we were in the region, operated largely without instructions. We were implementing a policy as we went along; the policy was generally to do the best we could. When I returned to the Middle East on September 14, that was the day Gemayel was assassinated. I was in Lebanon on the 15th; on the night of the 16th—approximately—, we saw signs of some Israeli activity, although we weren't sure what was happening; it could have been the Christians moving back into Beirut. But we weren't sure of what was happening for another 24 or 48 hours. Of course, during this time, we were trying to get Israeli assurances and also Christian promises not to enter Beirut. We went to see Gemayel's brother, who later became President, to ask him to keep his Christian militias out of the city. A lot of this became public later when the Israelis investigated the events of these weeks and punished the people responsible—there were lot of people punished. But we didn't know what was going on at the time, except that we were getting calls from Lebanese people, intelligence services, reporters. We could see through binoculars that there was considerable activity in the city. For example, the Israelis were firing illumination shells near the Palestinian camps. That aroused our suspicion. We discovered later that on that first night they let the Christian militia into the camps.

The Israelis maintained, at least at the time of the massacres, that there were still 3,000 or 4,000 fighters in the area that had to be rooted out. They insisted that they had intelligence information that had led them to that conclusions. I kept asking them for their sources because our checks indicated that there may have been a handful of fighters who had gone underground. There was a handful of former officials who were hiding out—one or two of them we helped to reach Damascus safely. They were the so called “scholars”—people who ran the Palestinian libraries, etc. At most there were a handful of guerrillas; it was certainly not an organized resistance. There were a few armed men in the camps,

some of whom our Embassy officials had talked to, but they were all men 60 or 70 years old. They may have had old shotguns, but they were not a threat. Essentially, the camps were disarmed. Sharon, in particular, had pushed Gemayel, when he was still alive, to enter the Palestinian area. We have records of this. Sharon wanted all these people cleaned out. The Israelis and Sharon were partially correct because the Palestinians had stored large amounts of arms and ammunition in underground caves and vaults. The Lebanese forces had volunteered to enter the areas to remove these supplies. They had people who could have done the job over a period of time. There were undeniably great caches of arms and ammunition that had to be removed; that was part of the understandings. The Lebanese government wanted to do it their way; the Israelis wanted the government to invite them to do the job for it. Gemayel's assassination gave the Israelis the excuse to proceed. So the Israelis entered Beirut, breaking their promise, and found gigantic caches of arms and ammunition that had been built up over the years. A lot was small arms. The Israelis got a lot of intelligence by searching the libraries and file rooms and other areas. So from one point of view, one can understand why the Israelis did what they did, but on the other, they did break a government-to-government promise. It was a shock to have the Chief of State of a country tell the emissary of another country, which was its main ally, something that turned out not to be true. That is quite an experience.

Q: Did you think Begin knew what was going to happen?

DRAPER: Someone in that room knew. Whether Begin did, is a mystery. The Israeli investigators of the Sabra-Shatila massacres found contradictory statements including a record made on the Jewish Sabbath which indicated that one Israeli official had called Begin to tell him some of the things that were happening. Begin, in his testimony to the investigators, denied having had such a call. Begin was a very faithful Jew; he would not customarily pick up a telephone on the Sabbath as he was preparing to go to a synagogue. So it is hard to tell where the truth lies.

Let me review the sequence: I had just returned from the United States and was in Israel, when we heard of the explosion which we later found out had killed Gemayel. Then we got the word that the Israelis might be engaged in some military activities; at that stage, we got in touch with Begin and got his promise that the Israelis would just encircle the city. We then left for Beirut to discover that the Israelis were going beyond encirclement; they were penetrating the city. Two days later, we found the evidence of a huge massacre. I was still in Beirut at that time. With Washington guidance, we then immediately focused getting the Israelis out of Beirut. The condemnation of the massacre was world-wide. We wanted the Israelis out of Beirut, out of Lebanon if possible, but at least as far away from Beirut as possible. We encountered great resistance from the Israelis to move back at all, but the public pressure, both within and outside Israel were so tremendous, that the government had to retreat to some degree. The whole Beirut incident later led to an investigation of the invasion and the massacre and the fall of Sharon. Although we focused on getting the Israelis out of Beirut and the surrounding area, because of our guilt complex, we had to bring back international forces to police the area and lend a presence. That was not something that either Habib or I recommended. Phil was in Washington at the time, so I can't be sure of that, but I doubt that he would have recommended the return of the multinational force. The decision was made unilaterally in Washington on the grounds that the US had to do something.

There has been a distortion in the history of the period. We did not bring the Marines back with a standard “military mission objective”. But there was an objective and that was for the Marines to be a presence while the legitimate Lebanese government could re-establish its authority. We didn't have a peace-keeping mission. It was very amorphous. It is a fact that the military didn't have its usual objectives, which are all spelled. If they had that sort of objective, the Marines would not have been placed where they were. They were put in the airport area because the Israelis controlled the airport and they would not pull out unless Americans were assigned there. The Israelis didn't want to be fronting against the French or the Italians for various reasons. None of the multinational forces came as

peace-keepers or police; otherwise there would have been thirty of forty thousand more —it would been a major military operation which would have occupied the area. But our objective was political; it was to lean on the legitimate government of Lebanon to assert their own authorities, build their own armies and use their police forces in a constitutional way. It was not an ideal solution by any means.

Q: Where were you during this period?

DRAPER: I went back forth between Lebanon and Israel. We had to get Israeli agreement to evacuate Beirut and other parts of Lebanon. The first multinational force worked in the port areas because that is the way we evacuated the Palestinians. But in this case, we had to get the Israelis out of Beirut and environs—it was bad enough that they were occupying an Arab capital. But we couldn't get anything done unless they at least left the airfield. That was our main logistic area. In addition, the Lebanese wanted the airport back so that they could start civilian traffic again. It was an economic necessity. So the Marines were assigned to the airfield. The Israelis resisted; they wanted to share occupation of the airport because they wanted to keep their liaison aircraft flying and out of the airport. The hero of this episode was Casper Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense. He said that he wouldn't accept that solution. We finally took over the airfield; the Israelis pulled back 100 yards from the airfield—that was all. They gave up every inch grudgingly.

There were other complications. The Marines were constrained by Habib and myself from expanding their perimeters beyond a certain area. We knew that it was unsound from a military point of view, but the Marines wanted to take control of a major highway which paralleled the airfield area. But that was the only highway that could supply Israeli forces in the mountains. So the Israelis wanted freedom to use the highway. Negotiations were already very difficult; we couldn't ask the Israelis to give up a supply road to some major forces and to have to rely on helicopters and air drops. So we compromised that they could still use the highway for a period of time. That prevented the Marines from taking over the area they wanted; there were occasions when the Israelis would stray into Marine

held areas; we had the incident when a Marine lieutenant told an Israeli tank to leave and actually pulled his pistol out. There were a number of small incidents.

Phil and I felt that it would be best if the Marines and the other multinational forces could be withdrawn as soon as possible. What we needed was an excuse; we had hoped that the Lebanese army would take over a key area outside of Beirut from which the Israelis were withdrawing or where there might still have been conflict—that would have been a first. I personally wanted the Lebanese army move into the Ashuf area—mountains east of Beirut were the Druze were in control and where certain Christian militias had moved to in order to compete with the Druids. If the Lebanese could have done that, it would have been an adequate excuse to get the multinational forces out of Lebanon. But that moment never came. For one reason, the Lebanese army was disorganized; many of the soldiers had returned to their families. A new army had to be recruited. With Marines, we brought training teams and were recruiting like mad. Many of the marines that were assigned did a lot of training. We were very excited by how much progress was being made. We were optimistic that the Lebanese army with a few months of training could really do something. Then the traditional rivalries among the Lebanese began to surface; the President, Amin Gemayel, was weak—he couldn't control his own Christian people. Many of the Israeli organizations were working at cross-purposes. Before we knew it, there erupted intense sniping between the Druze and the Christians, between Shiites and others—car bombs were exploding, there was intimidation, etc. So the situation gradually deteriorated.

The Marines had returned in September 1982 and were welcomed for many months. But starting in February or March, 1983, their position also began to deteriorate; they were no longer welcomed with open arms by the population; they were subjected to some minor sniping and there were some security problems. Then there was an car bomb attack on the American Embassy during which 70 people were killed or injured. We reached a withdrawal agreement on May 17, which I signed on behalf of the United States, but we had not yet reached the point at which the Lebanese army, even with the new recruits and

the training and the arrival of 36 M-60 American tanks, could take over. There were still too many complications; as a matter of fact the situation was deteriorating.

Habib and I had largely accomplished what we had set out to do. We were both desperately tired; Phil had a medical problem. So our role was taken over by Bud McFarlane, the former National Security Adviser. He and his team went to the Middle East; the situation was rapidly deteriorating and fighting began between the Lebanese army and the Druze and the Ashuf area that I mentioned earlier. Despite the advice of the local Marine commander, we were sucked into the fighting; we brought in battleships and attacked Syrian anti-aircraft batteries. At a certain point, the Lebanese and various factions looked at what was happening and noticed that the United States had come in on one side or another. I must say—strongly—that a few weeks after we had left the area, we did appear to take sides; that was something that Phil and I and others had violently opposed. It was a terrible policy. The appearance of the United States taking sides in an what was essentially a civil war led ultimately to the attack on the Marines.

Q: I can't imagine a more difficult task than having to deal with hard nosed Marine officers and hard nosed Israeli government which was being very difficult in any case. And you were an official of the State Department which has the reputation of being conservative and not understanding. What kind of problems did that create?

DRAPER: None with the American military. They were absolutely terrific. They did an outstanding job and we were highly complimentary. Some of the decisions that were made had nothing to do with the politics of the Lebanon situation. I came from a military family and I must say that I thought that who ever decided to put all of our Marines in barracks in the Beirut area should have been investigated and court-martialed. There was a reason for doing it; the helicopters which were shuttling the Marines from Beirut to the aircraft carriers and back were falling apart. It was dangerous to fly over the ocean in those transports. So placing the Marines ashore was almost a necessity, but to put them in barracks, which was blown up, may not have been the wisest decision. That was a military decision which had

nothing to do with the local political situation. Reagan vetoed the idea of an investigation or a court-martial, which could have cleared things up a little bit; so it turned into something else. The attack on the barracks was considered a military disaster because the American public largely regarded our presence in Lebanon as a peace-keeping military function. And it was not that; it was a political operation with the military being one of the instruments that were used. We really didn't want the military presence, as I mentioned earlier.

Besides the local complication, back in Washington there were people in the Pentagon and in the White House and other places that were fighting over the idea of bringing massive American military forces to Lebanon and in effect take over the areas of that country as the Israelis and Syrians withdrew. They wanted to take over on a grand scale. No one could reach a decision on this proposal, but I certainly had no enthusiasm for it and neither did Habib nor the military assigned to my staff at the time. But there were some ambitious people in Washington and as Geoffrey Kemp, who was the NSC staffer working on the Middle East later said, no one could make up their mind. It turned out that there were some NSC people, including Kemp, some Pentagon people and those Reaganites who wanted to destroy the “Vietnam syndrome” once and for all, who wanted a more active policy. Opposed to them were people in State Department who really knew Lebanon who were skeptical and then there was Casper Weinberger, who was opposed to any further military involvement. When you lose 300 Marines, it will of course be viewed as a military catastrophe, which was a misguided perception in many ways; it does not tell the whole story. I blame the decision to fire artillery, bring in the battleships and take other military actions which made it appear that we favored the Christian militias, which was not the case and skewed perceptions of our objectives. When that view took shape, we were dead. The bombing of the Marine barracks was just one result of the change in perception of our objectives; other anti-American activities would have occurred—the Lebanese people turned completely against us.

Q: Tell us a little more if you will about the different kinds of UN or multinational peace-keeping forces that you observed.

DRAPER: I was involved directly or indirectly with forces that were marshaled in the 1970s and 80s. The most prominent of these was the 1978 formation of the UN peace-keeping force in South Lebanon known as UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon). Before that, in 1975 after the second Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement, I was on a mission that moved into the Sinai to spot sites for our surveillance force and systems that were to be deployed near the key passes—the Mitla Pass and others—in the central Sinai area. Also in 1981-82, I was deeply involved in forming a multinational force for the Sinai to monitor the final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. That force had to be formed because we could not put together a UN force as originally anticipated in the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty because of the threat of a veto—by the USSR and others perhaps—in the Security Council. We made a commitment to Israel at the time that in addition to continuing various overhead surveillance of the Sinai—primarily aircraft, but satellites as well—we would also form a ground multinational force. The overhead surveillance required the permission of the Egyptians and Israelis when conducted and the pictures taken where then distributed to both sides so that they could see whether any violations of the truce had taken place. The ground force had to consist of troops whose countries had diplomatic relations with both Egypt and Israel. It was a lot of work putting that together, trying to overcome problems raised by Egypt and primarily Israel. We had to virtually negotiate everything from tent pegs to the caliber of weapons that we could use, the rules of engagement, etc. We found some superb Scandinavian military officers, but we were restricted to a certain extent by the requirement to find countries that maintained diplomatic relationships with both countries.

One aspect that is true of virtually all peace-keeping forces is that since the end of World War II there has been a tacit agreement that the Great Powers would not use their troops as part of UN peace-keeping forces. Nevertheless, beginning in 1948-49 with a variety

of supervisory forces in the Arab-Israeli theater, there were some American and Soviet observers attached to UN forces. There was a tradition that an American officer would be the chief-of-staff of the UN forces headquartered in Jerusalem, but would cover Egypt, Syrian and Lebanon. We had other observers—few in numbers—from time to time. The Egyptians were confined primarily to Egypt and Syria and had to be restrained periodically when they tried to extend their areas of operations. But putting together a peace-keeping force as we did in 1978 was very difficult because a lot of potentially eligible countries did not have diplomatic relations with Israel or were considered hostile by Israel. That group included Greece, for example. The caliber of the forces was often a problem, but some did surprisingly well. The Fiji forces for example contributed outstanding troops to UNIFIL which are still there. The Israeli and the Lebanese factions operating in South Lebanon are very respectful of the Fijians who are excellent soldiers who go by the book. The French contributed crack troops which at the beginning improved measurably the caliber of the over-all force. But there were also weaknesses; the Israeli found, for example, that the Irish troops were not always of good caliber. The Israelis, I think, resented the Irish for seeming to enjoy themselves and often challenged them rather than others. We had Iranian troops in 1978, but they had to be withdrawn in 1979 when the Shah's regime began to collapse. But we had considerable success and some tribute has to be paid to countries such as Italy, which had never contributed forces to a UN operation, but which did participate first in the Sinai by sending naval vessels which closed a big gap. You could always depend on some country to help out. The Canadians have always contributed troops, but it is such a small population that it has to rotate its troops through “hot” spots like Cyprus, Africa or the Middle East and that over and over. The Canadians are very useful because often we needed bilingual communications; these are always in English, but if you can have English and French that makes the tactical communications so much better because more people can receive them.

Q: U Thant was berated in 1967 for precipitously pulling UN troops out. Was that justified? What has been or can be done to insure that UN forces are not withdrawn prematurely?

DRAPER: The mandates issues by the UN since 1967 has always taken into account what U Thant had done. At the time, no one could understand why he had taken that action. In fact, Nasser who had called for the removal of the UN forces had assumed that U Thant would resist; he felt that he had made a token gesture that he could use in his propaganda war against Israel; he was astonished as every one else when the UN troops were withdrawn. U Thant justified his action by an over-legalistic interpretation of his mandate.

One of the problems with peace-keeping forces is that not all of the participants fully understand the nature of these forces. They really can not be armed for genuine deterrence. They have to manage peace-keeping—separation of forces—through tact and diplomacy and some military patrolling. But they are always in trouble with the forces that they are separating. Peace-keeping can't be done with true force. The UN troops are always outnumbered and outgunned by the confronting forces. Nowhere was that truer than in Southern Lebanon. Israel unfortunately has been so negative toward UN forces through the years—in part because they have been challenged and embarrassed by UN disclosures. This has led to a certain amount of loss of political support for UN forces. It is doubly ironic that Congress withheld financial support for some peace-keeping operations, which had been formed by the US—for example, the UN force in Southern Lebanon. That was tragic. Congress did that because of the pressure and propaganda put out by the friends of Israel and by Israel itself. That had led to a lot of serious problems. In 1982, for example, the US was compelled to form a multinational force, including US Marines, for Lebanon because the Israel had vetoed our preferred option: a UN peace-keeping force. We then didn't have any choice. If Israel had not been so negative, we might have had a different kind of arrangement. Israel at that time was not only antagonistic to UN forces, but hostile and distrustful. That distrust goes back to the formation of Israel. One of the aspects that is endemic to all UN peace-keeping forces or any mediating force is the tendency of people to favor and be sympathetic to he underdog. In the Israel-Arab confrontation, beginning with the founding of Israel, UN forces on the ground tended to

sympathize with the Arabs rather than the Israelis. This feeling grew and grew. In 1948, there was the separation of Hebrew University on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem by the armistice line. The UN supervised the truck supply line to Mount Scopus; it found weapons and radio equipment etc. that was being smuggled. The Israelis viewed that interdiction as a negative, one-sided UN view. There probably were in the UN forces at that time some anti-Israeli or anti-Semitic points of view. After all, there had been UN representatives that had been assassinated or intimidated through the years—Count Bernadotte, for one. So some of the bias was understandable, but it became the basis for Israeli distrust and dislike of the UN. The average Israeli, looking at some of the anti-Israel votes in the UN. General Assembly, might well conclude that 99 percent of the world was against his country. This just reinforces century-long feeling of many Jews that they are a distrusted race, disliked and isolated; it contributes to that feeling of non-acceptance which is a great factor in the Jewish psyche.

Q: In 1984, you left Middle East issues. What did you do next?

DRAPER: I was asked by senior State officials to spend most of 1984 to undertake a series of public addresses, speeches and appearances around the country. So I spent most of 1984 on the road, with the understanding that I would return to Washington at least once a week. I went to most of the lower 48 States and Alaska; didn't get to Hawaii unfortunately. I propounded and defended American foreign policy in the Middle East. It was well organized; we worked through the chapters of the Council for Foreign Relations and other groups. It was very, very interesting.

Q: What was the thrust of your message and what responses did you elicit?

DRAPER: The death of the 240 plus Marines in late 1983 by a truck bomber was a very traumatic event. At that time, the administration was on the defense on the issue of why the US stayed involved in the Middle East. There were a lot of Americans, who supported the administration otherwise, were upset or puzzled. Part of my mandate was

to explain the picture as best we could and to justify the decision to put the Marines in and then to pull them out. It was a painful period. At one point, President Reagan described our involvement in Lebanon as a “vital national interest”. It certainly was not “vital”. He overstated the case which his speech writers allowed to creep in. When the President calls a situation “vital” one minute and then pulls the Marines out the next, it takes some explaining.

The trips around the United States were very interesting for me because I found out that even in the hinterlands, there are news-hounds and foreign affairs “groupies” and organization which are fascinated by and interested in what is going on in the world around them. In the last couple of decades, cable television has reached these areas, even though it has not yet arrived in all parts of Washington, DC The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal can be bought in the newsstand in every little hamlet in all parts of the US People are far better informed than they were thirty years ago and consequently far more interested. I remember that in a community in Idaho I met people in their Foreign Affairs Council meeting who were leading demonstrations against transport of nuclear weapons and the deployment of ATLAS or MINUTEMAN missile squadron to their area. So I was involved in a major public affairs exercise along with other people. It was the biggest one-man show that the Department's Public Affairs Bureau had ever attempted since Vietnam.

Q: Were you followed by speakers who took the opposite point of view and that you were therefore caught over and over again in the same kind of debate?

DRAPER: No. At that time, there were people who were actually affected by the so-called “Vietnam syndrome”. They were afraid that we would get caught in another series of quagmires and wanted the US to stay aloof as much as possible. But the Middle East was far different from other American interventions. Most people recognized why the Middle East was important. The memories of the oil embargoes were still very fresh. Terrorism had struck a cord in the American psyche. The Palestinians had been making a better

case for their cause. So there was great interest in the Middle East with many differing opinions. There was an obvious yearning for greater clarity in the Reagan administration's policy; that came through in many ways. There was also a strong predisposition to support Reagan.

This was the time when the US recovery from a recession was very strong. You could almost see the attitudinal changes taking place right before your eyes. Very interesting.

Q: After that public affairs assignment, what did you do?

DRAPER: I worked with the Board of Examiners for about nine months. But even during this period, the Public Affairs people would call me for some special projects; I did some special projects for other areas of the Department as well.

Q: What did you think of the recruitment process?

DRAPER: There are a lot of problems with it. We were getting a very high caliber officer into the ranks, both male and female, but we still are short of minority candidates if we are to make the Foreign Service more representative. We made some changes in the process. Recruitment has always been one the Department's weakest areas. Other agencies fan out and set up networks of college professors; for some reasons, the Department has never done it effectively. It has never spent money on advertising; people have not gone to campuses and spent days, not hours, talking to the kinds of candidates the Foreign Service needed. Some of the recruitment material would have been satisfactory for an early 20th Century organization, but it was not adequate in the real world. The Department does not get the results it wants. It always gets the cream of the crop of law schools or the Ivy League schools or the Dukes, UCLAs or Stanfords of this world; it does very well on the East and West Coasts in some of the older and well-endowed institutions because students there know how to network—they know what is going on. But when the Department sends brochures and announcements to places like Utah, Georgia—which are perfectly respectable universities—but their bulletin boards are smothered with

announcements from dozens of other institutions. The Department should emulate what CIA and other institutions do and that is cultivate a network of professors and mentors on campuses. That takes time and money; it takes follow-up. I had a fellow examiner who spent a lot of time with successful candidates, following up after the examination, to keep them from getting discouraged. The recruitment process is weak, but there are other real problems. The time between the test and appointment into the Foreign Service sometimes is two or more years. People get discouraged. Also the character of the potential officers is changing; the average young person today in his or her '20s is thinking of a three career life. One with the government, then in private enterprise and then something else. That is not unusual. They will not give you that long thirty year commitment; they are more like the military and its “twenty-year” men. There are people of course who will make that long range commitment, but they are not as predominant as they were two generations ago. So there are a lot of weaknesses in the system; the caliber of some of the Department's examiners is not as high as it should be. Some of them have not themselves gone through the entrance examination; that is disappointing. Some of them are very conservative people who have long ingrained prejudices which come out in various ways. Oddly enough, I found that women examiners are a lot tougher on female candidates than their male counterparts.

Some of the examiners the Department has today, 1991, have never gone through the tough examination process that the candidates have experienced. These examiners were transferred in and became Foreign Service officers when they were 35 or 40. Director Generals, like George Vest and Roy Atherton, felt that only the best possible officers be assigned to the Board of Examiners. I must say that the Department has greatly improved in assigning younger officers of middle class ranks and getting greater minority representation; on the whole that has been pretty good. The inclusion of USIA officers has been, on the whole, very positive. But there are a lot of problems, some institutional, including the question that the written test has not produced as many successful female candidates as statistically there should be. Even worst results are obtained in the case

of minorities. The Department has, in response to class action suits by women and court directives, has tilted the screening mechanism to insure that women and minorities have their scores on the written exam adjusted so that the passing levels have a similar relationship to the total applicants as exists for white males. This is not written of the other parts of the examination—the orals, etc. Of course, this is a form of reverse discrimination. In fact, it is very hard to understand why women do not do as well as men in the written exam. Some of us have concluded from the statistics that it may be the result of the university subjects in which they major at the undergraduate level, but after graduate school, males and females have comparable academic credentials and they score about the same in the written exam. It is something about the undergraduate level education that creates a discrepancy.

As far as minorities are concerned, the Department is making some improvements—we have more role models in some cases and the Department is doing relatively well with black women. But it is woefully poor with black males, Asiatics in general and American Indians; Hispanics do a lot better than these latter groups. There is a feeling that if there were a greater number of minority applicants there would be statistically better results. The written test is the big barrier. Minorities and women, the so-called “disadvantaged groups”, do relatively well on the oral exam. Some of us have toyed with the idea of eliminating the written examination altogether; all written examinations are under threat and are being questioned. That is not simply because they seem to ethnically and culturally biased, but because they are not working. If you have to tilt a test, perhaps unfairly, it is hardly worth giving; it may be better to get rid of it and find some other kind of screening mechanism. But other methods are expensive. The test has the advantage of ease of administration and monitoring and of being relatively inexpensive. Top flight American private enterprise organizations use other methods which are far more intense, including personal interviews by top people in the company. They develop a core of elites through this intense examination process which parallels the department in some respect, but is far faster and much more personal. The Department's examination process is still

highly impersonal partly by design. It is very important that examiners not know whom they are going to see; that is considered important. That means that a second set of examiners have to look at the full record later and check police and security records, evaluations, etc. before the final decision is made. All the parts of the process are the result of compromises, but the present initial oral examination is about as objective as can be made. The time between passage of the examination and the appointment must be shortened to six or seven months as compared to the present two years. That requires that the written test be followed by an oral examination on a separate day. On that day, however, the successful candidates after the oral are also interviewed by a member of the Board of Examiners in a personal interview. The Department will also require that all the candidates do all of the paper work in advance as much as possible so that no time is lost in initiating security clearances. There is a lot of documentation required, including and autobiographical statement. But you win a little and lose a little; the Department can start the security processing quicker this way, but it has also found that minorities do not complete the paper work as others, so that some candidates are lost that way.

Q: After your tour with the Board of Examiners, you were assigned to Jerusalem as Consul General from 1986 to 1988. Could you explain the uniqueness of our representation in Jerusalem and what you responsibilities were?

DRAPER: Jerusalem in unusual in many different ways. From the American diplomatic aspect, it is unique because the US has never recognized the status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. We have always maintained, going back to 1948, that its final status should be decided within the context of a peace treaty. Consequently, we have a mission in Jerusalem which is not subordinate to our Embassy in Tel Aviv and which is only nominally recognized by the Israeli. There is no real parallel except maybe for Honk Kong which reports directly back to Washington rather than London or Beijing. The Mission in Jerusalem reports directly to Washington, although in the real world. any Consul General would be stupid to ignore the American Ambassador in Tel Aviv. There has to be close coordination. This scheme of representation gives the United States considerable leeway

in that the Consul General has relationships of sorts with the Israeli authorities—very tenuous with the Defense Ministry—but satisfactory with the Foreign Ministry and others. At the same time, the people in the occupied territories see the C.G. staff as officials they can talk to and who might be potential intermediaries, as protectors, as people who follow human rights policies. There are many American citizens in the West Bank and Gaza; they see the American passport as an entry into a better life. Our consular staff is overwhelmed all the time by the Palestinians seeing entry into the United States to work, to study—there are an enormous number of students who apply for study visas. Then there are a vast number of Israelis who want to visit the United States; there is a very sizeable group of ultra-religious, ultra-conservatives Jews who came originally from Eastern United States —Brooklyn, New Jersey, etc—who settled in Jerusalem, but maintain their American citizenship; some of them at least do not recognize the secular State of Israel and do not want to acknowledge its existence by becoming one of its citizens. There is a growing population in Israel and in Jerusalem so that you can see on any given day in the consular section a handful of American tourists in polyester and shorts and a vast number of Palestinians dressed in everything from business suits to tribal costumes and Israelis wearing their traditional costumes—fur hats, etc—with full beards with lots of children. It is tough duty; we reject many Palestinian visa applications if we suspect that the visitors might become permanent residents in the US It is also a painful process for Israelis who are accustomed, after having spent two or three years in the army, to travel around the world for a year before they return to their jobs or schools; we have to turn down some applicants who are suspected of seeking an excuse to go to the United States to get their “green card” or otherwise stay in the US beyond the visa time limitation. We have to observe our laws and consular regulations. This leads to considerable friction and a lot of pressure on the part of powerful people—politicians, educators, etc. It is a human problem.

While I was in Jerusalem, I spent vast energies in promoting more contacts between Israelis and Arabs, particularly those who were politically acute who had been unwilling to talk to each other over the years. I held a number of quasi-secret meetings—lunch

or dinners at my house, where people could come inconspicuously to meet others. One of the big problems is that so many Israelis and Arabs have never had such things as a sensible conversation with each other. There was always a great divide. When Israel first occupied the territories in 1967, the Israelis walked and marched and were bussed through the territories, but gradually, as the hostilities of the Arab population increased, fewer and fewer Israelis visited the territories. In 1986, when I arrived, I found that in fact the “Green Line” had been reestablished. Of course a lot of people still went into Israel and the territories, but it was very common to find Israelis who had never talked to an Arab in their lives and vice-versa. So I was trying to introduce and encourage many of the Palestinian nationalists to meet with certain Israelis, and not just the peaceniks. I encouraged the Palestinian militant to talk to the Israeli militants at my house or in other places. My success was uneven, to put it mildly, but at least there was a process. I made it a habit that all my social functions at my house would have a mixed Arab-Israeli guest list as much as possible, trying to find a concept that might be unifying. I remember we had an American ballet company, we had guest conductors and sometimes we could get Israelis and Arabs together in that kind of setting which was non-political and non-threatening. We couldn't do it in other ways. The Fourth of July party always had a mixed group from all sectors. Some people refused to come because they didn't want to talk to other groups. Particularly in 1986, we had a lot of interesting episodes. I spent a lot of time on this “exchange” program and there were some fruitful outcomes. It didn't always work well; in one case, two strong Palestinian Liberation Organization supporters carried on talks with a junior member of the Beirut branch of the Likud coalition, which was in power at the time. They came out with a manifesto of sorts which was quite moderate and pragmatic. Likud conservatives spanked the young politician for having that conversation, not to mention co-authoring a manifesto with Arabs. Then there were other such events.

There were other problems. The Palestinians can be pretty exasperating. As Abba Eban, the former Israeli Foreign Minister said one time, the Palestinians never lose an opportunity to lose an opportunity. It was very much rolling half up the hill, only to

roll all the way to the bottom. Even my most pragmatic friends with whom I discussed the problem as recently as this past February knew that the Palestinian support of the Iraqis after their invasion of Kuwait, but the Palestinian “main-stream” including the most conservative and the most pragmatic, tended to see Saddam Hussein in a light which differed from that of the rest of the world. They are so frustrated.

We did some things for them in the early '80s. We had a modest economic assistance program which was doing a lot of good work, including then establishment of an Arab owned bank in the territories, which was an essential ingredient. Few Americans, even including officials, recognize the economic death-grip around the territories, particularly in Gaza. These people are doubly frustrated because they can't sell what they produce and they can't farm what they want. These restriction exists sometimes for practical reasons, such as the shortage of water, but people who grow vegetables, fruits, melons, nuts on the West Bank could have found a market in Jordan and in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but were constrained not only by Israeli regulations, but also by Arab indifference and Arab road blocks or those set up by their competitors. A West Bank truck, loaded with fresh grapes, would cross, after paying an enormous fee to the Israelis, the River Jordan to Amman only to find that the farmers and businessmen there would see to it that the truck stayed in customs for three or four days until the fruit had rotted. It was a continuous series of frustrations for the Palestinians in the territories. The Israelis would not let them compete and in fact gained considerable revenue from the taxes on the trade that the Palestinians conducted. But it wax a “Catch 22” arrangement and some of our assistance programs were designed to overcome this. We introduced new animal husbandry techniques, better irrigation facilities, better sanitation, better medical facilities, etc. But the day to day life of people who were subjected to these constant economic and social frustrations and who had to deal with the Israeli bureaucracy which is unbelievable was just a major burden.

Q: What causes the Israeli bureaucratic problem?

DRAPER: I don't know why the bureaucracy is so complicated in Israel. It parallels the French bureaucracy, but the French at least have learned over centuries how to deal with it. But Israel, for example, it might take as long as six months to obtain a driver's license. The applicant has to pass a series of examinations; he has to take required courses by a fly-by-night outfit in some cases; and it is accompanied by implicit, if not explicit, bribery to facilitate the process. It is very painful. In many countries of the world it is difficult to get such things as telephones because of the shortage of equipment or technicians or other logistical problems. But in Israel, many of the obstacles are institutionalized. From a social point of view, one of the major problems is the extensive housing development, but the inability to complete a house in a reasonable period of time. Once all the licenses and approvals are obtained, it may take two and half years to build a house, which might take six months in the US. A house in the US can go up in two or three months with landscaping—and it has to be done that quickly if the builder is not to lose his financial shirt. In Israel I have seen homes that were unfinished after two years. Of course, there are different styles and materials, but that doesn't really explain the gap. It is a very serious problem. It means that, just as in the Soviet Union, young people who want to get married have to live with his or her parents in a small apartment, with all the complications that this arrangement generates. It is a serious social problem. When people don't get married when they are young, there are fewer children and that is a concern to the state.

There are a lot of problems of this kind. When the average Israeli needs six months to get a driver's license, imagine how long it takes a Palestinian who in addition to everything else has to undergo the scrutiny of the police and security authorities who could be very arbitrary if they suspect the applicant of being a secret member of the PLO or sympathizer or a person who could communicate with the PLO; they might just refuse to grant permission for a driver's license altogether. It is not the harsh part of the occupation—the night visits and some of the humiliation which are visited on the Palestinians (although those are very important to the Arab psyche)—but the day-to-day living experiences can be pretty bad for people unfamiliar with that kind of bureaucracy

and its complications. The Arab businessman who needs capital has to go through a lot of complications and has to borrow money from Israeli institutions at very high rates of interest. It is very difficult.

Q: You mentioned humiliations visited on the Palestinians. What kind were they?

DRAPER: Just going through check-points all the time; seeing Israeli troops moving into villages; the attitudes of some of the Israeli soldiers towards the Arabs; the feeling of being a second-class person. These things don't apply to all; you have to give the Israelis credit. Many Israelis soldiers are reservists—every Israeli has to serve three weeks every year until they reach 55—who after having served in the territories, come home and write for their newspapers about the horrors of serving in the territories—about the things they didn't like. Many hate that duty; it is very difficult to be in a occupation army. We discovered that ourselves. While I was there, the Intifada began on a major scale. The Israelis still haven't learned how to deal with it effectively—I am not sure that anybody really could. It is a very difficult thing to do. The average Israeli soldier does not like to carry out a policy of repression, doesn't like to fire guns at kids throwing stones, but he doesn't have much choice. It is pretty exasperating.

Unfortunately, 1986 was a transitional period that might have led to something and didn't. Today, it has just gotten worst; it has degenerated greatly since 1988, partly because of the Iraqi policies and the ostensible support that the Palestinians in the occupied territories and in Jordan gave Saddam Hussein. It now will be much more difficult for the Israelis to compromise. The peaceniks in Israel—"The Peace Now" movement, for example—are in disarray and much weaker and less interested in making a deal with the Arabs. Israelis who a few years ago were willing to give up territory—parts of the west Bank and Gaza—no longer feel that way, in part because of their experience with the SCUD missiles from Iraq. They want territorial depth. They are also very unhappy with the Palestinians who were so eager to support Saddam Hussein.

Q: Have the changes in demographics in Israel played a role in this new attitude? Is not today's Israel different from the one we perceived decades ago when the European Jews were predominant?

DRAPER: I think that is true. The dominant forces in the creation of Israel, going back to the beginning of the century, were Ashkenazis—European Jews—from Russia, Poland, Germany. They dominated up to 1948 when Israel was established. Ashkenazi leaders —the Ben Gurions, etc—were in the Labor Party at the time; they had migrated to the kibbutz and had fostered pro-Zionist sentiment. During the founding of the new state, however, many of the so called oriental Jews were brought into Israel from Morocco, Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, India—all over. Their birthrate was higher and their attitudes were more Middle Eastern in many ways—their synagogue is different in appearance, for example and so is their ritual. They have gotten to the point where they are now the dominant element numerically in Israel and that has changed the culture. I first visited Israel in 1958 and the differences are considerable. The music you hear in the streets emanating from cafes and restaurants is very Arabic in nature. In fact, a lot of the so called oriental Jews grew up primarily in an Arabic-speaking culture—Morocco and Yemen especially. They never lost their affinity for that culture. The Jews from Morocco tended to know Arabic and French much better than Hebrew, which they only learned after arriving in Israel. Unfortunately, in Israel's early days, there were great biases directed against the “orientals” by the Europeans to the point that as late as 1970, there were no “oriental” Jews among the top fighter pilots in the Israeli Air Force. All this began to change in 1977, as the “oriental” Jews became increasingly important. Begin, an Ashkenazi, reached out to the “oriental” Jews to gain their support which made it possible for him and his party to win elections after having been out in the wilderness for a long time. In 1958, when I first visited Israel, I was a guest in an Ashkenazi home and they referred to “them”—the “oriental' Jews. There were considerable racial undertones in their comments as if the “orientals” were all second class people. In more recent years, inter-marriages have broken down the barriers and it is clear that the “oriental” Jews are now getting an

education which is at least the equivalent of that received by the European Jews. Now the “orientals” are really the balance of force. The Labor Party, which was the home of the Ashkenazis and the Zionists, is no longer in a position to gain a numerical majority, even with its alliances, in the Knesset. The “oriental” Jews tend to be more anti-Arab, are much less willing to be accommodating with the Arab states. They tend to be more conservative religiously although that varies considerably in specific instances. That has effected all kinds of things in the Israeli body politic, including the explosive issue of religion—for example, the definition of what is a Jew. So Israeli life has really changed since its founding, but it has made it in some ways more lively. Israel, in 1991, is much more democratic culturally than it was in 1958 because of the inter-marriages and the co-mingling of various parts of society. An “oriental” Jew from Yemen can succeed in society just as well as his European colleague.

Q: The Palestinian at one time was considered the merchants of the Middle East—shrewd trader—who was interested in education and self-improvement. That drive seems to have atrophied.

DRAPER: I don't think so. The Palestinians at the turn of the century were not considered at the top of the heap by other Arabs. Through the years, starting even before the establishment of Israel, they tended to respond to the Jewish challenge and emulated certain attributes such as respect for education. Therefore, today Palestinians whether living in Kuwait or Jordan or the West Bank tend to have a very high degree of education. They want it. They also tend to be travelers—people who go abroad to seek success and have found it. They migrate the way the more aggressive Chinese did. Today, the Palestinians are considered pretty strong in the sense that they have responded very effectively to the Israeli challenge. It has in fact brought them up to the level where the Lebanese have been all along—excellent traders with a great respect for education.
I remember years ago being in a typical Palestinian home in Amman, Jordan, visiting friends; their children were not allowed to watch television after five o'clock in the

afternoon; they had to do their homework. They would sit down at the dining room table or where they could and go to work until 10 when they went to bed. It was very interesting.

Q: When you were in Jerusalem, who was the Ambassador and were there any particular problems?

DRAPER: None what so ever. Tom Pickering was the Ambassador. He and I had been good friends for many, many years. We did have problems with an American citizen of Palestinian origin who was a pacifist; he wanted to generate a genuine pacifist movement, a passive resistance to the occupation. It drove the Israelis up the wall. We tended to think that the Israelis tend to overreact to these kinds of activities. They were very upset by another Palestinian, who was not an American citizen, who published an Arab newspaper in Hebrew in an effort to show the Jewish community that there were moderate Palestinians. The Israelis did everything they could to stop distribution of this paper—harmless as it was. There were other incidents of this kind.

It is very difficult to be Consul General in Jerusalem because if you stop just beyond a certain line, the Israeli will consider you and tell you and publicize you as being anti-Israeli or worst, anti-Jewish. The Arabs do the same. You have to walk down a very narrow path. You can stay out of trouble by never saying anything or doing anything, but if you want to encourage interchanges and to know people and if you want to show the flag in different quarters, you have to take risks and can get into a lot of trouble. My wife was criticized the first week we were there by both Arabs and Israelis; so we knew she was doing something right. But you do antagonize people and that has its reverberations. I remember making a sarcastic remark about Meir Kahane, an American born rabbi who headed the Jewish Defense League which supported the expulsion of Palestinians from the territories. I found him repulsive and I told that to a Jewish American group that was visiting; I received scores of letters of complaint to me, to the Department, to the White House. I was always in that kind of trouble. I escaped some of it because Teddy Kollek, the Mayor of Jerusalem, defended me vigorously before the members of the Jewish

American community. But it was a hard task. I was criticized by the Jordanian government for some of the positions I had taken, mainly because the Jordanians wanted more jurisdiction over our modest economic assistance program. The American employees of the Consulate General were also laboring under impressions left by previous generations of Foreign Service officers. Congressmen would come on visits and sort of automatically expected that the Consulate General's employees would tilt irreversibly toward the Arab side. That was very hard on junior officers. As I mentioned before during our discussion of UN forces, American officers tend to sympathize with the “under-dog”. The Palestinians are the “under-dogs”. Some of that creeps into your views, but you can't afford to let that bias your reporting.

Q: Did you have seminars with your officers?

DRAPER: Yes, of course. These biases work both ways. We couldn't fantasize the Israelis as people who turned the deserts into gardens. You have to be objective as possible, although it is very difficult. We tried to handle this in various ways, by making sure that we had bonding with both sides. The Chief of our Political section, who spoke beautiful Hebrew and beautiful Arabic, was one of the people who emulated my example and brought Arabs and Israelis together. So we had ways to bridge the gaps. Many Israeli organizations took the initiative and invited our staff to see their kibbutzims or their organizations. We were particularly interested in organizations on both sides that tried to hold out a hand to the other side.

There was another not-too-well understood factor of living in Jerusalem. There were certain people who sought to be stationed there for reasons that weren't so imperative, including religious reasons. So there were some Americans in the organization that were fine people who did excellent work, but had come to Jerusalem for cultural or religious reasons. That is a major factor; you could be an atheist in Jerusalem and yet you would have to affected by being at the well-springs of major monotheistic religions—Islam, Judaism, Christianity. There are many parts of Jerusalem that look the same today as they

did 2,500 years ago—absent the television aerials. You can easily see the marks the many invaders have left, going back to Chadians to the Mamelukes, the Turks, the Jews, the British, etc. It is one of the most fascinating and attractive cities of the world because of the interplay of history.

Q: How would an officer with strong religious views be affected by an assignment to Jerusalem?

DRAPER: We had Jewish officers there, including one who was very exposed because he was the chief of the Consular Section. It never hurt his performance or the attitude that the Arabs had towards him. They regarded him as a very tough individual, but they thought he was fair. They didn't think that he made decisions on the basis of his Jewish heritage. That didn't work with everybody. It worked with this officer because he made such an effort because he made a conscious attempt to have a mixed of national employees, both Jewish and Palestinians.

We were improving our language capacity all the time; our junior staff was very good. Often they had had Arabic training before they got to Jerusalem and then they studied Hebrew while they were there and used it. I didn't see on the staff any very militant Christian, but had there been one, it could have effected his performance. I am speaking theoretically because many of the fundamentalist Christian groups in the US are vigorous supporters of Israel, partly because they believe in a literal interpretation of the Bible, which includes designation of the Jews as the “Chosen People”. I used to tease my Israeli friends by pointing out to them that they were getting such strong support from Southern Baptist groups; I said that the reason was that when Judgment Day came they expected the Jews and their supporters to be chosen. I can only speak to the question of the effect of personal religious convictions on a Foreign Service officer from a theoretical point of view. I do think that a person in the Jerusalem Consulate General has to watch out very carefully for the hidden agendas that some people have. In Jerusalem, there are inter-racial tensions, compounded by inter-religious differences. In the C.G., among our national

employees, we had Israeli Jews, we had Israeli Arabs, we had Palestinians of various denominations. When one person died, who was an Armenian, the Armenian Patriarch called and said that he had a number of candidates that we should consider for what he called the “Armenian slot” in the American mission. So we had pressures of that kind.

Q: Did you feel that there was an Israeli intelligence officer among your staff?

DRAPER: We had to fire one person that we were pretty sure was a de facto Israeli agent; on the other hand, there were a couple of Arab employees that we were sure were passing along everything they could to their clandestine organization. But a lot of this doesn't matter. We used to speak on the phone in the hopes that the intelligence service would pick it up. We did that for our own purposes. There was only one case where we had a problem and that resulted in the discharge of the employee, as I mentioned earlier. It was complicated because not only was there an Israeli angle to it, but there was also a third country angle.

We had the usual other problems sometimes compounded by the need of people to get along with each other, but who were jealous about other's promotions. We had an inspection at the end of 1986 or the beginning of 1987 which was very useful. In the inspection group was a wise old consular officer who looked at our rather large consular establishment which was doing more business than Tel Aviv with only about half the staff. This inspector suggested that we should have a greater hierarchy—more leaders, sub-leaders, etc. We were concerned about doing this because it inevitably an Armenian might come out ahead of a Roman Catholic or Jew ahead of a Palestinian. But we wanted to make the section work better. The logical answer was a more hierarchal answer in rank, specialization and duties; we had one Chief and a lot of Indians. This inspector had served in Canada and Belgium where friction between religious and ethnic groups was very much a problem. He convinced us that we could restructure; we followed his advice and did so, with good results, even though the jealously arose. We handled it in the public relations

way by telling all that the rivalries were negated by the advancement opportunities that the new organizational structure provided.

There were other complications resulting from wars and invasions, including that our old-time employees—people who had been with us before 1967—claimed exemption from Israeli income taxes by the virtue of their Jordanian citizenship, which theoretically made them still subject to Jordanian law. Oddly enough, Israel applied Jordanian as well as British mandate law to the territories as well as some part of Israeli law. Even to this day, I expect that there are pressures on these employees to pay Israeli income taxes. On the other side, Israeli citizens who were clearly subject to income taxes insisted all along that they be paid in cash and not by check so that the income paper trail is not so clear. This is something that virtually every Israeli citizens wants done; otherwise he would be wiped out by income taxes were the rates are 70 percent or more. The inspectors looked at our financial system both in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. We used some common arrangements. They pointed out that up to one half of our manpower could be saved by switching from a cash to a check basis. The head of the Israeli national employees immediately made it clear that every Israeli would walk out of the C.G. and out the Embassy in Tel Aviv if we switched systems. So here was a situation where the US could have increased efficiency and saved money, but was limited by local customs. Finally we worked out a system by which the Israeli citizens hired a retired employee, who would keep the books. The checks were sent to him and he would then pay the employees in cash; it required this fellow to spend ten to fourteen days in the Embassy and the C.G. to make the system work.

Q: There is a point of view in Washington which believes that everything reported from American officials in Israel ends up sooner rather than later in the Israeli Foreign Ministry and on Capitol Hill. Is there any truth to this?

DRAPER: It was a factor that inhibited some people from declaring forthrightly what they wanted to say. I made it very clear to our reporting officers that we had to bend over backwards to appear objective. That meant use of “code” words and the tone of objectivity

had to be clear. That however should not stop them from stating forthrightly what was happening. In some areas as human rights violations, we had to be accurate. We couldn't say that three houses had been demolished last night at 12 a.m. when in fact it had been four at 1 a.m. We had to describe our sources; we tried to follow as much as possible the newspaper rules that there be at least two sources to verify a story. It was kind of interesting, but we got very little flack and our reporting was held up as a model around the world. Actually the C.G. was chosen as one of the ten best missions inspected that year and our reporting was ranked as highly as possible. When you think a bout “code” words, it is very easy for things to creep in—all too easily. For example, we reported very assiduously about how people were arrested. In a series of reports, we showed that Israeli prosecutors had a 100 percent record of convictions in military courts. That is not possible statistically. These arrests included Palestinians and American citizens. One citizen was arrested because he happened to be on the fringes of a riot in Rammullah; he was brought before the Israeli authorities and even the violation citation contradicted the testimony in court. We had a full record of the proceedings. The prosecution didn't have any basis in law even to charge the defendant. The judge took secret testimony from an “intelligence” source which was customary in Israeli courts and then came out and handed down a sentence on the American citizen. It was a trumped up case, but the judge tried to mitigate by not giving a sentence even though he found the defended guilty. So the American citizen was not actually harmed except that a sentence appeared on his record. We had many cases like this which clearly showed that the Israeli establishment was not willing to admit that it could be occasionally wrong or that in some cases it did not have adequate evidence. Our reports were very strong and aroused considerable controversy in Washington—so much so that our then assistant secretary for Human Rights—Dick Schifter—came out and talked to me privately about the nature of our civil right complaints. I was able to show him that we were being extra careful in our conclusions and in reporting the facts so that others could draw their own conclusions. Finally, he agreed to some degree. It was a tricky issue because the mission in Jerusalem in the past had gone a little overboard without adequate facts. That had been remembered by many people, including

me. But we didn't get too much flak about it; our human rights submission was so carefully done that the real battle occurred in Washington on the question of how much of our reporting to include in the final report. The Israelis were very upset when the report came out and blamed us quite a bit for it, but not as much as I though they would. The Israeli press was tolerant. I had many interviews with the Israeli media and was very outspoken about such matters as the Jewish lobby in the United States, about the need for objective reporting by the Consulate General, about the need to portray a balanced picture—some of which helped us, some didn't—, but they got a straight story from us.

I had a situation in which one of the most distinguished, successful and revered attorneys in Israel, whose pro-Zionist sentiments could never be challenged in any way, told me once in great confidence about his disappointments with the Israeli judicial system. He described what he called its corrupt nature starting from 1947-48 and up to the present. He confessed that he had gotten to the point where he no longer went into a courtroom willingly because he was so disgusted by the corruption of the system. This was a conversation worth reporting to Washington, but I could not identify him by name because I had to anticipate that this would become known to quarters that might try to get even with him and that might even try to ruin his reputation unfairly. Besides, his story was given to me in confidence. There are cases like this where we had to report the substance, but not divulge the source. That does weaken the report to some extent, just like a newspaper column that quotes “unnamed sources” is sometime suspect. But by identifying the source too closely, it would have been harmful and perhaps dangerous So there were cases where we didn't change the thrust of the report, but we did not divulge the sources. That was done for both Palestinians and Israelis.

Q: On the question of corruption, what kind was he referring to?

DRAPER: He was particularly unhappy with the appointment of judges, beginning in 1977 with Begin's assumption of power. He and his party had been out in the political wilderness since the formation of the state; therefore he had to find jobs for his followers. Many were

put into the senior ranks of the Civil Service and the Labor Party incumbent was pushed out. My lawyer friend pointed out that many of the judges appointed by the Likud Party had no knowledge of the law; they were appointed for political reasons. It was getting worst. At the beginning at least these new judges tried to get help from lawyers and law students, but by the time I was there, not even that much was being done. He confirmed to us that the military courts were even worst; they had, as I mentioned, a 100 percent conviction record because of their willingness to use essentially illegal or unethical methods to make their point—"we have secret evidence that shows, etc". So the lawyer was very unhappy; he had great respect with what Israel had originally tried to do with the law—a system much of it based on British mandatory civil law, which incorporated the Judaic laws and customs. He was very proud of what had been done. he had been educated in England and had been a member of the bar—Queen's Council—he had very high standards and felt very strongly about the problems.

We often run into charges of corruption of this once clean and wonderful society. One friend of mine had been a young man in Palestine before the formation of Israel and lived in a Jewish community in Tel Aviv. He said that there, even with all the frictions, people left their doors open and that there was very little crime. After Israel became a state, a police force had to be set up which very few Jews had ever willingly joined under the British mandate. Suddenly, there were crime waves which had been unheard of before. Jews became crime lords for the first time in this little idyllic Zionist-inspired community. All of a sudden, all the vices of the world descended on them almost overnight. I saw this even in the '70s or '80s when Israel was essentially a non-consumer of narcotics, although hashish and other drugs were easily available. Very few Israelis ever used drugs and rank only very modestly. Much of that change although Israelis by and large do not drink very much alcohol; it is not a major problem, but the use of drugs has exploded in Israel in part because of the partial occupation of Lebanon starting in 1978. The drug smuggling trade has moved in part across Israel in route to Egypt and other places. The country has

changed. The drug use is a problem, not to the extent we have in the US, but is it pretty significant for a society that never had this problem before.

Q: Did you feel that there was ever a disinformation campaign, not only against you, but also against our Consulate General in Jerusalem?

DRAPER: Yes, but I had some historic perspective on this because I had watched the efforts to discredit the mission going back to late ''50s. I recall that in 1981 it was the first time that an Israeli Foreign Ministry official showed up at the C.G., wishing to see me when I was working on the withdrawal of the Israeli from the Sinai. As part of that effort, we had to talk to Israeli officials in our offices which were in the Consulate General. It was the first time that an Israeli official walked through those doors because of the prohibitions that had existed until then. When I became the Consul General, I knew the whole Israeli Cabinet and most of the top officials in the army from my previous incarnations and therefore was able to invite some Israeli officials to my house that had never been there before because they had been prohibited from visiting the American compound. There are still prohibition against Foreign Ministry people and certain others like Mossad intelligence people, but I broke a lot of those barriers when I was assigned to Jerusalem. I saw Israeli Cabinet officials and politicians regularly; so the situation has eased. It would not have happened with some of my predecessors; no Israeli official would have been seen in public with the American Consul General except perhaps at a party. We also reduced some of our foolishness. We used to be very strict about officials visiting Jerusalem and not being in the company of Israelis. This got to be ridiculous when it came to someone like Teddy Kollek, the mayor, who wanted to show hospitality. So we altered a lot of rules as well to be more pragmatic. When Vice-President George Bush came, he wanted a lot of photographs showing him in Jerusalem and he was in the company of Kollek who escorted him around. That would not have been possible fifteen years earlier because of our strict regulations of what could be done in Jerusalem. We did not recognize an Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem. There was clear prejudice against us; when I mentioned that I was the Consul

General, it was quite clear that both the staff and I were viewed as automatically as anti-Israeli. That went with the position.

Q: Did you deal with Palestinian leaders? You were, I believe, not permitted to deal with the PLO.

DRAPER: We tried to deal with everybody across the board including the super militants. Many of the Palestinians would not talk to any of us. When the Intifada began, much of the leadership switched to the hands of young people—17, 18.19, 20 year olds. Very, very few of them would come out of the woodwork to talk to us—very few. They were in the forefront of University students who were viciously anti-American. They were also very difficult to communicate with any young person in a refugee camp. Very few of the so-called refugees live in camps; most live in towns and villages. It was almost impossible to get to the people in the camps. It was very difficult to get to the real hot-heads in Gaza —which was both in and outside of the C.G.'s district. Ambassador Pickering and I had an arrangement; we often visited Gaza together to see particularly some of the old time politicians. I went to Gaza to talk to the people there, but most of the contact work there was done by the Embassy staff. That was an arbitrary arrangement which helped our consular problem. We had quite a few economic assistance projects in Gaza which were managed out of Jerusalem, so that we had to go there periodically. Some of the non-governmental organizations—the charitable organizations—operated in both areas so that we had to be contact for that reason. But we had a working arrangement with Tel Aviv and the coverage of Gaza was not a problem.

The other group that was almost impossible to deal with was the militant Muslim faction, with a few exceptions. That great Chief of the Political Section that I mentioned before had made real inroads with some of the relatively youthful mullahs—the non-traditional Moslem clerics—in various parts of the territories. I made a sort of a break-through with the Grand Mufti who for the first time ever paid a call on me in my residence in Israeli Jerusalem. It was the first time he had ever crossed the “green” line. But it was very hard to get into

that Muslim faction. We had an insight in what was happening because people in contact with these groups would report to us what was going on. We used the newspapers, the media, the journalists who had a comradery with these groups. We didn't ask whether someone was a PLO or PLPF (The Palestinian Liberation Popular Front) agent.We had one problem with the Mayor of Nablus who was assassinated the day after he had dinner with me. I was on lists of assassination targets, made by a couple of the extremist groups —one being George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—, which effected my security. The situation was comparable in some ways to countries where we have a very difficult time being in contact with the young rebellious elements to the extent we would like to. For example, it was somewhat comparable to Turkey in 1970 when I was there; we didn't have clue about what the young university students were thinking or doing. Otherwise, the average Palestinian is a real talker and finds it difficult not have an exchange even with the “evil Americans”. So we were able to keep our fingers on the pulse, except for those two groups.

Faisal Husseni, who is now the leader of the Palestinian group who seems to be in dutch now with Secretary Baker and others, was a difficult man; he didn't want to ruin his militant credentials by seeing Americans, but we were able to be in touch with him, but we had to be careful about his own security and his own credibility. We had to be careful about being seen with persons who were in trouble with their own people. The Mayor of Bethlehem was a good example. He was considered as an “Uncle Tom” by a lot of the Palestinians and then when Americans would show up at his house regularly that added to his woes. Sometimes that increased the threats on his life.

Q: What about AIPAC (American-Israeli Political Action Committee)? Did they visit you and view you as an agent for the enemy?

DRAPER: I don't think so. I was friendly with most of the AIPAC leadership and many of their major contributors because of my previous position as Deputy Assistant Secretary. The President of AIPAC and others when they came to Jerusalem would get in touch

with me and we would speak very frankly to each other about what was going on. AIPAC is pretty professional; I was more concerned about people who were not so and were much more amorphous and super sympathetic to Israel, but not so knowledgeable about the Israeli domestic scene. Or people who had a load of prejudices. The people who were really venomous were the followers of Rabbi Meir Kahane; some I refused to have anything to do with. One was the publisher of a newsletter which was poisonous, vicious and racist. He wanted an interview with me and I didn't want to give him even that much respectability. That caused me a certain amount of problems among certain Israeli loyalists, but not the main-stream Jewish community.

Q: Were you asked to present the Palestinian side to American Jewish groups that visited Jerusalem?

DRAPER: No, not for that purpose, but I did make presentations to these groups; they wanted to know what was going on—how the Arabs felt, about the human rights situation, etc. I would tell them. Many first time visitors to the United States, after seeing Disneyland, want to go find militant blacks. So we had many American Jews coming who wanted to talk face-to-face with one of the opponents of Israel; they wanted to see one of those "killers". I mentioned that I had briefed a Jewish group during which I had criticized Meir Kahane in very graphic terms; I thought most of the people there were pretty sophisticated and not particularly secular, but I did get some of the group very upset because of my criticism of the rabbi. I called him "irrelevant" and that really bothered some. The person who was particularly concerned was a very secular minded Jewish businessman from Philadelphia. So you never know. If you criticize a Jew, you are liable to be called anti-Semitic.

Q: While you were Consul General between 1986 and 1988, the Intifada began. How did it look to you at the time?

DRAPER: I recently have reviewed an interview I had given at the time. I pointed out at the time that we had been tracing a rise in tensions, measured statistically by number of incidents, violence, etc that had taken place in the previous two years. There was unquestionably a steady increase. We had been predicting for some time in our reporting that there would be an explosion. I also said in that interview that after the predicted explosion, the situation would stabilize but at a higher level of tensions than before. Frankly, we were a little surprised at the endurance of the Intifada. It was beginning to resemble what had happened between 1936 and 1939 when the Arabs rose en masse against the British and the Jews.

The uprising was well covered by the media. It took the form of demonstrations and rock throwing, fires, etc. by kids in grammar school and junior high school equivalent and high school. We watched fires and the closing of streets in part of Arab Jerusalem by young people 15, 16 and 17 years old. They got into big trucks and walked up alleys, etc. It was the young people who were taking charge at the beginning. Part of what was done at the beginning was the closing of shops by the merchants. There was a total boycott of business activity for certain hours, weeks and days which was only relaxed for the purchase of food stuffs and other necessities. There were boycotts against Israeli manufactured goods. Some of this was happening spontaneously in school yards where things like this always happen. The middle aged traditional leaders were dying to get a grip on the uprising. They didn't know what to do. The PLO was very slow to react; it didn't know what was going on. In fact, it is always slow; when something did happen in the occupied territories, it took it a week to make up its mind what to do. If a university were closed, there be no reaction from the PLO for four or five days; then it would come down on it. The PLO surrogates in the territories didn't have anything to say initially about the Intifada; I know because I was talking to them. Finally the PLO sort of embraced it and then the main stream PLO leadership in the territories also came along, after a week or two. The young people were quite clever; they were natural leaders—some better than their elders. These young people came from everywhere—private schools, camps, etc.

the camps were more obvious because the troops would enter the camps more often for confrontations. The troops were told to tear down Palestinian flags; they would look at a refugee camp which was mostly a slum and they would see these flags and go after them. That is what created the major part of the confrontations. But there were just as many in private schools, religious schools—many were run by Christian organizations—and there was just as much uproar there as in the camps. The camps were simply more conspicuous because the troops were there and some are on main roads and intersections and the demonstrations could cause real problems for entryway. In Nablus, there are two main refugee camps which straddle the two main highways leading into the city from the East and North-South. The troops had to something just to keep the traffic flowing. Our mission cars were stoned regularly going through the gauntlet. These areas were point of confrontation, but the Intifada was very wide spread. It could be found in all sorts of places. The press told all kinds of great stories of what was going on because at times they would go into dead ends or little villages and find people who were shouting for the Intifada, particularly when they found out that the stranger was a newspaper man. There were a lot of narrow escapes. The resentment was very wide spread.

One very clever man that I knew—rich middle class who owned a business—, who might be called a PLO moderate said that he got very excited about what was going on. He thought the real stimulus came a few weeks before the Intifada broke out when a Palestinian guerrilla team from Southern Lebanon had entered Israel and had attacked an Israeli army camp with only indifferent success—they killed a few Israelis, but the guerrillas were also killed. This man said that as a Palestinian, he felt proud of these people because they were young, had never lived in Palestine and they had risked their lives and most importantly had attacked Israeli military targets instead of schools or other civilian targets. He always felt embarrassed when the Palestinians only seemed interested in terrorism—bombs in city markets, killing school children, etc. For the first time, they had attacked Israeli soldiers. This was a team that was airborne—kites or balloons or

whatever. He was very proud of that incident and felt that had helped to spark the Intifada because it showed that Palestinians were willing to die fighting Israeli soldiers.

Anybody who was familiar with the territories knew that something would blow. We didn't know how high it would blow. We in the Consulate General in Jerusalem were far more concerned about some nuts who might set fires or try to destroy some of the Islamic monuments, like the Mosque on the Temple Mount. We knew what had happened in 1968-69 when riots broke out all over the Islamic world if they thought Americans had anything to do with what had happened. We were always concerned with that kind of reaction. The real Jewish “crazies” tend to be from the United States. There is still a group, mainly of American born Jews, who do not recognize Israel as a secular state who have a Yeshiva—a religious school—yards away from the Temple Mount, Sherif, what the Arabs call the “noble enclosure”. We were more worried about that possibility than a massive Palestinian uprising.

I think the Israelis were taken by surprise; their standard techniques of intimidation and control did not work, so they resorted to actions which drew vast criticism and justly so. They ordered the troops to break arms and legs and to beat up people. The Israelis have found it very difficult to get a handle on the Intifada; it is very difficult to know what to do when 8 year olds throw stones at you; it is very difficult for anyone to make war on children. One Israeli police officer described to me once a situation in which the police had to control a riot by the super-ultra-conservative groups in Israel, which came mainly from Brooklyn. The policeman told me about coming up against one of these bearded men of 60—very venerable, scholarly—and a person with very little physical strength because he spent most of his life behind a desk, studying. The policeman had quashed the riot, but found it personally difficult to move against this gentleman, because he looked so much like his own grandfather. So it was very difficult for young Israeli soldiers, even if they despises Arabs, to make war on children. They didn't know what to do and they still don't.

Q: Was your staff covering these uprisings and were they effected by what they saw?

DRAPER: In the two years I was in Jerusalem, there were quite few riots and disturbances of various kinds and killings. Our officers would cover these events to try to see if they could get in contact with various leaders to get a feel for what was happening. We had some success with that. We always got copies of the handbills; we monitored the media to see what the two populations were being told and what effect that might have on their attitudes. We knew the major trends and could describe those. But we did not go to see a riot for a riot's sake. Some visitors were interested in seeing some of the action. We had one Congressman who wanted to see some stone throwing. That somewhat upset me. One of our officers took him to the outskirts of a refugee camp in the company of the UNRA officials. Sure enough, some of the school children started throwing stones at an Israeli patrol that went by. One thing led to another and the Israelis threw back tear gas. The Congressman got a good look at what was going on, but that I had to tell him later that we were not in the tourist business for this sort of thing; it wasn't worth it and took too many of our resources and that I didn't want our junior officers out looking for trouble. I am familiar with the process in the United States. If you want to get attention, you can manipulate a press attendance at an event; we did in Jerusalem get wind of a lot of upcoming incidents because the media was being notified by the perpetrators.

The Israelis, particularly Teddy Kollek, the Mayor of Jerusalem, did a lot of things to head off problems and to forestall events that might have gotten out of hand. He was trying to keep peace in Jerusalem; he instructed his municipal police on what they could and could not do and they were much better than the Israeli army at controlling disturbances. For a long time, Jerusalem was fairly quiet, besides the occasional stabbing. Many of the problems could be forestalled by not allowing or keeping control of religious demonstrations. For example, once a year, there were groups of Israelis who thought they had a right to visit Temple Mount; that can be done if you are very careful and you warn the Arabs that it would happen. Teddy would often let me know what was going on to see whether we could help in various ways. There are always people who want to exploit tense situations. Riots can easily get out of control, especially in the Temple Mount-Harash el

Sherif area because there are loud speakers all over the area. It is has been a custom for the Mufti and others to shout over the speaker if there is any perceived danger. Before you know it, there are tens of thousands of people running to defended the Holy places as the Mufti has encouraged them to do; they drop whatever they are doing and are all running for one spot. It could have been a very innocent situation or a modest problem; when the police force armed with only a few shotguns watch thousands of people carrying knives rushing into their vicinity, it gets kind of nervous.

Q: What was your impression of Arafat's leadership in the 1986-88 period?

DRAPER: There were a few pictures of him around, but it wasn't much. Arafat had a lot influence; there is no question of that, but he was losing it with the younger people and the Muslim militants. His strength was in the refugee camps among people who didn't move out of the camps. There is a division in the Palestinian movement; there are some Palestinians who are in effect willing to forget going back to Haifa or any part of Israel proper and are willing to take the West Bank and Gaza and be satisfied with that. The other group who insist on returning to the same spots where they lived in 1947 and will never be happy until that happens. Too much time has passed for the latter group. Arafat, until about a year ago, always took the line that the Palestinians had to return to where they lived in 1947 and had to recover all the land they lived on then or at least he was ambivalent on the issue. A lot of the people who supported Arafat did so because at least he had not given up to returning to their former towns and settlements. On the other hand, the pragmatists, who wanted to make a deal with Israel would have been satisfied with East Jerusalem and the west Bank and Gaza. So there were always those tensions between the two groups. There were some of Arafat's deputies, including the ones that were assassinated in the last two years, let the word out that they wanted to destroy Israel. The pragmatists and those who finally got Arafat to move a little in his position were those who were willing to make a deal with Israel. But they did not have the charismatic quality that Arafat had. From an American point of view, that is of course mystifying because we don't see Arafat a charismatic; to me he looks like a druggist in Jerusalem. But he

had a fatherly, avuncular quality; he has been a survivor—he has good luck; he has his tail dragging, but it is still waggling; he has gone through a lot of difficult situations. He is called the “old man” in an affectionate way by his cohorts and by the masses. The trouble with the Palestinians is that if they didn't have the PLO, they would have to invent it. They haven't been politically sufficiently aware to make a difference. There is no home-grown movement in the territories; it is easier for them to owe quasi-allegiance to Arafat and the PLO, now stationed in Tunis, then to organize themselves. And why is that? Because the Palestinians themselves are balkanized—Christian Palestinians against Moslem Palestinians, people from Hebron against those others. These tensions are endemic. Even in municipal elections, families counts; it is a very traditional, old fashioned society and very tribal. People in the South end like Hebron are very conservative—no liquor, no beer. It is like Saudi Arabia—super conservative. On the other hand, 75 miles to the North, it is just the opposite. The Palestinians are very fragmented and they do not have any sense of unity. When we used to get together Palestinian groups to meet with Secretary Shultz or others, it was very difficult to get a group of less than fifteen because otherwise you couldn't represent all the Palestinian factions. Many of the ordinary Palestinians looked down on the refugees, especially those who lived in camps. In fact, some Palestinians felt that anyone who came to live in one of the West Bank cities after 1949, he was just a refugee and was not one of them. There were those splits. These tensions explain why the people in the territories have never been able to organize anything for themselves; they could never agree on their own leadership.

A start was made some years ago, with our encouragement, when there were free elections for Mayors of towns and cities. Some of the winners were strong critics of Israel —in fact, they were all strong critics—, but most were pragmatists and not radicals. But the Israelis couldn't even tolerate the moderates; so they expelled many of them, including one who is now the main PLO representative in Amman, who is about as moderate as one can get, but the Israeli have no tolerance for that kind of opposition and did not allow home-grown development of Palestinian leadership. The Israelis are now paying the

consequences of that misguided policy; there are no leaders in the territories. The Israelis would argue that if the leadership had existed, the Intifada would have been much worst; they may be right.

Q: What happened to you after your tour in Jerusalem?

DRAPER: After my return to Washington, I did some short term assignments, such as a study of security problems in rehabilitating Embassy buildings abroad. That was partly related to the question of what we should do about our Embassy in Moscow. And I did some other studies. Then I retired.

Q: From your long time perspective, what do you see as the future of Israel and Palestine?

DRAPER: First of all, I agree with an Israeli journalist, who is a friend, that despite the changes in Israel's culture and politics and despite the fact that a lot of the elan has gone out of the Israeli national esprit, Israel will somehow prevail and survive the threat. A few years ago, I wasn't quite so sure, but I feel more strongly about that prediction today. As far as the resolution of the Arab-Israeli problem, I am pessimistic, but I am not despairing. I am intrigued by some of the signals coming out of the Middle East now—the hints that Syria might possibly make a deal with Israel, the desire of many countries to get on the good side of the United States. I believe that we never had a better opportunity to make some progress since the 1973 War in part because of this magnificent coalition the US put together against Iraq and in part because of our spectacular military success and in part because the Russians are no longer a major negative feature and in fact are cooperating to a certain extent with the United States. They are not acting as a rival or as an opponent, for the time being. Finally, the opportunity exists because George Bush probably has another five years in office. It is a virtual certainty that he will be re-elected in 1992; so there won't be the same problem that arose in 1979-80 when President Carter was unwilling to put his prestige on the line for another major effort of the kind that had exhausted him earlier when the Egypt-Israeli treaty was negotiated and signed. We won't

have the same problem we had at the end of the Reagan administration when Secretary of State Shultz was trying to do something, but the President was then a “lame duck” and wasn't putting any enthusiasm behind his Secretary's efforts. So there are a lot of features at the present which will be helpful assuming that we want to push. Also on the positive side, there are some Israelis who are embarrassed by the negative stance that Shamir and others have been taking for all these years; they would like to find a second best arrangement that would still protect Israeli security. On the other hand, there are more deep seeded negative feelings and features than we have seen for several years, including the wide spread support by the Palestinians throughout the world for Saddam Hussein. One of the consequences of the Iraqi SCUD missiles attacks on Israel was to heighten the Israeli feelings of vulnerability against future hostile attacks on their little, narrow country. This feeling is spread throughout the population; it can not be ignored. The Israelis took modest casualties, but there was a lot of damage, including the strengthening of the feeling of insecurity. After all, if the Iraqis had managed to put poison gas or atomic or germ warheads on the missiles, there would have far greater panic than there was with very serious consequences. That makes the Israelis want the depth; they don't want to be decompressed into a smaller country. That makes it very difficult for those Israelis who a few years ago were willing to trade “land for peace” with the Arabs; they no longer have the influence and their own enthusiasm has waned. It will be very difficult for any intermediator such as the United States, but we are stuck in the Middle East and it would be shameful if we did not press our advantage, such as it is. Even during this last week, we established refugee camps for the Kurds in North-west Iraq and that is a remarkable development. What are we getting into and how soon can we get out? We made a major morale commitment to doing something about the Middle East and that is not something that can be ignored. We should not forget that the emotions aroused by the Kurds' plight, as communicated to European and Americans, caused turns in our policy while similar disasters in the Sudan and Africa have not had the same results.

So I think it will be more difficult to deal with the substantive positions than it has been, but it will be easier to deal with the procedural situations. The Israelis are now willing to talk about the possibility of a regional conference, perhaps they are not that concerned about the Russians anymore. This would not have been possible a few years ago. The problem is permanent though for us in one sense; we always had the problem of how to arrange the substantive aspects of the Arab-Israeli problem—the procedural obstacles and problems we face getting there and combining these all with the American and Israeli domestic political problems. It is a very complicated approach. We have been talking about this during the last week at the Institute for Peace; one of things that we all agree on is that the Arabs by and large have regarded procedural matters as a means of protecting their substantive positions; Americans have often looked at procedural issues—where to hold the conference, how to organize it, etc—as a way through which substantive positions of one or more of the parties can be changed, which is a very ambitious concept. But let's face it; there will never be the kind of peace and stability that we need unless the substantive positions of all the parties change to some degree. Ambassador Hart, who is a pretty savvy guy, said to me once that, with reference to Yemen in the early '60s after the Egyptians had invaded the country, if we can leave things alone in Yemen, they will eventually come out with some kind of workable solution which will allow them to live with the Saudis and maybe shirk off the Egyptians, but it will be very untidy and messy solution which we Americans and other Westerns will never understand; but Arabs can sometime put something together like that, however illogical. I think ultimately something like that will have to be developed in the Middle East because it is a society in an area which we Americans do not really understand very well—we have a feel for it, but no real deep understanding. It is basically a bazaar and the parties will have to work out an arrangement in the same way they reach a selling and buying price by haggling. If we forget that it is a bazaar and try to approach the resolution as if it werea labor dispute in Detroit, it will not be worked out. We will have to encourage the process at least through the haggling.

Q: Thank you very much for a very interesting interview.

End of interview